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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal of the order of the Third Circuit Court, 
Salt Lake County, denying the motion of Defendant/Appellee Fibro 
("Fibro") to set aside a default judgment. This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 78-2a-3(d), Utah Code. See also, 
Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Did the Court abuse its discretion in not setting aside 
the default judgement? 
Law Summary: A court's discretion must be balanced. Maxfield 
v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237, 238 (Utah App. 1989). To clamp a 
judgment rigidly and irrevocably on a party without a hearing is 
obviously a harsh and oppressive thing. Mayhew v. Standard 
Gilsonite Co., 376 P. 2d 951 (Utah 1962)}. No one has an 
inalienable right or constitutional right to a default judgment 
without a hearing on the merits, and the courts, in the interest of 
justice and fair play, favor, where possible, a full and complete 
opportunity for a hearing on the merits. Heathman v. Fabian and 
Clendenin, 377 P.2d 189, 190 (Utah 1962). 
Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion. Maxfield v. 
v 
Rushton, 779 P.2d 237, 238 (Utah App. 1989) 
B. Did the Court err as a matter of law in not setting aside 
the default judgement? 
Law Summary. Default judgments are not favored by the court 
nor are they in the interest of justice and fair play. Heathman v. 
Fabian and Clendenin, 377 P.2d 189, 190 (Utah 1962). 
Standard of Review: Correction of error standard. Reliance 
Insurance v. Utah Department of Transportation, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. 
14, 15 (S. Ct. August 16, 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
The determinative authorities are included in the Appendices, 
and are therefore not set forth verbatim here. Of particular help 
in determining this appeal, however, is Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. It provides: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court may in furtherance of justice 
relieve a party or his legal representative 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding 
for the following reasons: 
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; 
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due 
diligence could not have been discovered in 
time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b) ; 
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or 
vi 
other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an 
action has not been personally served upon the 
defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the 
defendant has failed to appear in said action; 
(5) the judgment is void; 
(6) the judgment has been satisfied, 
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment 
upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application; or 
(7) any other reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the judgment. 
The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), 
or (4) , not more than 3 months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or 
taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) 
does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not 
limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside 
a judgment for fraud upon the court. The 
procedure for obtaining any relief from a 
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of Case* 
This appeal is a request that this Court reverse the April 6, 
1993 order of the Honorable Michael L. Hutchings, Third Circuit 
Court, Salt Lake County. That order denied Fibro's motion to set 
vii 
aside a $9,000 default judgment. The judgment was the result of 
the complaint of Plaintiff/ Appellant Edwin Guyon ("Guyon"), a Salt 
Lake attorney, claiming Fibro owed him attorney fees. 
b. Course of Proceedings and Disposition at Trial Level. 
The procedural history is as follows: 
* The four paragraph complaint (R. 1) was filed November 25, 
1992. R. 1, Appendix A. 
* On November 28, 1992 Fibro was served with the complaint 
and summons, by service upon its trustee, Donald Pickett. R. 2. 
* On December 29, 1992 a default judgment was entered against 
Fibro for the full amount prayed for. R. 5, ,Appendix B.1 
* On February 17, 1993, Guyon sent a Notice of Judgment. R. 
6, Appendix C. In addition to being sent late, this Notice of 
Judgment was false, in that it stated that the judgment includes 
costs of court and "interest at the highest legal rate." Id. 
* Also on February 17th, Guyon filed his Affidavit of Costs. 
R. 7, Appendix D. 
1
 The proposed judgment as submitted was improper, since it" 
purported to award "costs of court" without specifying an amount or 
submitting a Bill of Costs, and since it provided for interest at 
"the highest legal rate" from a date almost ten months previous. 
However, instead of refusing to sign the proposed judgment, Judge 
Hutchings simply lined out the offensive provisions. R. 5, 
Appendix G. 
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c Disposition at Trial Level. 
* On February 25, 1993 Fibro filed its motion to set aside 
the default judgment, R. 9. That document was mailed on February 
23rd- Id. 
* On April 6, 1993 Judge Hutchings denied Fibro,s motion to 
set aside the judgment. This is the order appealed from here. R. 
56, Appendix E. 
* This appeal was filed on April 29, 1993. R. 57. 
* Fibro filed a Supersedeas Bond to stay execution on the 
judgment on May 20, 1993. R. 61-95. 
d. Statement of Relevant Facts. 
1. Plaintiff and appellee Edwin Guyon is an attorney 
practicing in Salt Lake County. Defendant and appellant Fibro 
Trust is a Utah trust. 
2. The action underlying this appeal is a suit for attorney 
fees which Guyon claims are owed to him by defendant Fibro. R. 18-
11-14, 21. 
3. Guyon was hired to handle various matters for Fibro, 
including an action to recover stock held in Fibro's name and 
converted by another company. R. 11-12. 
4. In the fall of 1992 the parties were involved in a dispute 
ix 
over the alleged unpaid attorney fees. Id. 
5. Fibro claims that it was overcharged by Guyon, that Guyon 
violated the fee agreement and that he malpracticed in his work on 
Fibro's behalf.2 Consequently, Fibro believes it owes little or 
nothing to Guyon, and that he actually owes money to Fibro in the 
form of a refund of overpayment, as well as for damages, due to 
professional negligence.3 R. 11-12. 
6. In the midst of the dispute, Guyon withdrew as Fibro's 
attorney on November 12, 1992. R. 2. 
7. The next day (November 13) Guyon wrote a letter to Fibro, 
in which he purported to withhold Fibro's files in two ongoing 
cases until he was paid in full the amount he claimed (and Fibro 
disputed) as attorney fees. R. 18, Appendix F. 
8. Despite the fee dispute, and in order to gain access for 
its new counsel to its files in the ongoing cases, Fibro paid $500 
to Guyon in November. R. 20, Appendix F. 
9. Between November 13 and November 20, Fibro tried several 
times to reach Guyon to discuss the dispute, but its calls were not 
2
 As a result of the default judgment, the dispute between the 
parties has never been presented to or determined by a court. 
3
 Fibro was required to hire other attorneys at considerable 
expense to redo much of the work Guyon had accomplished. In one 
instance, Fibro believes that if Guyon had promptly completed his 
work, he could have collected money from one of its debtors, which 
has since become insolvent. 
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returned. R. 21, Appendix G. 
10. Guyon did, however, in his November 13 demand letter, 
threaten legal action, giving Fibro until November 25, 1992 to pay. 
R. 20, Appendix A. 
11. On November 20 a Fibro agent responded by letter to Guyon 
expressing concern that its calls were not returned. R. 12, 21, 
24, Appendix H. That letter stated that the parties had 
misunderstandings to clear up, that the parties needed to speak, 
and that any lawsuit filed before such a communication would be a 
waste of time and expense. Id. 
12. Guyon continued not to speak with Fibro or its agents and 
on November 25, 1992, filed pro se the lawsuit underlying this 
appeal, in the form of a four paragraph complaint seeking a 
judgment of $8,279.88. R. 1, Appendix A. 
13. The complaint was filed at 12:22 p.m. on November 25, 
even though Guyon had (in writing) given Fibro through that date to 
satisfy his demands. R. 1, Appendix A. 
14. Guyon sued Fibro less than two weeks after withdrawing as 
its attorney. R. 13.4 
15. On November 28, 1992 Fibro was served with the complaint 
4
 Fibro's Factual Background section of its Memorandum 
Supporting Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment (R. 11-14) were 
verified by affidavit. R. 47-48. 
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and summons, by service upon its trustee, Donald Pickett, Re 2, 3, 
13. 
16. Under normal circumstances service upon Trustee Pickett 
would be entirely appropriate, and would have adequately notified 
Fibro of the pending action and its need to defend. However, Mr. 
Pickett's health, apparently exacerbated by a breakdown in 
communication, resulted in a failure to file a timely answer. R. 
13-14. 
17. Mr. Pickett's physical and emotional health were poor 
during the critical period between the date Guyon withdrew and the 
due date of the answer. This was due in part to several surgeries 
during 1992, with latest taking place on November 10, 1992, two 
days prior to Guyon quitting as its attorney in several ongoing 
matters.5 Id. 
18. Mr. Pickett's health had been poor for the previous 
several months, and particularly during the latter part of 1992. 
R. 13-14. 
19. In 1991 and early 1992 Pickett had 
a. surgery to remove his gall bladder; 
5
 Until two days after the surgery on its trustee and only 
employee, Fibro had been able to depend on Guyon to protect its 
legal rights and interests. Now, suddenly and a time when Guyon 
was essentially nonfunctional, a defense was needed to an action 
brought by Guyon himself. 
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b. surgery to remove a cancerous prostate; 
c. surgery to repair a hernia; 
d. surgery to replace his deteriorated shoulder• Id. 
20. The shoulder replacement in 1991 was incorrectly 
performed and was unsuccessful. On November 10, 1992 Mr. Pickett 
underwent still another shoulder replacement, requiring 
hospitalization and considerable recovery time. This is the most 
critical medical problem relating to this case.6 Id. 
21. As a result of the health problems, Mr. Pickett was 
unable to adequately manage the affairs of Fibro Trust, including 
this lawsuit, at least from November 10, 1992 until the middle of 
February, 1993.7 
22. Although no formal answer was timely filed, on December 
7, 1992 Pickett and the other Fibro agent8 had a phone conversation 
with Guyon. R. 13-14. 
23. Although that conversation related specifically to this 
6
 As a result of the many health problems, and especially the 
medical errors that necessitated a repeat of the shoulder 
operation, Pickett also suffered from bouts of depression. This 
hampered considerably his ability to properly manage Fibro's 
affairs during the critical last quarter of 1992, when this case 
was not properly defended. 
7
 As Fibro's counsel, Guyon was generally aware of Pickett's 
health, and of the fact that he had no staff to cover for him in 
his absence. 
8
 The agent's name is George Badger. 
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case and the attorney fee claim, and despite the fact that Fibro 
presented a settlement offer, neither Pickett nor the other agent 
recalls any mention by Guyon of a default or judgment. Id. 
24. The phone conversation resulted in a letter and 
settlement offer, contained in a December 8, 1992 letter from Fibro 
to Mr. Guyon. Appendix D. That letter set forth some of the 
defenses and counterclaims Fibro has against Mr. Guyon, and 
therefore constitutes an answer.9 R. 24, Appendix H. It is 
apparent from Fibro's letters (see appendices) that it was under 
the impression that settlement negotiations were occurring, rather 
than a judgment being sought. 
25. On December 2 9, 1992 a default judgment was entered 
against Fibro for the relief Mr. Guyon demanded in the complaint, 
totalling about $9,000. R. 5, Appendix B. 
26. After the default was entered, Guyon waited some six 
weeks, until February 17, 1993, to send a Notice of Judgment. 
Appendix C. The Affidavit of Costs was also not filed until 
February 17th. R. 6-7, Appendix D. 
27. On February 23, 1993, less than a week after Guyon 
informed Fibro of his judgment, Fibro served its motion to set 
aside the default judgment. 
9
 The letter was sent to Guyon well within the twenty day 
period for answering the summons and complaint. 
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28. This motion to set aside was filed only 56 days after the 
judgment• 
29. Both parties briefed the matter, and on April 6, 1993 the 
Honorable Michael Hutchings denied Fibro's motion to set aside the 
judgment. R. 56, Appendix E. 
30. On April 27, 1993 this appeal was filed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Default judgments are not favored, and here there is good 
reason and a timely motion to set it aside. The manner in which 
the judgment was obtained make failure to set it aside error, 
despite the considerable discretion a trial judge has when faced 
with such an issue. Relief from the judgment is appropriate under 
any of three subsections of Rule 60(b) . See 60(b) (1) , (3) and (7) , 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
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ARGUMENT 
1. All of Fibro's facts must be deemed to be true. 
The trial court had the same duty, and should therefore have 
set aside the judgment. Among other things, it remains undisputed 
that: 
* The parties were attorney and client, and have a dispute 
regarding attorney fees. Fibro, the client, has a claim and 
defense of negligence against Mr. Guyon. 
* There were various communications, both in writing and 
orally, which led Fibro to believe no judgment was being sought or 
had been entered. 
* Despite the dispute, Mr. Guyon sued Fibro for over $8,000 
just a few weeks after withdrawing as its attorney. 
* Mr. Guyon gave Fibro through November 25th to respond to his 
demand letter, and yet he filed his complaint around the middle of 
that very day. See Appendices, and especially Appendix F. 
* On November 28, 1992 a summons and complaint were served 
upon Fibro Trust, and default judgment was entered December 29, 
1992. Fibro attacked the judgment a week after learning of it and 
1 
well within the three month period imposed by Rule 60(b), URCPe 
* The fai Lure to timely answer was caused by a communication 
breakdown/unilateral mistake, and by the health problems of Fibro/s 
trustee, Don Picket. See generally R. 11-17. 
2. Rule 60 permits relief from judgment under these circumstances. 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may in the furtherance of justice 
relieve a party . . . from a final judgment . 
. . for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; . 
. . (3) fraud, . . . misrepresentation or 
other misconduct of an adverse party; or (7) 
any other reason justifying relief from the 
operation of the judgment.10 
This case is a clear example of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or 
excusable neglect. And the motion has been brought within three 
months, as required by the rule. Further, as will be pointed out 
below, it is a case of "other misconduct of an adverse party." 
Rule 60(b) (3) , URCP.11 
10
 The complete test of Rule 60, URCP appears above, in the 
section titled Determinative Authorities. 
11
 "For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of 
default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may 
likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b)." 
2 
3* Justice and public policy dictate relief in this instance* 
Under the circumstances, and especially considering that Fibro 
has a meritorious defense, justice will be served only if the 
judgment is set aside and the matter is allowed to be determined on 
its merits. To do otherwise would sanction a windfall, depriving 
Fibro of its defenses and offsets. It would also require a 
separate action against Guyon for his alleged professional 
negligence. In that second action, he might claim that the default 
judgment somehow is res judicata, barring Fibro's claims entirely. 
Judgments by default are not favored by the 
courts nor are they in the interest of justice 
and fair play. No one has an inalienable or 
constitutional right to a judgment by default 
without a hearing on the merits. The courts, 
in the interest of justice and fair play, 
favor, where possible, a full and complete 
opportunity for a hearing on the merits of 
every case. 
Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 14 Utah 2d 60, 377 P.2d 189, 190 
(1962) . 
4. The attorney-client relationship of the parties . 
makes the need to set aside the judgment more compelling. 
Failure to set aside the judgment would appear to sanction or 
even encourage sharp practices by an attorney in dealing with his 
client. Here Guyon represented Fibro in essentially all its legal 
3 
matters, and had filed two ongoing lawsuits. Fibro became 
convinced his fees charged were excessive*12 He suddenly resigned 
as its attorney and withdrew from its cases for perceived 
nonpayment in November, 1992. See generally R. 11-17. He: 
* purported to hold Fibro's case files hostage to force 
payment and waiver of the fee dispute; 
* refused or failed to take or respond to Fibro's phone calls 
from the time of his withdrawal until he had sued his former 
client; 
* generated a written demand for payment, threatening to sue 
if not paid nearly $9,000 in full by a date less than two weeks 
after he ceased being Fibre's attorney; 
* made no attempt to explain or justify his fees or otherwise 
to work out the fee dispute before suing13; 
* went ahead and filed the lawsuit, issued a summons and 
delivered them for service in the middle of the very day through 
which he had given Fibro to pay or be sued; 
12
 Charging excessive fees violates Rule 1.5 of the attorneys' 
rules of conduct. UCJA, Rules of Prof'l. Conduct 1.5(a). 
13
 If explanation and discussion failed to resolve the 
problem, the Utah Bar Association has available the services of its 
Fee Dispute Resolution Committee. "If a procedure has been 
established for resolution of fee disputes, such as an arbitration 
or mediation procedure established by the Bar, the lawyer should 
conscientiously consider submitting to it." UCJA, Rules of Prof'l. 
Conduct 1.5, Official Comment, Disputes over Fees. 
4 
* made no efforts to assist Fibro in obtaining substitute 
counsel for this new case or the pending cases he had filed on 
Fibro's behalf14; 
* engaged this former client in settlement discussions, and 
received a written response (in letter form) to the merits of his 
lawsuit, and yet did nothing to adequately point out that he 
nevertheless intended to seek judgment if no formal answer was 
filed; 
* acted with such haste and aggressiveness in obtaining 
judgment against his former client, despite his knowledge that its 
managing agent was extremely ill at the time; 
* once the judgment was obtained, waited nearly two months 
before informing Fibro that it had been entered. 
Mr. Guyon's conduct in his hasty withdrawal and rush to the 
courthouse to sue his client appear to run quite contrary to 
applicable disciplinary rules.15 Those violations, in addition to 
exacerbating the gravity of the "inadvertence, surprise or 
excusable neglect"16, constitutes "other misconduct of an adverse 
14
 This and Mr. Guyon's other November actions are likely to 
be included in the counterclaim, and as offsets claiming Guyon's 
professional negligence damaged Fibro. 
15
 See footnotes 8 and 9, above. 
16
 Rule 60(b)(1), URCP (emphasis supplied). 
5 
party"17, and provides a solid ffother reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the judgment."18 
5. The Rules of Discipline entitled Fibro 
to better treatment* 
Specifically, an attorney is required to "promptly comply with 
reasonable requests for information." UCJA, Rules of Prof'l. 
Conduct 1.4(a). And he must explain a matter "to the extent 
reasonably necessary to enable the client to make informed 
decisions regarding the representation." Id.19 
An attorney may resign his commission, but only within the 
limits and pursuant to the duties set forth by law, the courts and 
the disciplinary rules. "A lawyer may withdraw from representing 
a client if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse 
effect on the interests of the client . . . ." UCJA, Rules of 
Prof'l. Conduct 1.14(b) (emphasis added). 
Here there was clearly an adverse effect on the client. This 
was caused in part by the attorney himself in his haste to turn the 
17
 Rule 60(b)(3), URCP (emphasis supplied). 
18
 Rule 60(b)(7), URCP (emphasis supplied). 
19
 "A lawyer may not withhold information to serve the 
lawyer's own interest or convenience." UCJA, Rules of Prof'l. 
Conduct 1.4, Official Comment, Withholding Information. 
6 
attorney-client relationship into a creditor-judgment debtor 
relationship. The rest was caused by Pickett7s illness. 
An attorney can certainly sue a former client, but he may not 
be allowed to unexpectedly withdraw and immediately sue, taking 
advantage of what he knows about the client (e.g. that its managing 
agent is seriously ill or that he is the attorney to whom the 
client has looked for legal protection up until days earlier) to 
get a quick judgment but not on the merits.20 
Rule 1.14, supra, actually discusses more specifically what an 
attorney may and may not do if he is not being paid (though it 
should be borne in mind that Fibro denies the fees were even owed) : 
A lawyer may withdraw from representing a 
client if . . . . 
The client fails substantially to fulfill an 
obligation to the lawyer regarding the 
lawyer's services and has been given 
reasonable warning that the lawyer will 
withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled . 
• • • 
UCJA, Rules of Prof'l. Conduct 1.14(b)(4) (emphasis added). 
Clearly reasonable warning was not given, so the withdrawal was 
improper and the client was left "high and dry". 
But the rules go even further: 
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer 
20
 "Information acquired by the lawyer in the course of 
representing.a client may not subsequently be used by the lawyer to 
the disadvantage of the client." UCJA, Rules of Prof'l. Conduct 
1.9, Official Comment. 
7 
shall take steps to the extent reasonably 
practicable to protect a clientfs interests, 
such as giving reasonable notice to the 
client, allowing time for employment of other 
counsel, surrounding papers and property to 
which the client is entitled and refunding any 
. . . fee that has not been earned. A lawyer 
may retain papers relating to the client to 
the extent permitted by other law. 
UCJA, Rules of Prof'l. Conduct 1.14(d) (emphasis added). 
Here, when he withdrew, Mr. Guyon failed to take appropriate 
steps to protect Fibro/s interests. He failed to give reasonable 
notice and certainly did not allow time for employment of 
substitute counsel. In fact, the events suggest that he may have 
rushed the matter precisely to avoid new counsel becoming involved. 
Finally, in order to force full payment and avoid having to deal 
with the dispute, he threatened to withhold papers necessary for 
Fibro to pursue its other lawsuits. 
Fibro suggests that when the withdrawal is done in order to 
sue the former client immediately for fees, the attorney should be 
held to an even higher standard than usual, or at least that the 
rules of conduct should be strictly construed against him.21 
Withdrawing and suing presents an inherent conflict of 
21 "Even if the lawyer has been unfairly discharged by the 
client, a lawyer must take all reasonable steps to mitigate the 
consequences to the client.11 UCJA, Rules of Prof7!. Conduct 1*14, 
Official Comment, Assisting the Client Upon Withdrawal (emphasis 
added). The rules on withdrawal are expressly incorporated by 
reference by Rule 4-506(1), UCJA. 
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interest, especially when, as here, the attorney sues the client 
pro se. 
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client 
in a matter shall not thereafter 
[r]epresent another person in the same or a 
substantially factually related matter in 
which the person's interests are materially 
adverse to the interests of the former client 
UCJA, Rules of Prof'1. Conduct 1.9(a). Suing the former client pro 
se seems to violate at least the letter of this rule. 
The applicability of rule 1.9 cannot be carried to an 
illogical extreme22, but at very least it must require special care 
by the lawyer and scrutiny by the courts if the former withdraws 
then sues pro se. 
6. Guyon has shown no prejudice, and would suffer none. 
It is worth noting that here, where the plaintiff has 
represented himself23, there are no wasted attorney fees or costs to 
consider in granting Fibro its relief. In fact, neither side was 
represented by counsel in this case until after the judgment was 
rendered. In the trial court he made no showing that he would be 
22
 Read literally, Rule 1.9 would seem to make it impossible 
for an attorney ever to sue a former client, particularly as a pro 
se plaintiff. 
23
 Since , a corporation cannot represent itself, Fibro did 
not have the luxury of representing itself. So if anything, it 
is prejudiced by any favorable treatment given to Mr. Guyon. 
9. 
prejudiced by having to present his case at trial, subjecting it to 
Fibrous defenses, offsets and counterclaims. Nor can he make any 
such showing here. 
Unlike many cases where a judgment is attacked, the factual 
events, evidence and witnesses here are less than a year old and 
are still relatively fresh. 
7. The law favors relief from a default. 
Despite their broad discretion, the courts are generally 
required to be indulgent toward permitting full inquiry into 
disputes, so they can be settled advisedly and in conformity with 
law and justice. Mayhew v. Standard Gilsonite Co., 376 P.2d 951 
(Utah 1962) . 
To clamp a judgment rigidly and irrevocably on 
a party without a hearing is obviously a harsh 
and oppressive thing. It is fundamental in 
our system of justice that each party to a 
controversy should be afforded an opportunity 
to present his side of the case. For that 
reason it is quite uniformly regarded as an 
abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a 
default judgment where there is reasonable 
justification or excuse for the Defendant's 
failure to appear, and timely application is 
made to set it aside. 
Id., 376 P.2d at 952 (footnotes omitted). 
Where there is any reasonable excuse offered by the defaulting 
party, courts generally tend to favor granting relief from the 
10 
default judgment unless to do so would result in substantial 
injustice to the adverse party. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co, v. 
Paul W. Larsen Contractor, 544 P. 2d 876 (Utah 1975) . Here there is 
good reason for relief. Again, since the debt is still only a few 
months old, there cannot possibly be any prejudice to Mr. Guyon if 
the judgment is set aside. 
The Court should set aside the judgment, and allow Fibro to 
defend itself and counterclaim. Those defenses and claims include 
breach of contract/prior breach, professional negligence accounting 
and overcharge (both on an hourly basis and as to time spent and 
work performed) . Fibro has had to hire new counsel to remedy 
problems created by Mr. Guyon's representation, and its rights have 
been prejudiced. 
Discovery as to the • fees charged and work done will be 
required before the matter can be intelligently evaluated for 
settlement, much less for trial. The reasons to set aside the 
judgment are almost overwhelming. The Guyon billings contained in 
the record are quite broad and generalized in nature. The amount 
of time spent on miscellany and the like cry out for discovery and, 
if necessary, determination by a tribunal. 
In Cottonwood Mall v. Sine, 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 19 (March 
31, 1992), the attorney fee award was reversed, because, like here, 
there was insufficient specificity in the billings. Sine pointed 
11 
out that an attorney fee award "must be based on the evidence and 
supported by findings of fact." Id. The requesting party "has the 
burden of presenting evidence sufficient to support an award." 
Like here, the plaintiff in Sine provided only very general 
summaries of activities and hours spent. The Supreme Court stated: 
Except in the most simple cases, the evidence 
should include the hours spent on the case, 
the hourly rate or rates charged for those 
hours, and usual and customary rates for such 
work. 
Id. The Sine court ruled that discovery should have been allowed 
on the reasonableness of attorney fees, even though judgment and 
entitlement to attorney fees had already been affirmed on appeal. 
In opposing at the trial court Fibro's effort to get relief 
from its default, Guyon simply argued why he believes the fees are 
owed. He did not, however, show any reason why the facts sworn to 
on behalf of Fibro do not constitute "(1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise or excusable neglect; . . . (3) . . . other misconduct by 
an adverse party . . . or (7) any other reason justifying relief 
from the operation of the judgment." Rule 60(b), URCP. Nor is 
there any doubt that the motion was timely. 
8. Fibro has a meritorious defense. 
Mr. Guyon erroneously argued to the trial court that a 
meritorious defense must be shown, and that Fibro had not shown 
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one. Actually, Fibro has shown a meritorious defense. And the 
case law cited to by Mr. Guyon is not good law. It is rarely 
necessary to show a meritorious defense in order to be awarded 
relief from a judgment. It is not appropriate to even consider the 
issue. See, Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984). 
9. Improper procedure and errors in the judgment make 
relief from the judgment all the more compelling. 
There have been other errors and procedural improprieties, 
which only serve to provide further reasons for relief from the 
improper judgment. Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. It 
provides in part: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court may in furtherance of justice 
relieve a party or his legal representative 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding 
for the following reasons: 
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; 
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due 
diligence could not have been discovered in 
time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b) ; 
(3) fraud . . . or other misconduct of an 
adverse party; 
(5) the judgment is void; 
• or, 
(7) any other reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the judgment. 
Rule 60(b) is broad enough to cover most any problem. The 
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following sections point out the other irregularities, errors and 
procedural problems.24 
10. The Notice of Judgment was false-
Notice of judgment must be given promptly upon entry. Rule 
58A(d), URCP. Here, however, the Notice of Judgment was false. 
See Appendix C. It incorrectly stated that the judgment included 
"costs of court" and "interest at the highest legal rate". The 
judgment contained no such items, and in fact has never been 
amended to include them. 
11. The Notice of Judgment was late. 
Notice of Judgment was not given until February 17, 1993, some 
six weeks after entry of judgment. R. 7, Appendix C. However, the 
applicable rule provides: 
The prevailing party shall promptly given notice of the 
signing or entry of judgment to all other parties and 
shall file proof of service of such notice with the clerk 
of the court. However, the time for filing a notice of 
appeal is not affected by the notice requirement of this 
24
 Defects that are perhaps not worth a section in the main 
body of this brief include failure to include Mr. Guyon's state bar 
number on any pleading in violation of Rule 10(a) , URCP, and use of 
illegible, poor quality print and paper in violation of Rule 9(d) 
and failure to use a two inch margin. Id. Also, failure of the 
default judgment to include the "last known address of the judgment 
debtor". Rule 4-505(6), UCJA. 
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provision. 
Rule 58A(d) , URCP (emphasis supplied)25. 
While Rule 58A(d) specifies that failure to give prompt notice 
does not affect the appeal time, it is silent as to what effect it 
might have on the filing of a motion for relief from the judgment 
itself. Here the motion was timely, but failure to follow the 
mandatory and clear language of the rule makes the judgment suspect 
and susceptible to attack. 
Failure to give the Rule 58A(d) notice does not by itself 
affect the validity of the judgment. Workman v. Nagle 
Construction, Inc., 802 P.2d 749, 751 (Utah App. 1990). 
Rather, while noncompliance with those rules does not 
bring about the automatic invalidity of an entered 
judgment, it is a weighty factor in determining the 
timeliness of later challenges to the judgment under Utah 
R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5) through (7). 
Workman, supra, 802 P. 2d at 751.26 Fibro suggests that it may also 
be a weighty factor in evaluating the merits of a timely motion for 
relief. 
25
 The requirement of a Notice of Judgment is clearly applied 
to default judgments, as stressed by Rule 55(a) (1), URCP, and Rule 
4-504(4), UCJA ("Upon entry of judgment, notice of such judgment 
shall be served upon the opposing party and proof of the service 
shall be filed with the court.ff) 
26
 See also, Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. D. T. 
Southern Properties, 838 P.2d 672, 675 (Utah App. 1992). 
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12. The Memorandum of Costs was also late. 
As noted earlier, the Judgment by Default as submitted 
included "costs of court" without specifying them. Judge Hutchings 
crossed out that language, however. Then in the notice of 
judgment, it was falsely represented that the judgment included 
"costs of court [and] interest at the highest legal rate from 
February 14, 1992." Compare Appendices B and C. 
Guyon filed a document titled Affidavit of Costs, but again 
did not do so until six weeks after the judgment. R. 7-8, Appendix 
7. The applicable rule provides, however, that: 
The party who claims his costs must within five days 
after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party 
against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of 
the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the 
action, and file with the court a like memorandum thereof 
duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the 
items are correct, and that the disbursements have been 
necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. . . . 
Rule 54(d)(2), URCP (emphasis supplied). Here the Affidavit of 
Costs does not qualify as a Memorandum of Costs in compliance with 
Rule 54(d)(2). Not only was it not filed within the five day 
limitation period, but it also failed to state that "to affiant's 
knowledge the items are correct" or that "the disbursements have 
been necessarily incurred in the action . . . .if That language 
appears to be as mandatory as the five day limit under Rule 
54(d)(2), URCP. 
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It should be emphasized again, that while any of the defects 
alone might or might not make the judgment void, collectively they 
constitute "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect", 
"misconduct of an adverse party", a "void" judgment or "any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Rule 
60(b)(1), (3), (5) and (7). 
13. The Judgment awards more than double the proper interest. 
As mentioned above the proposed judgment contained an award of 
interest at the "highest legal rate from February 14, 1992". The 
trial judge lined that portion out, but awarded judgment relating 
back to that February date at the rate of ten percent. R. 5, 
Appendix B. However, Guyon's own billings in the record (R. 19-2 0, 
Appendix F, and R. 31-44) show that even this is way off in various 
ways: 
a. Most of the billing was for dates later than February 14, 
so charging interest from that date (either at the "highest legal 
rate" or even at ten percent) is gross error at best. In fact, it 
appears that only $2,439.55 of the debt was outstanding by February 
14, 1992. 
b. The interest charged fails to give credit for payments 
made. R. 20. 
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Ce Interest is charged beyond the legal rate. And yet there 
is no contract so providing attached to the complaint. Rather than 
ten percent for prejudgment interest, Guyon has billed for interest 
and received judgment thereon in the amount of one percent per 
month. R. 5, 18-2 0, Appendices B and F. 
d. Interest is included twice. The one percent per month 
rate is applied in Guyon's billings, and the resulting $8,279.88 
sued for includes that interest« Then the judgment includes by its 
terms an additional ten percent interest from February 14, 1992 
through the date of the December judgment. R. 5. This error 
resulted from the fact that Guyon prepared the proposed judgment 
that way, and in fact sued upon that full amount, which already 
included interest, as if it was the principal amount owed for 
attorney fees. Complaint, Appendix A, R. I.27 
14. The judgment includes improper charges. 
In addition to the above, it includes attorney fees charged 
twice for preparing the Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel, R. 19, 20, 
Appendix F. He charged twice for withdrawing from the same case 
27
 These errors may also bring into play Rule 60(a), URCP, 
allowing for corrections in judgments for clerical errors. This 
can even be done during appeal, but only with leave of this Court. 
However, if the judgment must be reopened and corrected, it should 
simply be set aside for plenary disposition on the merits. 
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(Eames). Id. It includes several entries that include the 
description "miscellaneous". Id. Some of those are not even 
narrowed to a specific date, but rather are designated as being 
incurred "7/6/92 to 11/13/92". R. 19, 20. The exact same 
description, with the same number of hours down to the exact tenth, 
were charged to Fibro for each of two different cases. 
Yet without setting aside the default judgment, Fibro has no 
opportunity to test and challenge the reasonableness of those 
entries.28 
CONCLUSION 
All Fibro seeks is its day in court, and due process requires 
as much. See, Utah Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 11; United States 
Constitution, Amendment XIV. The judgment stems from both Fibro's 
excusable neglect and from Mr. Guyon's questionable conduct, and 
his own vague communications, implying settlement discussions 
despite his simultaneous effort to get judgment. It should have 
been set aside. 
28
 Strangely, while admitting that his original fee 
arrangement with Fibro was to charge $100 per hour, R. 25, Guy on 
states that if there was not timely payment, billings would be at 
$150 hourly. Added to the one percent per month interest included 
in the complaint, and the additional ten percent annual awarded in 
the judgment, the interest rate is about 72%. Actually, from 
Guyon's own letter (R. 39) it is clear the higher hourly rate was 
not by agreement, but unilateral imposition. 
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Fibro requests that this Court reverse the denial, and remand 
the matter for Fibro to file its Answer and Counterclaim, and for 
the case to proceed normally through the courts. 
Respectfully so prayed the 24th day of September, 1993. 
77tM/i 
Kitche11 R. Barker 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify that on the 27th day of September, 1993, I 
caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing to be mailed, 
postage prepaid to: 
Edwin F. Guyon, Esq. 
2 05 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mitchell R. Barker 
I further certify that I lodged a prior draft of this brief 
with the Court of Appeals by postage prepaid mail on September 17, 
1993. 
<?^r/?#< 
Mitchell R. Barker 
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APPENDIX A 
Guyon's Complaint 
Edwin F. Guyon 
205 Newhouse Building 
~alt Lake City, Utah 84111 
801/355-8811 
FILED 
92 NOV 25 Pttl2:22 
CLERK Of THE CIRCUIT COURT 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
case no. 
judge 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE'COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
EDWIN F- GUYON 
plaintiff CGMPUUOT 
vs. 
FI3RO TRUST  w/'/f (J 
defendant 
1. Defendant at all times relevant to the instant 
action resided within the county of Salt Lake, state of Utah. 
2. Defendant is indebted to plaintiff for the total sum 
of $8,279.88 for services rendered to defendants from prior ;o 
February 14, 1992 to November 13, 1992. 
3. Plaintiff has made demand for payment in full of 
said amount; defendant has refused and continues to refuse to pay. 
Wherefore plaintiff prays that defendant be cited to 
appear and answer herein; for judgment in the amount of $8,279.88; 
for costs of court; for interest at the highest legal rate from 
February 14, 1992 and for such other and further relief to which 
Plaintiff is entitled. 
Dated the 25th day of November . 1992. 
NOV 2 5 1992 
-sv 
Edwin F. Guyon 
205 Newhouse Building 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT R 
EDWIN F. GUYON 
vs. 
FIBRO TRUST 
•SAI 
p l a i n t i f f 
FILED 
defendant 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDA 
You are hereby summoned and requ/red to file with the 
clerk of the above court, 451 South 200 East/ Salt Lake City, Utah. 
84111, a written answer to the attached complaint and serve upon or 
mail to plaintiff at the address aoove a copy of your answer within 
20 days after service of this summons on you. 
SUMMONS 
case n 
judge 
mm 
PARTMENT 
ICT COURT 
ThW/udieiaJ District 
1 4 1992 
SALT LAKE C0UN1Y 
r 
It you fail to so answer, judgment by default will oe 
taken against you for the relief demand^a in the complaint wnich 
has been filed with the clerk of the above court and a copy of 
which is attached and herewith served upon you. 
Dated the 25th day of November i9<52, 
SERVE DEFENDANT AT: 
— Donald H, "Pickett, agent for Fibro Trust 
1150 South Augusta Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
801/582-7203 
(£«- ^ 916E-) 
1 
CONSTABLE'S RETURN 
ARV ALEXANDER , being first duly sworn on oath and say: 
a duly appointed Deputy Constable, Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
jf the United States over the age of 21 years at the time of service 
nd not a part of or interested in the within action• 
ceived the within and hereto annexed, 
COMPLAINT 
of NOV , 1992 , and served the same upon FIRBO TRUST 
aamed defendant in said, 
COMPLAINT 
j a true copy of said, 
^OMPLAINT 
ufendant with DONALD H. PICKETT (AGENT) 
:>f suitable age and discretion there residing at, 
J~AUGUSTA WAY ,SALT LAKE CITY 
sual place of ABODE , on this 28 day of NOV ,1992 
rther ceritfy that at the time of service of the said, 
COMPLAINT 
1 the date and place of service and added my name and o f f i c i a l 
:eto • 
On the 28 day of JfOV , 1992 
Robert J . ^Rfeir^ConstcUJle, Sa l t Lake County 
396 Cypress S t . , Midvale~Ut, 84047 580-1741 
D e p u t y t ^ - ^ / 
Service 
i i leage 
kddress 
F i l i ng 
Copies 
-w Cost 
' o ta l 
Fee $6.00 
$7,00 
a a a s s s s s s a s s s a 
$13.00 
-J 
APPENDIX B 
Default Judgment 
Fff e ' Edwin F. Guyon s £ &•**«& 
205 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 DEC 9 9 J9C 
801/355-8811 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKEggjF 
EDWIN F. GUYON 
plaintiff JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT 
vs. 
FIBRO TRUST case no. 920016413-CV 
Judge Michael L. Hutchinc 
defendant 
Defendant in the above entitled action, Fibro Trust 
having been regularly and personally served with process; havin 
failed to appear and answer plaintiff's complaint on file herein 
the time allowed by law for answering having expired; the defaul 
of said defendant Fibro Trust having been duly entered according t« 
law; now, upon the application of said plaintiff to the court 
judgment is hereby entered against said defendant pursuant to the 
prayer of said complaint• 
It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that 
plaintiff have judgment against defendant Fibro Trust in the amount 
of *8,279.88; for coots of court; for interest at tftenigncat legal 
rate from February 14. 1992* 
i^d., of fef^j^A^ . i. 
CLERK 0F $flE~£QURt 
BvU "•¥ £. 
zr 
APPENDIX C 
Notice of Judgment 
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Edwin F. Guyon 
205 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
801/355-8811 ' 
'
93F®1B D 
casino. 920016413-CV 
jyage Michael L. Hutchin 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
EDWIN F. GUYON 
plaintiff NOTICE OF JUDGMENT 
vs. 
FIBRO TRUST 
defendant 
On December 29, 1992 judgrp^ nt was rendered on behalf 
plaintiff in the instant act ion ^ against defendant Fibro Trust 
the amount of $8,279,88; for/costs of court; for interest at t; 
highest legal rate from February 14, 1992. 
Dated the 17th day of February , 199: 
On the above date a copy of the foregoing was mailed -
Donald H. Pickett, agent for Fibro Trust, 1150 South Augusta Wa; 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84108. 
£ 
APPENDIX D 
Affidavit of Costs 
^ 
8
 fy OF 
Edwin f. Guyon 
205 Nev^house Building 
Salt L£ke City, Utah 84111 
8C31/355-8811 
. THI£D CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE 
EDWIN f. GUYON 
plaintiff AFFIDAVIT OF COSTS 
'0, 
case no. 920016413-CV 
judge Michael L. Hutch i 
vs. 
FIBRO TRUST 
defendant 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
Edwin F. Guyon upon oath deposes and says: 
As plaintiff in the instant action, I have incurred 
following costs for filing the complaint and obtaining service 
process upon defendant Fibro Trust: 
Costs incurred: filing fee $ 
service 
Total costs: $5: 
Dated the 17th day of February , 19' 
40.00 
13.00 
Edwin F. Guyoi^ , plaintiff ^ 
Sworn and subscribed to the day and date above shown 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
my commission 
expires: . . 
On the above date a copy of the foregoing was mailed 
Donald H* Pickett, agent for Fibro Trust, 1150 South Augusta Wa 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84108. 
<& 
APPENDIX E 
Order Denying Relief from Default Judgment 
Edwin F. Guyon 
205 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
801/355-8811 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
EDWIN F. GUYON 
plaintiff ORDER 
vs. 
FIBRO TRUST 
defendant 
On the 26th day of March, 1993 came on to be heard 
defendant's motion to set aside default judgment; and the court, 
having read the pleadings and considered the evidence and 
affidavits on file, good cause appearing; it is hereby 
Ordered, adjudged and decreed that defendant's motion to 
set aside judgement toe and hereby As denied. 
Dated the 6 o day of M v / ^ L A ~ ^ _ , 1993< 
case no. 920016413-CV 
judge Michael L. Hutchings 
Judge nx&^ 
Third Qi^cvii t- Goftrt 2J 
v#*s> *******
 a 7 
On the 30th day of March, \^93>*^c*0j/ 0'f the foregoing 
was mailed to Mitchell R. Barker, Esq. y ';2^ft^odth State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84115. ' '—* ' - — 
£-<-
APPENDIX F 
Demand Letter from Guyon to Fibro 
W1/355'SSM 
November 13, 1992 
George Badger 
550 Northmont 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Donald He Pickett, agent 
Fibro Trust 
Post Office Box 58548 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84158 
RE: Fibro v. Daniels, et al 
Fibro v. Eames, et al 
As a result of your non-payment for legal services rendered, I h 
withdrawn from representation in the above actions. By order 
the court signed by Judge Greene in the Daniels matter, my mot 
to withdraw was granted and an order signed in court by Ju 
Greene. I have filed my written withdrawal in the Eames case. 
Status of the Eames matter is as follows: 
The complaint has been filed and all defendants 
served. Garth Potts was served on September 3, 1992 and, 
no answer being filed, is in default. Jody Art Thompson 
was served on September 17, 1992. All other defendants 
were served on September 20, 1992. Robert A. Eames has 
responded by indicating he has filed bankruptcy and a 
stay is currently in effect as to him. Jim McConkie of 
Parker, McKeown & McConkie has indicated that he requires 
a ten day extension of time to respond which I granted as 
a professional courtesy on November 4, 1992. 
Status of the Daniels matter is as follows: 
Proposed sett 1 ement documents including st ipu 1 at ions 
and judgment were forwarded to counsel (Mr. Weaver in 
California and Mr. Nielson in Utah) but no response has 
been received from any party. Judge Greene has 
recognized Mr. Stamos as your counsel in this action. 
The files in the above actions will be available to Mr. Stamos 
his request immediately upon delivery of a check to me in the f 
amount due for services rendered. The following is a final bill 
for services rendered to date: 
The February 14, 1992, May 8, 1992 and Ju 1 y 6, 1992 unpaid bi 1 1 i. 
total the following: 
February 14, 1992 $ 2,439.55 
Exhibit /<3 
» 1.417.5D 
• 696.25 
• • • • • < . *4,553.40 
May 8, 1992 
July 6, 1992 
Total unpaid bi11ings « 
Interest on fetecr«as»ra«KI /li*e -aMfce of 1% ipcrinearth for billings 
unpaid in excess of thirty (30) days (calculatcc to November 15, 
1992) is: 
February 14, 1992 billing, 8 months $ 195.16 
May 8, 1992 billing, 5 months • 71.88 
July 6, 1992 billing, 3 months $ 20-89 
Total interest on unpaid billings . . . $287.93 
The total amount currently due on unpaid billings as of November 
15, 1992 is S 4,841,33. 
From July 6, 1992 to date, I have performed the following services 
on behalf of Fibro Trust: 
Fibro v. Daniels, et al 
iG/2'92 miscellaneous research anc review of applicaole 
securities law applicable to broker/stock owner 
agreements 1.Ohrs 
10/12/92 miscellaneous research and review of statues 
applicable tc broker/stock owner agreements 2.5hrs 
0/13/92 review of NASD and SEC regulations and standaras 
relating to secondary market price maintenance 3.2hrs 
10/19/92 review of complaint/answer anc related correspondence 
regarding settlement, preliminary preparation of proposec 
settlement documents 2.Ohrs 
12/20/92 final preparation of proposec settlement documents 
including stipulations and judgment 1.2hrs 
10/21/92 letters to opposing counsel regarding settlement C.4hrs 
11/3/92 prepare and file withdrawal aocuments regarding 
Daniels ana Eames actions 0.7hrs 
11/5/92 telephone conference with counsel for defenaant 
Eames, et al re answer/extension of time 
11/8/92 preparation and filing of notice of 
11/12/92 court appearance before Judge Greer 
witharawal in Daniels case 
7/6/92 to 11/13/92 miscellaneous office ana 
conferences with client: 
7/6^92 tc 11/13/92 miscellaneous office anc 
conferences with opposing counsel 
16.7 hours at Sl50.00/hr 
Office expense: 
reproduction 57 copies 3 SO*15 
telephone 
court costs 
total due (Daniels) 7/6/92 to 11/13/92 
wi thdrawal 
e regarding 
te1ephone 
te1ephone 
Total 
$ 2,505.00 
$ 8.55 
$ nil 
S ni 1 
• 2,513, 
0„4hrs 
0.3hrs 
1 .Ohrs 
2.5hrs 
1-5hrs 
16.7hrs 
.55 
2 
Fibro v. Eames, et al 
for service 
constable 
copies of summons 
3/92 prepare summons and complaint for defendant 
Potts; deliver summons to constable 
'20/92 prepare summons and complaints 
on remaining defendants; deliver to 
" '22/92 duplicate for file and forward 
and return to court for filing 
_./3/92 prepare and file notice of withdrawal of counsel 
7/6/92 to 11/13/92 miscellaneous office and telephone 
conferences with client; 
7/6/92 to 11/13/92 miscellaneous office and telephone 
conferences with opposing counsel _ 
Total 
8.4 hours at *15Q.0Q/hr 
Office expense: 
• 7hrs 
• Bhrs 
.6hrs 
.3hrs 
2.5hrs 
8.4hrs 
* 1,260.00 
court costs; 
service 
service 
service 
service 
serv ice 
service 
service 
service 
service 
service 
(return) 
on Brahman 
on San Marino 
on Am. Pacific 
on Mark Eames 
on J.A. Thompson 
on R. Eames $ 28. 
(return) 
(baa address) 
on Potts _ 
17.00 
6.00 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
00 
* 
» 20.00 
6 
6 
25 
29 
1 
17 
,00 
00 
,00 
,00 
.00 
.00 
reproduction 134 copies 9 $0 
telephone 
less November, 1992 
total aue (Eames) 7/6/92 
total 
15 
costs 155.00 
10.10 
nil 
payment * 
to 11/13/92 
500.00 
• 925.10 
In summary, my final billing to you is as 
amounts unpaid from prior billings 
interest on unpaid prior billings 
current billing, Daniels case 
current billing, Eames case 
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE 
follows: 
9 4,553.30 
S 278.93 
$ 2,513.55 
$ 925.10 
$ 8,279.88 
Demand is made for the immediate payment of S8.279.88 which, if 
received 
attached 
by November 
comp1ai nt. 
25, 1992 wi 1 1 result in the filing of 
not 
the 
^ > ^ 
APPENDIX G 
Letter from Fibro to Guyon 
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George Badger & Associates 
550 Northmonl, Salt Lake Cit 
Telephone 
November 20th, 1992 
Mr. Ed Guyon 
P.O. Box 17697 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
Dear Ed: 
I have tried several times to call you, but all I get is your answering service. 1 would 1 
respond in person to your letter and the demand you have sent because I believe there are 
inissunderstandings that can be resolved to everyone's benefit if we talk. If you proccc* 
file the complaint it will simply add more expense and delay payment of any money tha 
be due. Don Pickett and 1 will be available any time at your convience to discuss this r 
cither in person of'over the phone. 
Sincerely / 
j5eorge •' 
cc / Don Pickett via fax 
E x h i b i t B 
APPENDIX H 
Letter from Fibro to Guyon 
T H E F I B R O T R U S T 
D. H. Pickett, CPA, Trustee 
P.O. Box 58548 
Salt Lake City, UT 84158 
(801) 582-7703 
December 8, 1992 
Ed Guyon 
P.O. Box 17697 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
Dear Ed: 
Following up our telephone conversation on Monday, December 7, 1992,1 would propose 
the following for your consideration: 
1. Since your were employed to work on the Eames' matter (June 1991), the LTI 
stock that we hoped to recover from Eames has dropped in value from $9.00 a 
share to approximately $1 a share; and, there is now only a limited market. If 
you had proceeded more diligently with this matter, we would, perhaps, have 
had far greater resources from which to pay our bills. As it now stands, we 
are seriously suffering because of your delays. 
2. We have the same argument with respect to the Daniels/Katz matter - that is, 
if this could have been resolved more expeditiously, we would have been able 
to have more liquid resources. 
3. It was our understanding that you would be doing the work for approximately 
the same hourly rate that Leonard Nielsen was charging and that would be $75 
an hour. Although we paid your first billing at $100 an hour, we think there 
should be an adjustment. 
In conclusion, the thing I am saying is that if you have already filed the complaint, it is still 
not too late to work out a settlement, and I would just as soon pay you a portion of what I 
will otherwise have to pay another attorney. 
Although I feel that you have been paid a fair and reasonable fee for the work you have done 
in both the Eames' and the Daniels* cases, I submit for your consideration that I would be 
willing to pay you another $2,000 as a complete settlement. 
Very truly yours, 
THE FIBRO TRUST 
Exh ib i t E 
APPENDIX I 
Applicable Rules 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART VII. 
JUDGMENT. 
54. Judgnv .lis; costs. 
% \ Definition; form. Judgment" as u*>ed m these rules includes a decree 
*l£?anv order from which an appeal lies A judgment need not contain a 
2 ^ 2 r f pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings 
^f l i l Judgnient upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple part ies. 
« w L more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
jSwT counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple 
Z^MLL are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
Stormore but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
Semina t ion by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
f«eB8 direction for the entry of judgment In the absence of such determma-
S^and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, 
!5Lft adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of 
tinpi than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the 
ffrfrY** or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision 
tfctny time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
ggfiia and liabilities of all the parties 
($) Demand for judgment . 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is en-
tered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not 
demanded such relief m his pleadings It may be given for or against one 
or more of several claimants, and it may, when the justice of the case 
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as 
between or among themselves 
- (2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different 
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the 
demand for judgment 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is 
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be 
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise 
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for re-
view is taken, costs of the action, other than costs m connection with such 
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination 
of the cause Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies 
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law 
d
 (2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five 
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against 
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs 
and necessary disbursements m the action, and file with the court a like 
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the 
items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily in-
curred m the action or proceeding A party dissatisfied with the costs 
claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, 
file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the 
Judgment was rendered 
&H ^  A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the 
fene of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and 
.conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be 
^considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered 
(3), (4) [Deleted ] 
•Jnterest and costs to be included in the j u d g m e n t The clerk must 
~nn any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision 
13| 
from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed 
ascertained. The clerk must, withm two days after the costs have been t °* 
or ascertained, in any case where not included in the judgment, insert*? 
amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and male 
similar notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docfe* * 
(Amended effective January 1, 1985 ) **• 
Amendment Notes. — Subdivisions (d)(3) 
and (d)(4), relating to the award of costs by the 
appellate court and costs in original proceed-
ings before the Supreme Court were repealed 
with the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appel-
late Procedure effective January 1, 1985 See, 
now, Rule 34(d), Utah R App P 
Compilers Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 54 F R C P 
Cross-References. — Continuances, discre-
tion to require payment of costs n o n ~ 
40(b) ' H C * 
Judges' retirement fee, taxing as 
§ 49-6 301 C 0 ^ 
State, payment of costs awarded 
§ 78-27-13 agaio^ 
Stay of judgment upon multiple rl*,~-
U R C P 62(h) C l t m * 
Witness fees, taxing as costs, § 21 5-g 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Absence of express determination 
Amendment of pleadings 
Appeal as of right 
Certification not determinative 
Costs 
—In general 
—Challenge of award 
—Depositions 
—Discretionary 
—Expenses of preparation for action 
—Failure to object 
—Liability of state 
—Service on adverse party 
—Statutory limits 
—Untimely filing of memorandum. 
—When not demanded 
Default judgments 
Effect of partial final judgment 
Final order 
—Appealability 
—Attorney's fee award 
—Claims for relief 
—Complete disposal of claim or party 
—Multiple parties 
—No just reason for delay 
—Review of finality 
—Separate claims 
Inconsistent oral statements 
Interest on judgment 
Judgment based on unpleaded theory 
Judgment in favor of nonparty 
Motion to reconsider 
Pleading in the alternative 
Presumption of finality 
Real party in interest 
Relief not demanded m pleadings 
Specific performance request 
Unpleaded issue tried by consent 
Cited 
Absence of express determination. 
In action based on alleged breach of loan 
agreement, where trial court improperly dis-
missed plaintiff-corporation's complaint with 
prejudice and granted defendant-bank judg-
ment on its counterclaim and cross-claim, judg-
ment on cross-claim and counterclaim would 
be subject, on remand, to revision since all 
claims presented had not been adjudicated and 
since trial court made no express determina-
tion as required by this section M & S Const* 
& Eng'g Co v Clearfield State Bank, 24 Luk 
2d 139 467 P2d 410 (1970) ^ 
Amendment of pleadings. 
The proper application of Rule 15(b) and 
Subdivision (c)(1) of this rule, is that amen± 
ments should be allowed where a case has ae» 
tually been tried on a different issue or a differ. 
ent theory than had been pleaded First 3«c 
Bank v Colonial Ford, Inc, 597 P 2d 85§ 
(Utah 1979) 
Appeal as of right. 
Where the requirements of this rule concern-
ing appeal of orders in multi-party or mult*, 
claim actions are satisfied, the parties are enti-
tled to appeal such orders as a matter of right, 
and the Supreme Court does not have discr#» 
tion to refuse to review the orders Pate v Mir» 
athon Steel Co , 692 P 2d 765 (Utah 19841 
After a party or parties have availed thenv 
selves of the provisions of Subdivision ib) al-
lowing an entry of judgment on 'fewer than all 
of the claims or parties,' an appeal may be had 
on the adjudicated claims or by those partie* 
All Weather Insulation, Inc, v Amiron Dev 
Corp, 702 P2d 1176 (Utah 1985) 
Certification not determinative. 
This rule does not necessarily mean there « 
a final judgment merely because the court s or» 
der so recites, there was in fact no final judf» 
ment where the trial court denied defendant* 
motion to dismiss, thus leaving the parties in 
court, then entered an order that the denial 
was a final judgment Little v Mitchell, b04 
P 2d 918 (Utah 1979) 
Costs. 
—In general. 
Costs were not recoverable at common la* 
and are therefore generally allowable only m 
the amounts and in the manner provided bv 
statute Frampton v Wilson, 605 P2d 771 
(Utah 1980) 
'Costs,' as used in Subdivision (d)(1) m e a j * 
those fees which are required to be paid to tht 
court and to witnesses, and which the statuus 
authorize to be included in the judgment-
Frampton v Wilson, 605 P 2d 771 (Utah 19S0) 
Subdivision (d)(2) provides a process of re-
view by a trial court of the amount claimed to 
w*% •ty's costs, not a process for appeal of - rard State ex rel. State Dep't of Social 
iM^R U S cet ta , 742 P 2d 114 (Utah Ct. App. 
-^igllenge of award. 
!^5^inemorandum of costs is filed before 
iXJLnt an<* c o s t s *n specific amounts are 
ffEfed in that judgment, then a party dissat-
ifiSwith those costs may have the right of 
; | i 2 j i to alter or amend the costs in the judg-
jittnder Rule 59(a)<3), enjoying thereby the 
neriod of ten days to do so rather than the 
restricted period of seven days under 
£|£vi8i< on (d)(2) of this rule. Nelson v. New-
?£& 
583 p.2d 601 (Utah 1978). 
,.____tions. 
T J L , depositions were taken but witnesses 
A** testified at trial, costs of the depositions 
J J o o t properly includable within the cost 
3 £ H H U V. Goodman, 4 Utah 2d 163, 290 P.2d 
^L^naes of taking depositions of defendants 
^ttoeral contractor in materialman's action 
^ j 1 1 4 - 2 - 2 were assessable as costs where 
^j^aary to P r o t e c t plaintiffs rights. Lawson 
tesfr Co v. General Plumbing & Heating 
5^27 Utah 2d 84, 493 P.2d 607 (1972). 
gifaidant was not entitled to the cost of tak-
gg&positions where the depositions were not 
gjtj at trial and there was no evidence pre-
dated that they were necessarily incurred for 
6 t preparation of defendant's case. Nelson v. 
Jfrwman, 583 P.2d 601 (Utah 1978). 
Costs of depositions are taxable subject to 
At limitation that the trial court is persuaded 
tfeeithey were taken in good faith and, in light 
sf ffet circumstances, appeared to be essential 
ft? the development and presentation of the 
mm deposition costs should be allowable as 
tsejSMry and reasonable where the develop-
HSjH of the case is of such a complex nature 
<SSt dlii.uvery cannot be accomplished through 
# t tsss expensive methods of interrogatories, 
feqttsst* for admissions and requests for the 
flMfaction of documents. Highland Constr. Co. 
s.CyottPac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984). 
flit party claiming entitlement to the costs 
*SjSnositions has the burden of demonstrating 
'•Mi the depositions were reasonably neces-
<•!& determining whether that burden is met 
fcjjjjjjathe sound discretion of the trial court. 
*%*l Unlimited v. Nature's Way Mktg., Ltd., 
mfM 507 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
"^Wsstetkmary. 
aSibdivtfljon (<£) leaves the question of costs 
• • J J w i n the discretion of the courts. Hull 
^ j * * " * ^ 4 Utah 2d 163, 290 P.2d 245 
3 * ^ y C0Urt c a n e x e r c i s e reasonable dis-
^ ^ ^ ^ g a r d to the allowance of costs, but 
•^ tofcy to guard against any excesses or 
1 j n ? _ t a x i n& thereof. Frampton v. Wil-
g»*»P.2d 771 (Utah 1980); Hatanaka v. 
•2 IS R 2 d 1052 ^Uta* Ct. App.), cert. 
J J j ^ W P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). 
HgJ?*™?1**011 of divorce decrees under the 
^ T * ° g jurisdiction of the trial court, the 
J J 2 « t h e ability or inability of a party to 
&&—,-.!* a Actual matter that lies in the 
discretion of the trial court. Hardy v. Hardy, 
776 P.2d 917 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
—Expenses of preparation for action. 
In a habeas corpus proceeding by parents 
against a child-placement agency to obtain 
custody of a child, expense items incurred by 
the agency in the taking of depositions and se-
curing certified copies of a marriage license 
and divorce decree in preparing for the action 
appeared to be reasonable and incurred in good 
faith, and these costs should have been allowed 
to the prevailing agency as a matter of course. 
Thomas v. Children's Aid Soc'y, 12 Utah 2d 
235, 364 P.2d 1029 (1961). 
The trial court did not err in not awarding 
the costs incurred by a wife in a divorce action 
who, after the suit was filed, secured the ser-
vices of an appraiser who was able to testify at 
length about his opinion of the identity, nature 
and net value of the marital estate after his 
inspection of various property and documents. 
His research and preparation, although essen-
tial to the presentation of the case, could not be 
considered a "cost." Stevens v. Stevens, 754 
P.2d 952 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
—Failure to object 
Defendant waived any error as to the costs 
allowed the plaintiff where defendant waited 
23 days after filing of cost bill before filing any 
objection. Suniland Corp. v. Radcliffe, 576 P.2d 
847 (Utah 1978). 
—Liability of state. 
The general terms of a statute giving costs to 
the prevailing party do not include the state. 
Tracy v. Peterson, 1 Utah 2d 213, 265 P.2d 393 
(1954). 
The state is not liable for costs unless there 
is some statute or rule of court which expressly 
or by clear implication includes it. Section 
78-27-13 does not authorize the taxation of 
costs against the state but only provides the 
source from which such costs shall be paid 
when authorized. Tracy v. Peterson, 1 Utah 2d 
213, 265 P.2d 393 (1954). 
The Uniform Act on Paternity, Chapter 45a 
of Title 78, makes no provision for an award of 
costs against the state. State ex rel. State Dep't 
of Social Servs. v. Ruscetta, 742 P.2d 114 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987). 
—Service on adverse party. 
This rule requires that only one verified copy 
be served and it is to be served to the court; 
there is no requirement that the copy served 
upon the party from whom costs are claimed be 
verified. Barton v. Carson, 14 Utah 2d 182, 380 
P.2d 926 (1963). 
—Statutory limits. 
Award of costs in excess of those expressly 
allowed by statute for service of subpoena, wit-
ness fees and preparation of model, photo-
graphs and certified copies of documents was 
improper even though the costs represented 
the actual expenses incurred; fact that Su-
preme Court has on occasion approved taxing 
of expense of depositions as costs should not be 
taken as opening the door to other expenses of 
the character claimed in the instant case. 
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980). 
Witness fees, travel expenses, and service of 
process expenses are chargeable only in accor-
Rule 54 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 140 
dance with the fee schedule set by statute. 
Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
Witness compensation in excess of the statu-
tory schedule is generally inappropriate as a 
cost. Morgan v Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah 
Ct, App. 1990). 
—Untimely filing of memorandum. 
Although plaintiff filed an unverified memo-
randum of costs within five days after entry of 
judgment, because he did not file a verified 
memorandum of costs until after the five-day 
period, plaintiff was not entitled to an award of 
costs. Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. New York 
Term. Whse. Co., 10 Utah 2d 210, 350 P.2d 626 
(1960). 
Plaintiffs who were contractually entitled to 
attorney fees, costs, and expenses, and applied 
for them five weeks after judgment in their 
favor, were not barred from receiving an award 
of such fees by Subdivision (d)(2) because the 
rule does not apply to expenses or attorney 
fees. Howe v. Professional Manivest, Inc., 829 
P.2d 160 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
—When not demanded. 
Fact that plaintiff did not ask for attorney 
fees in his complaint did not preclude trial 
court from awarding them to him since this 
rule indicates that there shall be liberality of 
procedure to reach result which justice re-
quires. Palombi v. D & C Bldrs., 22 Utah 2d 
297, 452 P.2d 325 (1969). 
District court's award of attorney fees in ex-
cess of the fees demanded in the complaint and 
of costs where no costs were demanded was 
proper where the proof at trial showed the 
party was entitled to such relief. Pope v. Pope, 
589 P.2d 752 (Utah 1978). 
Default judgments 
Subdivision (c)(2) and Rule 55 prescribes the 
procedure to be followed by trial courts in en-
tering judgments against defaulting parties, 
and courts are not at liberty to deviate from 
those rules just because one party is in default 
and is not entitled to be heard on the merits of 
the case. Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 
(Utah 1984). 
Effect of partial final judgment. 
The entry of a final judgment as to fewer 
than all of the parties or claims does not affect 
the ability of the district court to proceed with 
respect to the remainder of the claims and par-
ties; and when an appeal is taken from such a 
judgment, it only brings before the Supreme 
Court that portion of the action with respect to 
which the judgment has been entered, and the 
rest of the action remains in the trial court and 
is not necessarily affected by the appeal. Lane 
v. Messer, 689 P.2d 1333 (Utah 1984). 
Final order. 
—Appealability. 
The final judgment rule, Subdivision (b), ap-
plies when the trial court orders a separate 
trial of the claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or 
third-party claim, and failure to have the case 
certified as final by the trial court, leaving is-
sues and parties before that court, will deprive 
the appellate court of jurisdiction over an ap-
peal. First Sec. Bank v. Conlin, 817 P.2d 298 
(1991). 
Appeal of an order that was not final and 
neither certified nor eligible for certification 
under Subdivision (b) was not properly taken, 
and the remedy was dismissal of the appeal. 
A.J. Mackay Co. v. Okland Constr. Co., 817 
P.2d 323 (1991). 
—Attorney's fee award. 
Because a trial court's initial attorney's fee 
determination in a class action was not a final 
order, it was subject to revision by the same 
judge who entered it until a final judgment 
was handed down. Therefore, the law-of-the-
case doctrine was not offended by the trial 
court's revision of its earlier order. Plumb v. 
State, 809 P.2d 734 (Utah 1990). 
—Claims for relief. 
Where liability has been decided but the ex-
tent of damage remains undetermined, there is 
no final order for purposes of appellate review. 
This is also the case where the trial court's 
order disposes of a request for declaratory and 
injunctive relief but leaves unresolved other 
equitable and legal claims for relief. Olson v. 
Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 724 P.2d 960 (Utah 
1986). 
—Complete disposal of claim or party. 
An order that does not wholly dispose of a 
claim or a party is not "final" and will not be 
appealable. Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 
P.2d 765 (Utah 1984); Backstrom Family Ltd. 
Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d 1157 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
Summary judgment that did not dispose of 
all claims of all parties in a consolidated case, 
and had not been certified as a final judgment 
pursuant to Subdivision (b), was not a final 
judgment for purposes of appellate jurisdiction. 
Steck v. Aagaire, 789 P.2d 708 (Utah 1990); 
Sneddon v. Graham, 821 P.2d 1185 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). 
Partial summary judgment granted on one of 
plaintiffs three alleged causes of action was 
not eligible for certification under this rule, be-
cause the remaining causes of action in plain-
tiffs complaint were based upon the same oper-
ative facts as those disposed of by the trial 
court's grant of partial summary judgment. 
Furniture Distribution Ctr. v. Miles, 821 P.2d 
1165 (Utah 1991). 
Because only part of the claims were re-
solved by a trial court's ruling, and the ques-
tion of the remedy remained to be determined, 
the summary judgment ruling failed to dispose 
completely of either a claim or a party as re-
quired by Subdivision (b) of this rule. Ameri-
can Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Gibson, 839 P.2d 797 
(Utah 1992). 
—Multiple parties. 
The question of whether there is a substan-
tial factual overlap between issues certified for 
appeal and issues remaining before the trial 
court, to be satisfied by determining whether 
the resolution of an issue on appeal would con-
stitute res judicata of an issue remaining be-
low, does not apply to the certification of final 
judgments against separate parties. West v. 
Thomson Newspapers, 835 P.2d 179 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992). 
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—No just reason for delay. 
Pursuant to the requirement in Subdi isi^u 
(b) that the trial court "-nav • ™ct * ^ ^try of 
a final judgment . ,/un an express de-
termination by the - bat there is no just 
reason for delay" in ise this determina-
tion by the trial court ibject to judicial re-
view under an abuse of accretion standard, a 
brief explanation should accompany all future 
certifications so that the appellate court may 
render an informed decision on that question. 
Bennion v. Pennzoil Co., 826 P.2d 137 (Utah 
1992). 
—Review of finality. 
The initial question of whether an order is 
eligible for certification under Subdivision (b), 
i.e., whether the order is "final," is a question 
of law. Therefore, the appellate court will re-
view the trial court's decision on this point for 
correctness. Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 1099 (1991). 
—Separate claims. 
When the degree of factual overlap between 
the issue certified for appeal and the issues re-
maining in the trial court is such that separate 
claims appear to be based on the same opera-
tive facts or on the same operative facts with 
minor variations, they are not separate claims 
for purposes of Subdivision (b). Kennecott 
Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 1099 
(1991); FMA Leasing Co. v. Citizens Bank, 823 
P.2d 1065 (Utah 1992). 
To be eligible as an appealable order under 
Subdivision (b), the court's ruling must dispose 
of a "separate claim." A "separate claim" must 
arise from different facts than those underly-
ing the remaining causes of action. Webb v. 
Vantage Income Properties, 818 P.2d 1 (1991). 
Plaintiffs alleged three causes of action, all 
of which arose out of the same set of operative 
facts, constituted only one "claim" for purposes 
of this rule. Furniture Distribution Ctr. v. 
Miles, 821 P.2d 1165 (Utah 1991). 
A claim is not separate if a decision on 
claims remaining in the trial court would ren-
der moot the issues on appeal. Bennion v. 
Pennzoil Co., 826 P 2d 137 (Utah 1992). 
Pursuant to the requirement of U.R.C.P. 
52(a) that the trial court "find the facts spe-
cially," in order to facilitate appellate review of 
a judgment certified as final under Subdivision 
(b) of this rule, the trial court should enter 
findings supporting its determination that 
such an order is final and the findings should 
explain the lack of factual overlap between the 
certified and remaining claims. Bennion v. 
Pennzoil Co., 826 P.2d 137 (Utah 1992). 
Where the substance of plaintiffs lawsuit 
was that defendant defamed mm several times, 
each alleged defamation was a separate injury 
giving rise to a separate and distinct claim; the 
resolution of a given libel claim arising from 
one statement would not have a res judicata 
effect on other libel claims arising from other 
statements and therefore such claims could be 
severed from the claim remaining before the 
trial court. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 835 
P.2d 179 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Inconsistent oral statements. 
Oral statements of opinion by the trial court 
mco^"' .^at with the findings and conclusions 
ultimately rendered do not affect the final 
judgment McCollum v. Clothier, 121 Utah 
311, 241 P2d 468 (1952). 
Interest on judgment. 
Interest follows a judgment as a matter of 
law and is collectible even though the clerk of 
court fails to include the same in the judgment 
signed by him. Dairy Distnbs., Inc. v. Local 
976, Western Conference of Teamsters, 16 
Utah 2d 85, 396 P 2d 47 (1964). 
In an action on an oral contract, a party's 
failure to specifically plead a request for pre-
judgment interest was of no consequence be-
cause the interest issue is injected by law into 
every action for the payment of past due 
money. Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P 2d 301 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
When a judgment is reversed on appeal, the 
new judgment subsequently entered by the 
trial court may bear interest only from the 
date of entry of that new judgment. Mason v 
Western Mtg. Loan Corp., 754 P.2d 984 (Utah 
Ct App. 1988). 
Judgment based on impleaded theory. 
Where plaintiff alleged only an express con-
tract and he sought no amendment of his 
pleadings nor offered any proof to establish a 
quantum meruit theory, court erred in grant-
ing judgment for plaintiff based on the theory 
of quantum meruit. Taylor v. E.M. Royle Corp., 
1 Utah 2d 175, 264 P.2d 279 (1953). 
Although a complaint may sound m con-
tract, it is not prejudicial error for a court to 
allow recovery on the basis of quantum meruit, 
where defendant was not denied a fair opportu-
nity to meet the change m theory of recovery. 
PLC Landscape Constr. v. Piccadilly Fish 'n 
Chips, Inc., 28 Utah 2d 350, 502 P.2d 562 
(1972). 
Complaint for foreclosure of a lien was defec-
tive because of the nature of relief sought even 
though it did not demand judgment for per-
sonal liability on contract and judgment was 
granted for such personal liability, since this 
rule provides that a judgment shall grant the 
relief to which a party is entitled even though 
it is not demanded. Motivated Mgt. Int'l v. 
Finney, 604 P.2d 467 (Utah 1979). 
In a dispute over the appropriation of assets 
and goodwill of a business corporation, it was 
error for trial court to liquidate assets of the 
corporation where the issues upon which such 
action rested were neither pleaded nor raised 
by parties, nor tried. Combe v. Warren's Fam-
ily Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733 (Utah 1984). 
Judgment in favor of nonparty. 
Subdivision (c)(1) is consistent with the gen-
eral principle that a trial court may not render 
judgment in favor of a nonparty. Courts can 
generally make a legally binding adjudication 
only between the parties actually joined in the 
action. Hiltsley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024 (Utah 
1987). 
Subdivision (c)(1) cannot dispense entirely 
with the necessity that a claimant make some 
claim in the lawsuit against the defendant. 
Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 
1987). 
A court may not grant relief to a nonparty. 
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Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 
1987) 
Judgment creditors who participated as par-
ties in a lien case could not recover m a sepa-
rate fraudulent conveyance case, where they 
had not moved to intervene and were never 
parties in the separate case. Butler v. Wilkin-
son, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987). 
Motion to reconsider. 
Although a motion to reconsider is not ex-
pressly available under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Subdivision (b) does allow by impli-
cation for the possibility of a judge's changing 
his or her mind in cases involving multiple 
parties or multiple claims. Salt Lake City 
Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Pleading in the alternative. 
In action by architect against owners for 
value of his services, the alternate remedies of 
an action on the contract or in quasi contract 
under the theory of quantum meruit could be 
pleaded in alternative form and inserted by 
amendment late in the proceedings. Parrish v. 
Tahtaras, 7 Utah 2d 87, 318 P.2d 642 (1957). 
Presumption of finality. 
Subdivision (b) allows courts to readjust 
prior rulings in complex cases as subsequent 
developments in the case might require, unless 
those rulings disposed of entire claims or par-
ties and those rulings were specifically certi-
fied as final. The "law of the case" doctrine 
nonetheless promotes a measure of predictabil-
ity in such cases by creating a kind of presump-
tion that the court's prior rulings, even if not 
certified as final, were correct and should 
stand. Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Construc-
tors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Real party in interest. 
Where surety's pleadings in action on bond 
stated that it deemed plaintiffs partial assign-
ment of right of action on bond as a breach of 
contract releasing its liability, plaintiff had 
sufficient notice and surety was entitled to 
show that plaintiff was not real party in inter-
est as a result of the assignment even though 
this specific defense was not pleaded. Pruden-
tial Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hartford Acci-
dent & Indem. Co., 7 Utah 2d 366, 325 P.2d 
899 (1958). 
Relief not demanded in pleadings. 
Where plaintiffs prayer for relief does not 
include punitive damages but he adduces the 
necessary requirements for such damages at 
trial, he can claim punitive damages under 
Subdivision (c) without a formal amendment to 
the pleadings. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., 
675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983). 
Every final judgment shall grant the relief to 
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is 
entitled, even if the party has not demanded 
such relief in his pleadings. However, although 
Subdivision (c)(1) permits relief on grounds not 
pleaded, that rule does not go so far as tr au-
thorize the granting of relief on issuf»c iieitlit; 
raised nor tried. Combe v. Wa*- . «• family 
Drive-Inns, Inc , 680 P.2H ' ^> (Utah 1984); 
Farr v. Brinkerhoff, 8? P.2d 117 (Utah Ct. 
App 1992). 
Every fin**' sh r~ + the relief to 
which the party is entitled, even if the } 
has not demanded such relief in his plead 
Mabey v. Kay Peterson Constr. Co., 682 
287 (Utah 1984). 
In consonance with Subdivision (c)(l 
would have been proper for the court to 
reformed the contract if a mutual mistai 
fact had been established by clear and con 
ing evidence even though the issue of mi 
mistake was not raised and such relief wa 
demanded by the pleadings Mabey v. K ^ 
terson Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 287 (Utah 1! 
Clark v. Second Circuit Court, 741 P.2d 
(Utah 1987). 
Subdivision (c)(1) requires trial courts t 
liberal in awarding appropriate relief just 
by the facts developed at trial, as long as 
ure to request a particular form of relief 
not prejudice a party in the preparation or 
of the case. If there is no prejudice, it is n* 
sary only that the relief granted be suppo 
by the evidence and be a permissible fori 
relief for the claims litigated. Henderson 
For-Shor Co., 757 P.2d 465 (Utah Ct. , 
1988). 
The rule laid down in Mabey v. Kay Pe 
son Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 287 (Utah 1984), 
that Subdivision (c)(1) allows a court to ref 
a document if a mutual mistake is establis 
even if the issue of mutual mistake was 
raised and reformation was not demands 
the pleadings, also applies when the mistai 
unilateral and reformation is appropn 
Guardian State Bank v. Stangl, 778 P.2. 
(Utah 1989). 
Specific performance request . 
In action on real estate contract calling: 
paying of purchase price in installments, pit 
tiffs prayer for specific performance was 
strued as request for judgment for installrm 
in arrears and attorneys' fees. Woodarre 
Allen, 1 Utah 2d 220, 265 P.2d 398 (19* 
Unpleaded issue tried by consent. 
Where an issue is raised at trial without 
jection by the nonraising party, where h 
sides present evidence on the issue, and wh 
there is no evidence that the nonraising pc 
was surprised or misled by the introduction 
the issue, the fact that such issue was 
raised in the pleadings or on a motion 
amend does not vitiate a finding on such i&s 
Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos, 6 Utah 2d 2 
310 P.2d 517 (1957). 
Where defendants did not plead subsequc 
agreement as an affirmative defense to acti 
on prior agreement, and although plaintiff
 ( jected to evidence on issue of subsequent agn 
ment, when it was overruled, he made no 
quest for a continuance nor did he make a 
representation to the court that he was tak 
by surprise or otherwise at a disadvantage 
meetin? ' * is^ue, trial court properly allow 
issue t( :_>^ed and properly received co 
tract in e- .LC. Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Ut; 
: : , . P.2d 86 (1963). 
Cited in Morris v. Russell, 120 Utah 54 
236 P.2d 451 (1951); Leger Constr., Inc. v. Ro 
erts, Inc., 550 P.2d 212 (Utah 1976); Salt Lai 
City Corp. v. Layton, 600 P.2d 538 (Ut£ 
1979); South Shores Concession, Inc. v. St«* 
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600 P.2d 550 (Utah 1979); Myers v. Morgan, 
626 P.2d 410 (Utah 1981); Bernard v. 
Attebury, 629 P.2d 892 (tftah 1981); Bailey v. 
Sound Lab, Inc., 694 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1984); 
GMAC v. Martinez, 712 P.2d 243 (Utah 1986); 
Williams v. State, 716 P.2d 806 (Utah 1986); 
Owen v. Owen, 734 P.2d 414 (Utah 1986); 
Tebbs, Smith & Assocs. v. Brooks, 735 P.2d 
1305 (Utah 1986); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 
(Utah 1986); Freegard v. First W. Nat'l Bank, 
738 P.2d 614 (Utah 1987); Crosland v. Peck, 
738 P.2d 631 (Utah 1987); Elder v. Triax Co., 
740 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1987); Mascaro v. Davis, 
741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987); Payne ex rel. Payne 
v. Myers, 743 P.2d 186 (Utah 1987); McKee v. 
Williams, 741 P.2d 978 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); 
Galloway v. Mangum, 744 P.2d 1365 (Utah 
1987); Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987); Kathy's Food Mtores, Inc. v. Equi-
table Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 753 P.2d 501 (Utah 
1988); Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 754 
P.2d 41 (Utah 1988); OK Motors, Inc. v. Hill, 
762 P.2d 1102 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Redevel-
opment Agency v, Daskalas, 785 P.2d 1112 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); Wade v. Burke, 800 P.2d 
1106 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); City Consumer 
Serv., Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234 (Utah 1991); 
Cornish Town v. Koiler, 817 P.2d 305 (Utah 
1991); Town of Manila v. Broadbent Land Co., 
818 P.2d 2 (Utah 1991); Peterson v. Peterson, 
818 P.2d 1305 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Quinn v. 
Quinn, 830 P.2d 282 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); 
King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P.2d 
858 (Utah 1992); Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992); J.H. ex rel. D.H. v. West 
Valley City, 840 P.2d 115 (Utah 1992). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Multiple 
Claims Under Rule 54(b): A Time for Reexami-
nation?, 1985 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 327. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and 
Error § 1009 et seq.; 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs 
§§ 14, 26 to 36, 87 et seq.; 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judg-
ments § 1. 
C.J.S. — 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error §§ 46 to 
166; 20 C.J.S. Costs § 1 et seq.; 49 C J .S . Judg-
ments § 1. 
A.L.R. — Attorney's personal liability for 
expenses incurred in relation to services for cli-
ent, 15 A.L.R.3d 531; 66 A.L.R.4th 256. 
Effect on compensation of architect or build-
ing contractor of express provision in private 
building contract limiting the cost of the build-
ing, 20 A.L.R.3d 778. 
Recoverability under property insurance or 
insurance against liability for property dam-
age of insured's expenses to prevent or miti-
g a t e damages, 33 A.L.R.3d 1262. 
Dismissal of plaintiffs action as entitling de-
tfendant to recover attorney's fees or costs as 
"'prevailing party" or "successful party," 66 
/A.L.R.3d 1087. 
Who is the "successful party" or "prevailing 
p&arty" for purposes of awarding costs where 
b» th parties prevail on affirmative claims, 66 
Ak.L.R.3d 1115. 
Continuance of civil case as conditioned 
urpon applicant's payment of costs or expenses 
incurred by other party, 9 A.L.R.4th 1144. 
Mule 55. Default. 
(a) Default. 
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative 
relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by 
these rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk shall enter his 
default. 
(2) Notice to party in default. After the entry of the default of any 
party, as provided in Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be neces-
sary to give such party in default any notice of action taken or to be taken 
or to serve any notice or paper otherwise required by these rules to be 
served on a party to the action or proceeding, except as provided in Rule 
5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or in the event that it is necessary for the court to 
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of damages of the 
nondefaulting party. 
Running of interest on judgment where both 
parties appeal, 11 A.L.R. 4th 1099. 
Allocation of defense costs between primary 
and excess insurance carriers, 19 A.L.R.4th 
107. 
Authority of trial judge to impose costs or 
other sanctions against attorney who fails to 
appear at, or proceed with, scheduled trial, 29 
A.L.R.4th 160. 
Allowance of attorneys' fees in mandamus 
proceedings, 34 A.L.R.4th 457. 
Retrospective application and effect of state 
statute or rule allowing interest or changing 
rate of interest on judgments or verdicts, 41 
A.L.R.4th 694. 
Obduracy as basis for state-court award of 
attorneys' fees, 49 A.L.R.4th 825. 
Modern status of state court rules governing 
entry of judgment on multiple claims, 80 
A.L.R.4th 707. 
Recoverability of cost of computerized legal 
research under 28 USC § 1920 or Rule 54(d), 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 80 A.L.R. 
Fed. 168. 
Modern status of Federal Civil Procedure 
Rule 54(b) governing entry of judgment on 
multiple claims, 89 A.L.R. Fed. 514. 
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error <*= 24 to 
135; Costs «* 78 et seq., 195 et seq., 221 et seq.; 
Judgment «=» 1. 
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State Retirement Office v. Salt Lake County, P.2d 1083 (Utah 1990); Alford v. Utah League 
780 P.2d 813 (Utah 1989); Donahue v. Durfee, of Cities & Towns, 791 P.2d 201 (Utah Ct. App. 
780 P.2d 1275 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Territorial 1990); Govert Copier Painting v. Van 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452 (Utah Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
Ct. App. 1989); G. Adams Ltd. Partnership v. Gate City Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Dalton, 
Durbano, 182 P.2d 962 (Utah C t App. 1989); 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991); City Consumer 
Chapman ex rel. Chapman v. Primary Chil- Serv., Inc. v, Peters, 815 P.2d 234 (Utah 1991); 
dren's Hosp., 784 R2d 1181 (Utah 1989); Yoho Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1991); 
Automotive, Inc. v. Shillington, 784 P.2d 1253 Silcox v„ Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); Hunt v. Hurst, 785 R2d (Utah Ct App. 1991); Kirk v. Division of Oceu-
414 (Utah 1990); Butterfield ex reL Butterfield pational & Professional Licensing, 815 P.2d 
v. Okubo, 790 P.2d 94 (Utah Ct App. 1990); 242 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Johnson v. Morton 
Whatcott v. Whatcott, 790 P.2d 578 (Utah Ct Thiokol, Inc., 818 R2d 997 (Utah 1991); Hill v, 
App* 1990); Village Inn Apts. v. State Farm Seattle First Natl Bank, 827 P.2d 241 (Utah 
Fire & Cas. Co., 790 P.2d 581 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Campbell v. State Farm Mut Auto. Ins.. 
1990); Madsen v. United Television, Inc., 797 Co., 840 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Attorneys' Fees in Dead man's statute, use of evidence exclud-
Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev, 553. able under, to defeat or support summary judg-
Note, The Movant's Burden in a Motion for ment, 67 A.L.R.3d 970. 
Summary Judgment, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 731. Liability in tort for interference with physi-
Am. Jur. 2d, — 73 Am. Jur. 2d Summary
 cian's contract or relationship with hospital, 7 
Judgment §§ 16 to 19, 26 to 36, 41 to 44. ALR.4th 572. 
C.J.SL - 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 219 to 227. Admissibility of oral testimony at state sum-
A X J t -Proceeding for summary judgment judgment hearing, 53 A.L.R.4th 527. 
f
 T o ^ r l ol P r e s e n t a t l 0 n o f counterclaim, 8 Sufficiency of evidence to support grant of 
'Reviewability of order denying motion for s u m m ^ r y j u d g ^ l t f *£ i f £?"* ** " " ^ 
summary judgment, 15 A.L.RSdI 899. proceedings, 53 A.L.R4th 561. 
Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action Necessity of oral argument on motion for 
as affected by opponent's motion for summary summary judgment or judgment on pleadings 
judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or di- m federal court, 105 A.L.R. Fed 755. 
rected verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113. Ker Numbers. — Judgment ** 178 to 190. 
Rule 57, Declaratory judgments. 
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment pursuant to Chapter 33 
of Title 78, U.C.A. 1953, shall be in accordance with these rules, and the right 
to trial by jury may be demanded under the circumstances and in the manner 
provided in Rules 38 and 39. The existence of another adequate remedy does 
not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate. 
The court may order a speedy hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment 
and may advance it on the calendar. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 57, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Oil Shale Corp. v. Larson, 20 Utah 
2d 369, 438 P.2d 540 (1968). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 22A Am. Jur. 2d Declara- declaratory relief in state court, 33 A.L.R.4th 
tory Judgments §§ 183, 186, 203 et seq. 146. 
C.J.S. — 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments Key Numbers Declaratory Judgment «=» 
§§ 17, 18, 104, 155. 41, 42, 251, 367. 
AX«R. —. Right to jury trial in action for 
Rule 58A. Entry. 
(a) Judgment upon the verdict of a jury. Unless the court otherwise 
directs and subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the verdict 
of a jury shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed. If there is a special 
verdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories re-
turned by a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the appropriate 
judgment which shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed. 
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(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided in Subdivision (a) hereo 
and Subdivision (b)(1) of Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed by the judge 
and filed with the clerk. 
(c) When judgment entered; notation in register of actions and judg-
ment docket. A judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered for all 
purposes, except the creation of a lien on real property, when the same is 
signed and filed as herein above provided. The clerk shall immediately make 
a notation of the judgment in the register of actions and the judgment docket. 
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment. The prevailing party shall 
promptly give notice of the signing or entry of judgment to all other parties 
and shall file proof of service of such notice with the clerk of the court. How-
ever, the time for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the notice require-
ment of this provision. 
(e) Judgment after death of a party. If a party dies after a verdict or 
decision upon any issue of fact and before judgment, judgment may neverthe-
less be rendered thereon. 
(f) Judgment by confession. Whenever a judgment by confession is au-
thorized by statute, the party seeking the same must file with the clerk of the 
court in which the judgment is to be entered a statement, verified by the 
defendant, to the following effect: 
(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money due or to become due, it 
shall concisely state the claim and that the sum confessed therefor is 
justly due or to become due; 
(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the purpose of securing the 
plaintiff against a contingent liability, it must state concisely the claim 
and that the sum confessed therefor does not exceed the same; 
(3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for a specified sum. 
The clerk shall thereupon endorse upon the statement, and enter in the 
judgment docket, a judgment of the court for the amount confessed, with costs 
of entry, if any. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Paragraph 
(d) is intended to remedy the difficulties sug-
gested by Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 14 
Utah 2d 334, 384 R2d 109 (1963). 
Compiler's Notes. — The subject matter of 
this rule is dealt with in Rules 58 and 79(a), 
F.R.C.P. 
ANALYSIS 
Death of party 
—During appeal 
Other cases 
—Unsigned minute entry 
When entered 
—Completion. 
Formal judgment. 
Notice to parties 
—Filing 
—Unsigned minute entry. 
Cited. 
Death of r&~tv. 
—During t * *1. 
Where i nrned verdict for plp"-*i*p but 
judge en' mctgment
 k . « _ - - , . the 
verdict. u^Aw. *•' it^&i* c*-'aintrk ~:ng 
appeai ai.* . J t abate appeal since co^ *>• cer 
Sub*4* iaion (e) of this rule, could stih * -iier 
* -agment on verdict if judgment notwithstand-
ing verdict were reversed Bau- v Burns, 2 
Utah 2d 362, 274 P.2d 569 (U -, 
Cross-References. — Judgment against 
person dying after verdict or decision, not a 
hen on realty, § 78-22-1 1 
Judgment by confession authorized, § 78-22-
3. 
Other cases. 
—Unsigned minute entry. 
An appeal from a summary judgment was 
dismissed where the record showed only an 
unsigned minute entry and no judgment or or-
der signed by the judge Wisden v City of 
Salina, 696 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1985) 
When entered. 
—Completion. 
Formal judgme* t 
Whether plamtif! n~J right to have action 
dismissed upon payrn of costs presented ju-
dicial question tG b^ i ~*rzmned by court, so 
thf»t where court c-~ case dismissed and 
clerk entered "ca&- •, <sed" in register of 
actions but formal . - had not been en-
tered, action was st 4 between parties 
Yusky v Chief Con- . filing Co., 65 Utah 
269, 236 P 45? ,> 
Notic* to parties. 
Vjuiei this rule, a judgment is complete and 
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^deemed entered for ail purpose* when it is 
signed and filed, and not when notice is re-
ceived by the parties r - dv's Estate, 121 
Utah 299, 241 P 2d « 
Where a losing pan 
judgment against her 
after learning that the 
ytered. and her ignorance *. 
r that time was due in par* 
t that the prevailing party was 
vide pursuant to this rule 
i ro set asiue »,hc 
boi a month 
y- ce n «n-
-^ent until 
JL of notice 
quired to pro-
ber motion was 
tamely under Rule 60(b) Workman v Nagle 
Constr, Xnc, 802 P 2d 749 (Utah Ct App 
1990) 
Plaintiffs' failure to mail a copy of the de-
fault judgment to defendants did not invalidate 
the default judgment when defendants re-
ceived the notice of default approximately 
seven weeks after the court entered the default 
judgment, in time to move to set aside the judg-
ment Lincoln Benefit Life Ins Co v D T 
Southern Properties, 838 P 2 d 672 (Utah Ct 
App 1992) 
—Filing. 
For cases discussing nece3s»tv oi vim/ ^ r 
posed findings, judgments ^rd "— ~— 
posing counsel m corrp]
 a r itn tormer Rule 
„ 2 , * ^ofT^-n t
 d andCir Ct (now 
Rule 4-504 r IU Administration), 
see Bigelow v
 sersoil, 6 i3 P 2d 50 (Utah 
i2Qf*), Wayne Garff Constr Co v Richaras 
7 0 6 P < J i n £ 5 rTL*h **) ( Ufov DC -
art Co 7* ' P 2d 697 (Utah l»ott) Larsen \ 
Larsen 674 P 2d 116 ^Utah 1983) 
—Unsigned miBute entry 
An unsigned nainute entry does not consti 
tute an entry of judgment, nor is it a final judg-
ment Wilson v Manning, 645 P 2d 655 (Utah 
1982), Wisden v City of Sahna, 696 P 2d 1205 
(Utah 1985) 
Cited in Orton v Adams, 21 Utah 2d 245, 
444 P 2d 62 (1968), Larsen v Larsen, 674 P 2d 
116 (Utah 1983) Sather v Gross, 727 P 2d 212 
(Utah 1986) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Smadach, Fuentes 
and Mitchell A Confusing Trilogy and Utah 
Prejudgment Remedies, 1974 Utah L Rev 
536 
Am J u r 2d. — 46 Am Jur 2d Judgments 
§§ 91 to 105 152 to 166 47 Am Jur 2d Judg-
ments §§ 1098 to 1151 
C J S. — 49 C J S Judgments §§ 29, 106 to 
116, 134 et seq 
A.L.R. — Requirements as to signing, seal-
ing, and attestation in warrants of attorney to 
confess judgment, 3 A L R 3 d 1147 
Enforceability of warrant of attorney to con-
fess judgment against assignee, guarantor, or 
other party obligating himself for performance 
of primary contract, 5 A L R 3d 426 
Constitutionality, construction application, 
and effect of statute invalidating powers of at-
torneys to confess judgment or contracts giving 
such power 40 A L R 3 d 1158 
Modern status of state court rules governing 
entry of judgment on multiple claims, 80 
A L R 4th 707 
What constitutes entry of judgment" within 
meaning of Rule 58 of Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure as amended m 1963, 10 A L R Fed 
709 
Key Numbers. — Judgment «=> 12, 29 et 
seq 270 to 272, 276 
Rule 58B. Satisfaction of judgment. 
(a) Satisfaction by owner or attorney. A judgment may be satisfied, m 
whole or in part, as to any or all of the judgment debtors, by the owner thereof, 
or by the attorney of record of the judgment creditor where no assignment of 
the judgment has been filed and such attorney executes such satisfaction 
within eight years after the entry of the judgment, in the following manner 
(1) by written instrument, duly acknowledged by such owner or attorney, or 
(2) by acknowledgment of such satisfaction signed by the owner or attorney 
and entered on the docket of the judgment m the county where first docketed, 
with the date affixed and witnessed by the clerk Every satisfaction of a part 
of the judgment, or as to one or more of the judgment debtors, shall state the 
amount paid thereon or for the release of such debtors, naming them 
(b) Satisfaction by order of court. When a judgment shall have been 
fully paid and not satisfied of record, or when the satisfaction of judgment 
-
1
*-
11 u
 ' * ' l judgment was recovered may, 
e the attorney of the judgment 
order declaring the same satis-
)on the docket 
sfaction of judgment, duly exe-
he same with the papers in the 
[e shall also enter a brief state-
amount paid, on the margin of 
\ of such satisfaction 
nt shall have been satisfied, in 
*, and such satisfaction entered 
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Cited in National Farmers Union Property 
& Cas Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P.2d 
249 (1955); Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435, 
326 P.2d 722 (1958); Howard v. Howard, 11 
Utah 2d 149, 356 P.2d 275 (1960); Nunley v 
Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 126, 
388 P.2d 798 (1964); Hanson v. General Bldrs 
Supply Co., 15 Utah 2d 143, 389 P.2d 61 
(1964); James Mfg. Co. v. Wilson, 15 Utah 2d 
210, 390 P.2d 127 (1964), Porcupine Reservoir 
Co v Lloyd W Keller Corp., 15 Utah 2d 318, 
392 P.2d 620 (1964); Watson v. Anderson, 29 
Utah 2d 36, 504 P.2d 1003 (1973); Nichols v 
State, 554 P.2d 231 (Utah 1976); Edgar v. 
Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah 1977); Time Com. 
Fin. Corp v. Bnmhall, 575 P.2d 701 (Utah 
1978); Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828 
(Utah 1980); Miller Pontiac, Inc. v. Osborne, 
622 P.2d 800 (Utah 1981); Mulhenn v. Inger-
soll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981); 
Kohler v. Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 (Utah 
1981); Pozzolan Portland Cement Co v Gard-
ner, 668 P.2d 569 (Utah 1983); Nelson v. 
Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983); Golden 
Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730 (Utah 
1985); Estate of Kay, 705 P.2d 1165 (Utah 
1985); York v Unqualified Washington 
County Elected Officials, 714 P.2d 679 (Utah 
1986); King v Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 
1987); Fackrell v Fackrell, 740 P 2d 1318 
(Utah 1987); Walker v Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372 
(Utah Ct App. 1987); Arnica Mut. Ins. Co v 
Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct App 1989); 
Paryzek v Paryzek, 776 P.2d 78 (Utah Ct 
App. 1989); Allred v. Allred, 835 P.2d 974 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial 
§§ 11 to 14, 29 et seq., 187 to 191. 
C.J.S. — 66 C.J.S. New Trial §§ 13 et seq., 
115, 116, 122 to 127. 
A.L.R. — Consent as ground of vacating 
judgment, or granting new trial, in civil case, 
after expiration of term or time prescribed by 
statute or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion 
or comments by judge as to compromise or set-
tlement of civil case, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457. 
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits 
in opposition to motion for new trial m civil 
case, 7 A.L.R.3d 1000 
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.L.R.3d 335. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instruc-
tions in civil case as affected by the manner m 
which they are written, 10 A.L.R.3d 501 
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by 
jury in civil case of scene of accident or prem-
ises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918. 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of reference 
by counsel m civil case to result of former trial 
of same case, or amount of verdict therein, 15 
A.L.R.3d 1101. 
Absence of judge from courtroom during trial 
of civil case, 25 A.L.R.3d 637 
Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of 
acquaintance or relationship with attorney m 
case, or with partner or associate of such attor-
ney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64 
A.L.R.3d 126. 
Amendment, after expiration of time for fil-
ing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion 
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845 
Authority of state court to order jury trial in 
civil case where jury has been waived or not 
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041. 
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching 
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on 
appeal, 38 A.L.R.4th 1170 
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state 
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747 
Court reporter's death or disability prior to 
transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or 
new trial, 57 A.L.R.4th 1049 
Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory 
damages for personal injury to or death of sea-
man in actions under Jones Act (46 USCS 
Appx. § 688) or doctrine of unseaworthiness — 
modern cases, 96 A.L.R. Fed. 541. 
Excessiveness or adequacy of awards of dam-
ages for personal injury or death in actions un-
der Federal Employers' Liability Act (45 USCS 
§§ 51 et seq.) — modern cases, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 
189. 
Key Numbers. — New Trial «= 13 et seq., 
110, 116 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
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(4) when, for any cause fhc o , ,^mons in an action has not been personally 
served upon ^ ^ rendari t as required u~* H, - -M md t - -Wo«^o~+ h~~ 
failed to appea^ n said action, (5) the judgment is void, , ^ e judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment uh n which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equity!? ^ ^ t 
the judgment should have prospective application, or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4) not more than 3 
.nonths after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion 
Rule 60 F R C P to set aside judgment, § 21 1 5 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
"Any other reason justifying relief" 
—Default judgment 
—Impossibility of compliance with order 
—Incompetent counsel 
—Lack of due process 
—Merits of case 
—Mistake or inadvertence 
—Real party in interest 
Appeals 
Clerical mistakes 
—Computation of damages 
—Correction after appeal 
—Date of judgment 
Void judgment 
—Estate record 
—Inherent power of courts 
—Intent of court and parties 
—Judicial error distinguished 
—Order prepared by counsel 
—Predating of new trial motion. 
Court's discretion 
Default judgment 
Effect of set aside judgment 
—Admissions 
Fraud 
—Divorce action 
Form of motion 
Independent action 
—Constitutionality of taxes. 
—Divorce decree 
—Fraud or duress 
—Motion distinguished 
Invalid summons 
—Amendment without notice 
Inequity of prospective application 
Jurisdiction 
Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable 
neglect 
—Default judgment 
Illness 
Inconvenience 
Merits pjf claim 
Negligence of attorney 
——No claim for relief 
—Delayed motion for new trial 
—Failure to file cost bill 
—Failure to file notice of appeal 
—Nonreceipt of notice and findings 
—Trial court's discretion 
—Unemployment compensation appeal 
—Workmen s compensation appeal 
Newly discovered evidence 
—Burden of proof 
—Discretion not abused 
Procedure 
—Notice to parties 
Res judicata 
Reversal of judgment 
—Invalidation of sale 
Satisfaction, release or discharge 
—Accord and satisfaction 
—Discharging representative of estate from 
further demand 
—Erroneously included damages 
—Prospective application of judgment 
Timeliness of motion 
—Confused mental condition of party 
—Dismissal for lack of prosecution 
—Fraud 
—Invalid service 
—Judicial error 
—Jurisdiction 
—Mistake, inadvertence and neglect 
—Newly discovered evidence 
—Order entered upon erroneous assumption 
— 'Reasonable time ' 
—Reconsideration of previously denied motion 
—Satisfaction 
Unauthorized appearance 
Void judgment 
—Basis 
—Lack of jurisdiction 
Cited 
"Any other reason justifying relief." 
Subdivision (7) embodies three require-
ments First, that the reason be one other than 
those listed in Subdivisions (1) through (6) sec-
ond, that the reason justify relief and third, 
that the motion be made within a reasonable 
time Laub v South Cent Utah Tel Ass'n, 657 
P2d 1304 (Utah 1982), Richins v Delbert 
Chipman & Sons, 817 P 2d 382 (Utah Ct App 
1991) 
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Where a defendant's motion to set aside 
judgment based on Subdivisions (b)(1) and (7) 
and his motion for a new trial claimed that 
plaintiff violated Rule 5(a) on several occasions 
by not providing defendant with a copy of 
pleadings, thereby causing surprise, centering 
on plaintiffs failure to provide a copy of his 
motion for summary judgment to defendant, 
which the latter claimed was a clear showing 
of fraud on plaintiffs part, the trial court could 
have believed in denying defendant's motion, 
that fraud was not present in what could be 
considered a lapse in procedure by plaintiffs 
counsel. Walker v. Carlson, 740 P.2d 1372 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Defendant's claim that he mistakenly en-
tered into an ill-advised stipulation without 
fully understanding its consequences was cor-
rectly characterized by trial court as mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise or neglect under Subdi-
vision (b)(1); because Subdivision (b)(1) ap-
plied, Subdivision (b)(7) could not apply and 
could not be used to circumvent the three-
month filing period. Richins v. Delbert 
Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
—Default judgment. 
It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial 
court to relieve a defendant from default and 
allow her to answer where it was shown that 
she had mistakenly believed that she was fully 
protected by a divorce decree and felt that such 
decree required her husband to bear the obliga-
tion and defend the action for her. Ney v. Har-
rison, 5 Utah 2d 217, 299 P.2d 1114 (1956). 
Trial judge did not abuse discretion in refus-
ing to set aside default judgment where defen-
dant asserted that he thought the summons 
was invalid and therefore paid no attention to 
it. Board of Educ. v. Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 
P.2d 806 (1963). 
Where any reasonable excuse is offered by 
defaulting party, courts generally tend to favor 
granting relief from a default judgment, unless 
it appears that to do so would result in sub-
stantial injustice to the adverse party. West-
inghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen 
Contractor, 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975). 
Subdivision (b)(7) did not apply in a case 
where defendant husband sought to set aside a 
default judgment of divorce 5 2h months after 
its entry on the grounds that plaintiff wife had 
incorrectly stated the extent of his assets, and 
that he had not received a copy of the amended 
divorce decree; therefore the court had no juris-
diction to disturb the judgment. Kessimakis v. 
Kessimakis, 546 P.2d 888 (Utah 1976). 
Where defendant stated he failed to answer 
complaints due to naivete regarding the legal 
process but admitted that he had discussed the 
complaint with an attorney, had failed to de-
liver necessary documents to the attorney, and 
had never paid the attorney, it was not abuse 
of discretion for court to refuse to set aside de-
fault judgment against defendant "for any 
other reason justifying relief." J.P.W. Enters., 
Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486 (Utah 1979). 
Where plaintiff sought relief from a default 
judgment pursuant to Subdivision (b) on three 
occasions before three different judges and his 
motions were denied in the first two proceed^ 
ings, the third judge was barred by the law of 
the case from overruling the previous orders. 
Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987). 
—Impossibility of compliance with order. 
Impossibility of compliance with a court or-
der, such as an order that the defendant return 
property he has already sold, is an appropriate 
basis for amendment of the order. Corbett v. 
Fitzgerald, 709 P.2d 384 (Utah 1985) 
—Incompetent counsel. 
The provisions of Subdivision (b)(7) are suffi-
ciently broad to permit a court to set aside an 
order, dismissing a plaintiffs complaint, which 
was entered upon an assumption that the 
plaintiff was procrastinating and not answer-
ing interrogatories submitted to him and to en-
ter a new order based upon the record before it 
that plaintiff was represented by incompetent 
counsel and that defendants were not being 
unduly prejudiced. Stewart v. Sullivan, 29 
Utah 2d 156, 506 P.2d 74 (1973). 
—Lack of due process. 
A party claiming and establishing a lack of 
due process of law would be entitled to relief 
from a judgment under Subdivision (b)(7) even 
after the expiration of three months, because 
relief from a judgment on account of a lack of 
due process of law is not expressly provided for 
by this rule. Bish's Sheet Metal Co. v. Luras, 
11 Utah 2d 357, 359 P.2d 21 (1961). 
—Merits of case. 
Where defendant, in his reasons for setting 
aside default judgment, asserted that the judg-
ment entered was based upon a void contract 
for the reason that the contract did not comply 
with the statute of frauds, such assertion went 
to the merit of the case and could not be consid-
ered on motion to set aside judgment. Board of 
Educ. v. Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 806 
(1963). 
—Mistake or inadvertence. 
Subdivision (b)(7) may not be used to circum-
vent the three-month filing period where the 
basis for the relief from judgment is based on 
mistake or inadvertence. Pitts v. McLachlan 
567 P.2d 171 (Utah 1977). 
Subdivision (b)(7) of this rule is not available 
to one who should have filed under Subdivision 
(b)(1) but did not do so within the three-month 
time limitation. Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 
652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982). 
The provisions of Subdivision (b)(7) may not 
be used to circumvent the time limitation on 
motions pursuant to Subdivision (bXD. Gardi-
ner & Gardiner Bldrs. v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429 
(Utah 1982). 
Subdivision (b)(7) of this rule may not be re-
sorted to for relief when the ground asserted 
for relief falls within Subdivision (b)(1) since 
the three-month limitation on relief under 
Subdivision (b)(1) would be averted. Russell v. 
Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984). 
The three-month period allowed for Subdivi-
sion (b)(1) motions may not be circumvented by 
filing a motion under Subdivision (b)(7). 
Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984). 
—Real party in interest 
In action by corporation for legal services 
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rendered, trial court's denial of defendant's mo-
tion to set aside default judgment on grounds 
plaintiff was not the real party in interest, un-
der Subdivision (b)(7) of this rule, was sup-
ported by evidence that plaintiff was the real 
party in interest and that defendant had 
knowledge thereof. Robinson v. Myers, 599 
P.2d 513 (Utah 1979). 
Appeals.
 t 
An order denying relief under Subdivision 
(b) is a final appealable order. Moreover, im-
proper or untimely motions do not toll the time 
for appeal from final orders* Arnica Mut. Ins, 
Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
Clerical mistakes* 
Computation of damages. 
Where damage award was based on the sum 
of four separate amounts listed in a letter ex-
hibit, and the sum of the amounts was in error, 
the error was within the definition of a clerical 
mistake and was subject to correction by the 
trial court. Stanger v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. 
Co., 669 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983). 
—Correction after appeal. 
Trial court may correct clerical error made 
in recording of decree after Supreme Court has 
affirmed erroneous decree on appeal. Bagnall 
v. Suburbia Land Co.? 579 P.2d 917 (Utah 
1978). 
—Date of judgmento 
Void j u d g m e n t 
Where later judgment was void and different 
from earlier valid judgment, no appeal could be 
taken on ground that defendants were appeal-
ing from the earlier judgment and that inser-
tion of date of void judgment was merely a cler-
ical error which court could correct. Nunley v. 
Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 126, 
388 P.2d 798 (1964). 
—Estate record. 
The correction of the record in an estate is 
properly made in the probate court in which 
the errors occurred, and the court was justified 
in accepting parol evidence as to the incorrect-
ness of the record. Harmston v. Harmston, 5 
Utah 2d 357, 302 P.2d 270 (1956). 
—Inherent power of courts. 
The courts of this state had recognized the 
inherent right of a court to enter a judgment 
nunc pro tunc to correct clerical errors. Frost v. 
District Court ex rel. Box Elder County, 96 
Utah 106, 83 P.2d 737 (1938). 
—Intent of court and parties. 
The correction contemplated by Subdivision 
(a) of this rule must be undertaken for the pur-
pose of reflecting the actual intention of the 
court and parties. Lindsay v. Atkin, 680 P.2d 
401 (Utah 1984). 
—Judicial error distinguished. 
The distinction between a judicial error and 
a clerical error does not depend upon who made 
it; rather, it depends on whether it was made 
in rendering the judgment (judicial error) or in 
recording the judgment as rendered (clerical 
error). Richards v. Siddoway, 24 Utah 2d 314, 
471 P.2d 143 (1970). 
Question of whether an error is "judicial" or 
"clerical" depends not on who made it, but on 
whether it was made in rendering the judg-
ment.or in recording the judgment Lindsay v. 
Atkin, 680 P.2d 401 (Utah 1984). 
—Order prepared by counsel. 
Erroneous assumption by judge in signing 
order that the order as prepared by counsel cor-
rectly reflected his judgment was a mistake of 
a perfunctory or clerical nature which the 
court could and properly did correct upon its 
own motion. Meagher v. Equity Oil Co., 5 Utah 
2d 196, 299 R2d 827 (1956). 
—Predating of new trial motion, 
A court may not enter a nunc pro tunc pre-
dating a motion for new trial that is untimely 
filed so that the motion will be timely Kettner 
v. Snow, 13 Utah 2d 382, 375 P.2d 28 (1962). 
Court's discretion. 
The trial court is afforded broad discretion in 
ruling on a motion for relief from judgment 
under Subdivision (b), and its determination 
will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discre-
tion. Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
Default judgment. 
Once a default judgment has been entered, it 
can only be set aside in accordance with Subdi-
vision (b). Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 
P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Effect of set°aside judgment. 
—Admissions. 
Subdivision (b) does not provide that as part 
of the order setting aside a judgment any ad-
missions are also set aside; those matters are 
covered exclusively by a motion made as pro-
vided by Rule 36(b). Whitaker v. Nikols, 699 
P.2d 685 (Utah 1985). 
Fraud. 
—Divorce action. 
Motion to set aside provisions of divorce de-
cree concerning child custody and support 
based upon allegation that wife had perpetu-
ated a fraud upon the court by falsely claiming 
husband was child's father did not comply with 
Subdivision (b) and should have been denied. 
McGavin v. McGavin, 27 Utah 2d 200, 494 
P.2d 283 (1972). 
The wife in a divorce action was entitled to 
have the decree set aside on the ground of 
fraud where the assets of the parties may have 
been more than five times the amount dis-
closed by the husband who prevented the wife 
from gaining full and accurate knowledge of 
his total assets by transferring his corporate 
holdings to family members without relin-
quishing control of those assets, by 
understating the true value of jointly held 
property, and by avoiding compliance with 
court-ordered discovery. Boyce v. Boyce, 609 
P.2d 928 (Utah 1980). 
Form of motion. 
Trial court did not err in vacating judgment 
in response to defendants' supplemental state-
ment of objections, which, though clearly mis-
labeled, was the functional equivalent of a mo-
tion to set aside the judgment under Subdivi-
sion (b), was filed in contemplation of the rule, 
contained the same kinds of arguments and as-
sertions one would normally expect to find in a 
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motion to set aside the judgment, and was 
treated by the trial court as such a motion. 
Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). 
Independent action. 
—Constitutionality of taxes. 
Constitutionality of state income tax rates 
could only be raised in independent action and 
not in supplemental proceedings upon warrant 
for judgment for underpayment of income 
taxes. State Tax Comm'n v. Wright, 596 P.2d 
634 (Utah 1979). 
—Divorce decree. 
Where ex-husband brought independent ac-
tion in equity seeking relief from that part of 
divorce decree naming him father of unborn 
child and ordering payments for its support, on 
ground that child was not his, court properly 
ordered taking of blood test, and upon showing 
that ex-husband could not be father, properly 
granted relief sought. Egan v. Egan, 560 P.2d 
704 (Utah 1977). 
—Fraud or duress. 
Where "fraud upon the court" is the grava-
men of a proceeding to relieve a party of the 
effect of a judgment, such proceeding must be 
pursued in an independent action by filing a 
separate suit, and not by way of motion in the 
original action. Shaw v. Pilcher, 9 Utah 2d 
222, 341 P.2d 949 (1959). 
The three-month limitation period does not 
limit the power of a court to entertain an inde-
pendent common-law action to set aside a judg-
ment or decree for fraud or duress after the 
three-month period has expired. Rather, the 
doctrine of laches and other equitable princi-
ples determine the time within which the ac-
tion must be brought. St. Pierre v. Edmonds, 
645 P.2d 615 (Utah 1982). 
This rule does not limit the power of the 
court to entertain an independent action based 
on fraud. Despain v. Despam, 682 P.2d 849 
(Utah 1984). 
—Motion distinguished. 
Where plaintiff filed separate, independent 
action to vacate six-year-old divorce decree, 
but reverted to procedure for motion in the 
original action and trial court dealt with the 
matter as having been made on motion only, 
plaintiffs "action" became a motion to set aside 
judgment and, as such, was properly dismissed 
as having been filed beyond the statutory dead-
line. Howard v. Howard, 601 P.2d 931 (Utah 
1979). 
Invalid summons. 
—Amendment without notice. 
Where original summons designated a court 
which, because of the amount in controversy, 
could not have had jurisdiction and summons 
was improperly amended without notice to de-
fendant to indicate court with jurisdiction and 
where the complaint had been filed, defendant 
was entitled to relief from default judgment in 
latter court based on ground there had been no 
valid service of summons. Utah Sand & Gravel 
Prods. Corp. v. Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 
P.2d 703 (1965). 
Inequity of prospective application. 
The third clause in Subdivision (b)(6) pro-
vides a basis for relief from a judgment that 
has prospective application when subsequent 
events have occurred making enforcement of 
the judgment's prospective application no lon-
ger equitable. Party who claimed that the judg-
ment never was equitable but that he did not 
realize its inequity until later, but who did not 
allege that any subsequent event had rendered 
the prospective application of the judgment no 
longer equitable, was not entitled to relief un-
der Subdivision (b)(6). Richins v. Delbert 
Chipman & Sons, 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
Jurisdiction. 
The trial court has jurisdiction to consider a 
Subdivision (b) motion while an appeal is pend-
ing. If the trial court finds the motion to be 
without merit, it may enter an order denying 
the motion, and the parties may appeal from 
that order. If, however, the trial court is in-
clined to grant the motion, counsel should ob-
tain a brief memorandum to that effect from 
the trial court, and request an order of remand 
from the appellate court so that the trial court 
can enter an order. Baker v. Western Sur. Co., 
757 P.2d 878 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); White v. 
State, 795 P.2d 648 (Utah 1990). 
A trial court has no jurisdiction to consider 
the merits of an untimely motion under Subdi-
vision (b)(1). Richins v. Delbert Chipman & 
Sons, 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excus-
able neglect. 
—Default judgment. 
A refusal to set aside a default divorce decree 
was not an abuse of discretion where the con-
duct of the party in default indicated absence 
of good faith and where the granting of relief 
would work an injustice upon the opposing 
party. Chrysler v. Chrysler, 5 Utah 2d 415, 303 
P.2d 995 (1956). 
It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial 
court to deny a motion for relief from a default 
judgment where there was evidence that plain-
tiffs attorney had called the defendant's attor-
ney several days before the default and re-
minded him that the matter was in default and 
in view of the fact that the plaintiff, an elderly 
woman, had traveled from Seattle, Washing-
ton, to be present and presented an accounting 
at the default hearing. Masters v. LeSeuer, 13 
Utah 2d 293, 373 P 2d 573 (1962). 
Default judgments should have been set 
aside where stockholders seeking an opportu-
nity to protect their interest in actions against 
corporation, showed that process was served on 
person resigning as president, sending notices 
to only two other remaining directors when 
there was no active management functioning; 
that shareholders' group attempted to form a 
reorganization committee and hired counsel 
two days after final day for answering; and 
counsel on day of appointment, having been 
refused an opportunity to answer, filed motions 
to set aside default judgments. Mayhew v. 
Standard Gilsonite Co., 14 Utah 2d 52, 376 
R2d 951 (1962). 
A default certificate may be set aside upon 
the grounds of excusable neglect. Heathman v. 
Fabian, 14 Utah 2d 60, 377 P.2d 189 (1962). 
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Refusal to set aside default judgment on 
ground of excusable neglect was not error 
where defendant failed to contact his counsel 
from February to time of trial in September, 
and counsel did not attempt to contact defen-
dant until ten days before trial even though 
both had long been informed of approximate 
time of trial, notwithstanding claim that coun-
sel was unable to contact defendant due to de-
fendant's long working hours and his custom of 
visiting his wife who was terminally ill with 
cancer. Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 
30 Utah 2d 65, 513 R2d 429 (1973). 
<• Motion for relief from default judgment was 
properly denied to cosigner (father) who 
claimed that his son was the proper defendant 
and took no steps to file an answer to the com-
plaint. Pacer Sport & Cycle, Inc. v. Myers, 534 
P.2d 616 (Utah 1975). 
A trial court is justified in denying relief 
from a default judgment because of lack of 
timely request, long passage of time before 
making such request, general procedural ne-
glect, urgence of hypertechnicality about a 
statute, or an almost complete absence of sub-
stance or merit in the relief for which he 
prayed. Heath v. Heath, 541 P.2d 1040 (Utah 
1975). 
Motion to set aside default judgment was 
properly denied in case where defendant of-
fered no reasonable excuse for his nonappear-
ance, failed to respond to repeated attempts to 
contact him regarding status of the lawsuit he 
knew was pending, and knew that a hearing 
had been scheduled and that his counsel had 
withdrawn. Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 855 
(Utah 1979). 
Where defendant claimed default judgment 
was due to his attorney's failure to communi-
cate with him, and the record showed that de-
fendant failed to contract his attorney for one 
and half years after he filed his answer and 
counterclaim, trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in denying defendant's motion to set 
aside the default judgment. Gardiner & Gardi-
ner Bldrs. v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429 (Utah 1982). 
In order for defendant to be relieved from a 
default judgment, he must not only show that 
the judgment was entered against him through 
any reason specified in Subdivision (b), but he 
must also show that his motion to set aside the 
judgment was timely, and that he has a meri-
torious defense to the action. A meritorious de-
fense is one which sets forth specific and suffi-
ciently detailed facts which, if proven, would 
have resulted in a judgment different from the 
one entered. State ex rel. Utah State Dep't of 
Social Servs. v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 
(Utah 1983). 
Default judgment should not have been en-
tered in tort case arising out of injuries in-
flicted upon plaintiff by defendant where con-
tradictions surrounding adequacy of service of 
process and other factors resulted in genuine 
mistake on part of defendant, in the absence of 
which the default would not have occurred. 
May v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109 (Utah 1984). 
- Default judgment was proper where state-
ments of defendant demonstrated indifference 
on his part, and lack of diligence in pursuing 
his opportunity to defend. Russell v. Martell, 
681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984). 
Neither the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, 
§ 78-22a-l et seq., nor this rule, permits a 
court to set aside a foreign default judgment 
because of alleged inadvertence, mistake, or 
neglect absent a showing of fraud or the lack of 
jurisdiction or due process in the rendering 
state. Data Mgt, Sys. v. EDP Corp., 709 R2d 
377 (Utah 1985). 
Failure to reserve rights under § 70A=3-
606(1 )(a)v which governs impairment of re-
course or of collateral in regard to commercial 
paper and does not apply to judgments, could 
not be used to set aside default judgments 
against debtors under Subdivision (b)(6) of this 
rule. First Sec. Bank v. Aarian Dev. Corp., 738 
P.2d 1019 (Utah 1987). 
——Illness. 
Illness alone is not a sufficient excuse to 
make neglect in failing to defend a cause of 
action a ground for vacating a default judg-
ment. Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 
416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953). 
Inconvenience. 
Mere inconvenience or the press of personal 
or business affairs is not deemed as an excuse 
for failure to appear at trial. Valley Leasing v. 
Houghton, 661 P.2d 959 (Utah 1983). 
— M e r i t s of claim. 
Usually, it is not appropriate on Subdivision 
(b) motions to examine the merits of the claim 
decided by the default judgment. Larsen v. 
Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984). 
Negligence of attorney* 
An oral promise made by the attorney for the 
plaintiff to the effect that defendant could have 
more time in which to answer, where the plain-
tiff already had obtained a default judgment, 
was now sufficient excusable neglect so as to 
allow the vacation of the default judgment. The 
defendants were deprived of nothing by the al-
leged promise inasmuch as the default judg-
ment had already been entered. Such a prom-
ise could in no way bind a client who already 
had a judgment. Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 
123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953). 
Where defendant's counsel withdrew at pre-
trial conference and defendant claimed it re-, 
ceived no notice to appoint counsel and had no 
notice of trial until it received notice of default 
judgment, the default was set aside in the in-
terest of justice, the court stating that where 
there is doubt about whether a default should 
be set aside, the doubt should be resolved in 
favor of doing so. Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. 
Agla Dev. Corp., 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980). 
Where plaintiffs attorney and insurance ad-
juster for defendant's insurance company were 
engaged in settlement talks at time plaintiffs 
petition was filed, defendant was entitled to 
relief from subsequent summary judgment on 
grounds of "excusable neglect" since plaintiffs 
attorney had duty to notify adjuster of poten-
tial default and did not do so. Helgesen v. 
Inyangumia, 636 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1981). 
Party may not claim his attorney's neglect in 
failing to notify him of proceeding as grounds 
for setting aside a default judgment where the 
party has been negligent by not communicat-
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ing with his attorney. Gardiner & Gardiner 
Bldrs. v Swapp, '656 P.2d 429 (Utah 1982). 
The trial court abused its discretion in refus-
ing to set aside a summary judgment after a 
failure to observe the rule prescribing the pro-
cedure to be followed upon withdrawal of an 
attorney had been brought to the attention of 
the court. Sperry v. Smith, 694 P.2d 581 (Utah 
1984). 
The reasons asserted by the defendant for 
setting aside the default judgment, that his at-
torney neglected to file an answer and that he 
mistakenly relied on his attorney's assurances 
that an answer had been filed, fell within Sub-
division (b)(1), not Subdivision (b)(7), and the 
defendant's filing of a motion to set aside the 
default judgment six months after its entry 
was therefore untimely. Lincoln Benefit Life 
Ins. Co. v. D.T. Southern Properties, 838 P.2d 
672 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
No claim for relief. 
Trial court abused its discretion in condition-
ing the setting aside of a default judgment 
against defendant upon his payment of attor-
ney fees where plaintiffs complaint was funda-
mentally flawed in that it appeared clearly 
upon the face of the complaint that no claim for 
relief was stated. Sovereen v. Meadows, 595 
P.2d 852 (Utah 1979). 
—Delayed motion for new trial. 
In furtherance of their discretion to grant 
relief "in furtherance of justice," district courts 
could allow a notice of motion for new trial to 
be filed after the prescribed time limit when a 
proper application and sufficient showing 
therefor was made. Audia v. Denver & 
R.G.R.R., 45 Utah 459,146 P. 559 (1915); Lund 
v. Third Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Salt Lake 
County, 90 Utah 433, 62 P.2d 278 (1936). 
Party seeking relief "in furtherance of jus-
tice" to permit tardy filing of notice of motion 
for new trial had to do more than merely move 
the court to act and file the necessary affida-
vits in support of motion for a new trial; the 
applicant had to produce proper evidence upon 
which the court could base findings that 
through no fault of his he was prevented from 
filing notice of motion for a new trial within 
the time fixed by the statute, and had to pro-
duce satisfactory evidence why he did not ap-
ply for an extension of time at some time 
within the statutory limitation. Lund v. Third 
Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Salt Lake County, 
90 Utah 433, 62 P.2d 278 (1936). 
—Failure to file cost bill. 
Whether party would be relieved from ne-
glect in failing to file timely cost bill was 
within discretion of trial court. Hirsh v. Ogden 
Furn. & Carpet Co., 51 Utah 558, 172 P. 318 
(1918). 
—Failure to file notice of appeal. 
Neither Rule 6(b), granting the court power 
to extend where a failure to act in time is due 
to "excusable neglect" generally, nor Subdivi-
sion (b)(1) authorizing the court to relieve from 
a final judgment for inadvertence or excusable 
neglect, applies where the notice of appeal has 
not been filed in time. Anderson v. Anderson, 3 
Utah 2d 277, 282 P.2d 845 (1955); Holbrook v. 
Hodson, 24 Utah 2d 120, 466 P.2d 843 (1970). 
—Nonreceipt of notice and findings. 
The fact that his counsel did not receive no-
tice and findings from the clerk of the court 
does not entitle an appellant to file out of time 
a motion to amend findings and decree, and a 
motion for a new trial. In re Bundy's Estate, 
121 Utah 299, 241 P.2d 462 (1952). 
—Trial court's discretion. 
Trial court has discretion in determining 
whether a movant has shown "mistake, inad-
vertence, surprise, or excusable neglect," and 
the Supreme Court will reverse the trial 
court's ruling only when there has been an 
abuse of discretion. Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 
52 (Utah 1984). 
—Unemployment compensation appeal. 
An administrative law judge's refusal to con-
sider an employer's untimely protest of a deter-
mination of benefits by the department of em-
ployment security did not contravene a 
claimed public policy to relieve a party of de-
fault for "mistake" or "excusable neglect." 
Mini Spas, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 733 P.2d 
130 (Utah 1987). 
—Workmen's compensation appeal. 
Supreme Court could not relieve applicant 
from operation of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act section prescribing the time within 
which a writ of certiorari had to be applied for; 
fact that applicant's counsel was misinformed 
by commission's stenographer that there had 
been no decision did not authorize granting of 
relief. Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 73 
Utah 199, 273 P. 306 (1928). 
Newly discovered evidence. 
—Burden of proof. 
The burden of showing facts to justify the 
granting of a new trial is upon one seeking 
such relief Kettner v. Snow, 13 Utah 2d 382, 
375 P.2d 28 (1962). 
—Discretion not abused. 
District court held not to abuse its discretion 
in denying motion for new trial based on 
"newly discovered evidence." See Hall v. Fitz-
gerald, 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983). 
Procedure. 
—Notice to parties. 
Motion to reconsider a motion is not provided 
for under these rules, but even if it were, trial 
court erred in hearing defendant's motion and 
acting upon it ex parte and without any notice 
to plaintiff. Utah State Employees Credit 
Union v. Riding, 24 Utah 2d 211, 469 P.2d 1 
(1970). 
Res judicata. 
A denial of a motion under this rule pre-
cludes a subsequent collateral attack on the 
judgment only if the claim or ground actually 
adjudicated in the Rule 60(b) motion is the 
same claim asserted in the independent action. 
Pepper v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 801 P.2d 144 
(Utah 1990). 
Reversal of judgment 
—Invalidation of sale. 
Where real estate agent was granted default 
judgment against purchaser of home for uncol-
lected commission from sale, subsequent inval-
idation of purchaser's and seller's sales con-
tract warranted vacation of default judgment 
upon purchaser's motion. Kelly v. Scott, 5 Utah 
2d 159, 298 P.2d 821 (1956). 
Satisfaction, release or discharge. 
—Accord and satisfaction. 
A judgment defendant is not constrained to 
raise an alleged accord and satisfaction only as 
an affirmative defense to further attempts by a 
judgment creditor to enforce the terms of a 
judgment. Rather, the issue may be raised 
seeking direct judicial sanction of the satisfac-
tion by motion or independent action pursuant 
to Subdivision (b)(6). Sugarhouse Fin Co„ v 
Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1980). 
When a judgment creditor accepted a prom° 
issory note with greater consideration and dif-
ferent performance from the earlier judgment, 
he released the judgment debtor from the judg-
ment in an accord and satisfaction. Brimley v. 
Gasser, 754 P.2d 97 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
—Discharging representative of estate 
from further demand. 
Relief under this rule is available with re-
gard to an order under § 75-3-1001 discharg-
ing a personal representative of an estate from 
further claim or demand after a final order has 
been entered. Morgan v. Zions Nat'l Bank, 711 
P.2d 261 (Utah 1985). 
—Erroneously included damages. 
Defendant, whose insurance company had 
satisfied judgment against him in automobile 
accident action which erroneously included 
amounts plaintiff had received as PIP benefits 
under its insurance policy, could not seek to 
modify judgment to exclude erroneously in-
cluded amount by way of motion pursuant to 
either Subdivisions (b)(6) or (7). Laub v. South 
Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 
1982). 
—Prospective application of judgment. 
Rule permitting relief from a judgment on 
the basis that it is no longer equitable that the 
judgment have prospective application was in-
applicable between the parties when the judg-
ment had been satisfied by the party seeking 
relief. Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 
657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982). 
Timeliness of motion. 
A motion to set aside a judgment that is 
based on a reversed judgment must be made 
within a reasonable time. Guardian State 
Bank v. Stangl, 778 P.2d 1 (Utah 1989). 
—Confused mental condition of party. 
There was no abuse of discretion in trial 
court's denial of plaintiffs motion to vacate or-
der dismissing action entered pursuant to re-
lease and stipulation of parties where motion 
was filed six and one-half years after plaintiffs 
physician detected plaintiffs confused mental 
condition urged as basis for vacating motion. 
Young v. Western Piling & Sheeting, 680 P.2d 
394 (Utah 1984). 
—Dismissal for lack of prosecution. 
Where the evidence indicated that plaintiff 
had not gotten in touch with his attorney for 
two years after filing complaint, it was proper 
for court to deny plaintiffs motion to set aside 
a judgment, dismissing his complaint for lack 
of prosecution. Pitman v. Bonham, 677 .P.2d 
1126 (Utah 1984). 
A trial court's refusal to set aside a dismissal 
for failure to prosecute will not be overturned 
absent an abuse of discretion. Meadow Fresh 
Farms v. Utah State Univ. Dept. of Agric, 813 
P.2d 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in re-
fusing to set aside a dismissal for failure to 
prosecute, .where the underlying events oc-
curred in 1981, an initial action filed in 1983 
was dismissed for lack of prosecution, and the 
instant action based on the same facts was not 
filed until 1988, by which time many of the 
potential witnesses might have moved out of 
state and/or their recollection of the circum-
stances and events might have dimmed. 
Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State Univ. 
Dept. of Agric, 813 P.2d 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
—Fraud. 
A cross-complaint seeking to set aside a 
judgment for fraud in its procurement may be 
brought after the time limit in Subdivision (b) 
for a motion to set aside a judgment. Bowen v. 
Olson, 122 Utah 66, 246 P.2d 602 (1952). 
Motion by ex-husband to order paternity 
blood test to furnish evidence on possible modi-
fication of support decree, based on fraud on 
court, was governed by time limit in this rule 
and was too late when filed 14V2 months after 
divorce decree, even though baby was unborn 
and blood test could not have been performed 
before the divorce. McGavin v. McGavin, 27 
Utah 2d 200, 494 P.2d 283 (1972)., 
—Invalid service. 
The three-months provision provided for in 
Subdivision (b) for motions to vacate a judg-
ment has no application to a judgment which is 
void because of invalid service of summons. 
Woody v. Rhodes, 23 Utah 2d 249, 461 P.2d 465 
(1969). 
Where the judgment is void because of a 
fatally defective service of process, the time 
limitations of Subdivision (b) have no applica-
tion. Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 
1986). 
—Judicial error. 
Where judgment contained no clerical error 
amendable under Subdivision (a) but may have 
contained judicial error, trial court erred in 
granting motion to amend the judgment filed 
nine years after judgment was entered, since 
the error was not corrected by timely motion 
for new trial, appeal or suit in equity. Richards 
v. Siddoway, 24 Utah 2d 314, 471 P.2d 143 
(1970). 
—Jurisdiction. 
In suit for injunction, wherein it appeared 
that parties stipulated that hearing on dam-
ages be deferred and tried later, and court 
made order that plaintiff might later file 
amended or supplemental complaint with re-
spect to issue of damages, district court did not 
lose jurisdiction of case because damage issue 
was not determined during term of court at 
which injunction was granted and no applica-
tion for relief "in furtherance of justice" was 
made within six months after term. Utah Oil 
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Ref. Co. v. District Court, 60 Utah 428, 209 P. 
624 (1922). 
—Mistake, inadvertence and neglect. 
A motion under Subdivision (b)(1) to set 
aside a default judgment on the ground of mis-
take, inadvertence, and excusable neglect of 
one's attorney, if made more than three 
months after the judgment was entered, is un-
timely and properly denied. Peck v. Cook, 29 
Utah 2d 375, 510 P.2d 530 (1973). 
—Newly discovered evidence. 
Father's petition to reopen a divorce judg-
ment, based on newly discovered evidence, to 
raise the issue of paternity of a child born dur-
ing the marriage was procedurally deficient 
and properly denied by the trial court where 
the petition was not filed within three months 
of the divorce judgment. Roche v. Roche, 696 
P.2d 647 (Utah 1979). 
—Order entered upon erroneous assump-
tion. 
A formal order signed and entered upon the 
erroneous assumption that it conformed to a 
direction of the court theretofore made after 
hearing on the merits is more than a mere in-
advertence, and can therefore be set aside more 
than three months after its entry, provided the 
motion is made within a reasonable time. 
Dixon v. Dixon, 121 Utah 259, 240 P.2d 1211. 
(1952). 
—"Reasonable time." 
Because a losing party moved to set aside the 
judgment against her within about a month 
after learning that the judgment had been en-
tered, and her ignorance of the judgment until 
that time was due in part to a lack of notice 
that the prevailing party was required to pro-
vide pursuant to Rule 58A(d), her motion was 
timely under Subdivision (b). Workman v. 
Nagle Constr., Inc., 802 P.2d 749 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
Although Utah has no statutory limitation 
period specific to adoptions, in recognition of 
the need for finality in adoption proceedings, 
court held that plaintiff's action, brought three 
and one-half years after adoption order was 
granted, was not brought within a "reasonable 
time" under Subdivision (b). Maertz v. Maeftz, 
827 P.2d 259 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
—Reconsideration of previously denied 
motion. 
Trial court committed no error by first deny-
ing a motion for summary judgment made by 
the defendant, and then upon subsequent pro-
ceedings within the time limits of Subdivision 
(b) deciding to vacate that order and reconsid-
ering and granting defendant's motion. Rees v. 
Albertson's, Inc., 587 P.2d 130 (Utah 1978). 
—Satisfaction. 
The fact of prior satisfaction of the judgment 
is an important consideration in determining 
whether a motion to modify the judgment is 
made within a reasonable time. Laub v. South 
Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 
1982). 
Unauthorized appearance. 
Wife who had been personally served with 
process but had no actual knowledge of action 
was not entitled to relief from judgment 
against her and her husband on ground that 
appearance for her by attorney retained by 
husband was without her authority. Plaintiff 
would have been entitled to default judgment 
against wife, and his position could not be 
worsened by unauthorized appearance over 
which he had no control. Brimhall v. Mecham, 
27 Utah 2d 222, 494 P.2d 525 (1972). 
Void judgment. 
—Basis. 
A judgment is void only if the court that ren-
dered it lacked jurisdiction over the subject 
matter, or over the parties or was otherwise 
incompetent to render judgment; a judgment 
based on a void stipulation may be voidable, 
but is not void within the meaning of Subdivi-
sion (b)(5). Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons, 
817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
—Lack of jurisdiction. 
It is a basic rule that a judgment is void and 
subject to collateral attack if lack of jurisdic-
tion in the court appears on the face of the 
record. Bowen v. Olson, 122 Utah 66, 246 P.2d 
602 (1952). 
Where the affidavit for publication of sum-
mons presented no evidentiary facts, a default 
judgment entered against the defendant can be 
attacked collaterally. Bowen v. Olson, 122 
Utah 66, 246 P.2d 602 (1952). 
A denial of a motion to vacate a judgment 
under Subdivision (b) is ordinarily reversed 
only for an abuse of discretion. However, when 
a motion to vacate a judgment is based on a 
claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district court 
has no discretion: if jurisdiction is lacking, the 
judgment cannot stand without denying due 
process to the one against whom it runs. State 
Dept. of Social Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130 
(Utah 1989). 
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finding of the trial court. Thatcher v. Merriam, 
121 Utah 191, 240 P.2d 266 (1952). 
Facts that some evidence of insurance agents 
inadvertently got into the record was not preju-
dicial under the circumstances of the case, es-
pecially since one of the defendants was a large 
corporation, and there was no apparent reason 
why a jury would find against an insurance 
company and not against such a defendant. 
Tuttle v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 
121 Utah 420, 242 P.2d 764 (1952). 
Where personal injury plaintiff had intro-
duced evidence as to her sales ability and her 
opportunity for success and loss of probable in-
come of $1000 per month, it was not prejudicial 
error for defendant to be allowed to show that 
plaintiff had filed for bankruptcy and had 
unpaid judgments against her. Bullock v. 
Ungricht, 538 P.2d 190 (Utah 1975). 
Affidavits regarding the jury's request for a 
dictionary to define "proximate" in order to un-
derstand "proximate cause" were admissible 
where a question existed as to whether or not 
use of the dictionary was "prejudicial." Hillier 
v. Lamborn, 740 P.2d 300 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, 
denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). 
Amendment of pleadings. 
Where the court did not find that the defen-
dant maintained an attractive nuisance as had 
been alleged in an amendment to the com-
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No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error 
or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or 
by any of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or otherwise disturb-
ing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the 
court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the 
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does 
not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
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TITLE II. *tij 
APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF~% 
TRIAL COURTS. j J 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken, Z$* 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be 
taken from a district, juvenile, or circuit court to the appellate court with, 
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as 
otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the 
trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take 
any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the 
validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court 
deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanc-> 
tions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to 
appeal from a judgment or order and their interests are such as to make 
joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an 
appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint 
appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual 
appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own 
motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the 
separate appeals. 
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as 
the appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or 
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where" 
otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the appel-
late court, the party making the original application shall be known as the 
petitioner and any other party as the respondent. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the 
party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or 
part thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from which the appeal is 
taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken. 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give 
notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy 
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the 
party is not represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last 
known address. 
(£) Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals. At the time of filing any 
notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the 
appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court such filing fees as are estab-
lished by law, and also the fee for docketing the appeal in the appellate court. 
The clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing 
and docketing fees are paid. 
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and pay-
ment of the required fees, the clerk of the trial court shall immediately trans-
mit one copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, the docket-
ing fee, and a copy of the bond required by Rule 6 or a certification by the 
clerk that the bond has been filed, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon 
receipt of the copy of the notice of appeal and the docketing fee, the clerk of 
the appellate court shall enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall be 
docketed under the title given to the action in the trial court, with the appel-
lant identified as such, but if the title does not contain the name of the appel-
lant, such name shall be added to the title. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
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' Advisory Committee Note. — The designa-
tion of parties is changed to conform to the des-
ignation of parties in the federal appellate 
courts. 
The rule is amended to make clear that the 
mere designation of an appeal as a "cross-ap-
peal" does not eliminate liability for payment 
of the filing and docketing fees. But for the 
order of filing, the cross-appellant would have 
been the appellant and so should be required to 
pay the established fees. 
ANALYSIS 
Absence of record. 
Attorney fees. 
Denial of intervention. 
Dismissal by trial court. 
Filing fees. 
Filing of notice. 
Final order or judgment. 
Judgment nunc pro tunc. 
Motion to strike. 
New trial. 
Partial judgment. 
Postjudgment orders. 
Purpose of notice. 
Review in equity cases. 
Summary judgment. 
Unsigned minute entry. 
Cited. 
Absence of record. 
There was nothing for the court to review 
where the alleged error was not made part of 
the record. Powers v. Gene's Bldg. Materials, 
Inc., 567 P.2d 174 (Utah 1977). 
Attorney fees. 
Because plaintiff was entitled to attorney 
fees by law, he was entitled to attorney fees 
incurred on appeal in defending his judgment 
without the necessity of having to file a cross 
appeal. Coates v. American Economy Ins. Co., 
627 P.2d 92 (Utah 1981); Wallis v. Thomas, 
632 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981). 
Denial of intervention. 
Order denying with prejudice an application 
for intervention was appealable. Tracy v. Uni-
versity of Utah Hosp., 619 P.2d 340 (Utah 
1980) 
Dismissal by trial court. 
Both an order to dismiss with prejudice, on 
the merits of the issues under Rule 4Kb), 
U.R.C.P., and an order of dismissal without 
prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1), U.R.C.P., are 
final adjudications of the issues and the time 
for appeal under this rule begins to run with 
the entry of the order. Sterner v. State, 27 Utah 
2d 284, 495 P.2d 809 (1972). 
Denial of defendant's motion to dismiss was 
not a final judgment subject to appeal. Little v. 
Mitchell, 604 P.2d 918 (Utah 1979). 
Dismissal without prejudice of plaintiffs ac-
tion was appealable where the trial court's rul-
ing went to the legal merits of any cause that 
plaintiff may have framed. Bowles v. State ex 
rel. DOT, 652 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1982). 
Filing fees. 
It is not the clerk's duty to file notice of ap-
peal until he has received the appropriate fil-
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective October 1,1992, inserted "and a 
copy of the bond required by Rule 6 or a certifi-
cation by the clerk that the bond has been 
filed" and made minor stylistic changes in Sub-
division (g). 
Cross-References. — Circuit courts, ap-
peals from, § 78-4-11. 
Justice courts, appeals from, § 78-5-120. 
Juvenile courts, appeals from § 78-3a=5L 
ing fee. McLain v. Conrad, 19 Utah 2d 346, 431 
P.2d 571 (1967). 
Where the notice of appeal was left at the 
clerk's office prior to the expiration of the time 
for filing but the filing fee was not paid until 
after expiration of the time for filing and the 
clerk did not file the notice until the fee was 
paid, the notice was untimely filed and the 
court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 
McLain v. Conrad, 19 Utah 2d 346, 431 P.2d 
571 (1967). 
Filing of notice. 
Where the deadline for filing an appeal ex-
pired on Saturday, the notice of appeal which 
was filed on the following Monday was within 
the time limit, in view of the provisions of 
§ 17-16=9. Transwestern Gen. Agency v. Mor-
gan, 526 P.2d 1186 (Utah 1974). 
Without notice of appeal being given, the Su-
preme Court is without jurisdiction to hear the 
matter. Yost v. State, 640 P.2d 1044 (Utah 
1981). 
The Supreme Court cannot take jurisdiction 
over an appeal which is not timely brought be-
fore it; and an untimely appeal will be dis-
missed for lack of jurisdiction. Burgers v. 
Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982); Bowen v. 
Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982); Nel-
son v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 390 (Utah 1983). 
Mailing a notice of appeal to the clerk of the 
court does not constitute a "filing" of the notice 
of appeal under this rule. Isaacson v. Dorius, 
669 P.2d 849 (Utah 1983). 
Final order or judgment. 
An oral finding of contempt of court and sen-
tence of 15 days in the county jail, with 10 days 
suspended, was not a final judgment from 
which an appeal could have been taken. 
Hinkins v. Santi, 25 Utah 2d 324, 481 P.2d 53 
(1971). 
In the case of a divorce decree which did not, 
by its terms, become a final judgment until 
three months after it was entered, appeal had 
nonetheless to be taken within one month of 
the decree, which was the last proceeding nec-
essary before the judgment became final. 
Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 546 P.2d 888 (Utah 
1976). 
A judgment is final when it ends the contro-
versy between the parties litigant. Salt Lake 
City Corp. v. Layton, 600 P.2d 538 (Utah 
1979). 
Order finding person in contempt was an ap-
pealable order. Salzetti v. Backman, 638 P.2d 
543 (Utah 1981). 
District court orders requiring party to con-
vey property in accordance with divorce decree 
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were final orders and thus appealable where 
the effect of such orders was to determine sub-
stantial rights in the property and to terminate 
finally the litigation surrounding it. Cahoon* v. 
Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140 (Utah 1982). 
Where the order appealed from was not final 
and was not certified nor eligible for certifica-
tion under Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P., the appeal was 
not properly taken, and the remedy was dis-
missal of the appeal. A.J. Mackay Co. v. 
Okland Constr. Co., 817 P.2d 323 (Utah 1991). 
Judgment nunc pro tunc. 
A judgment nunc pro tunc has no effect on 
the time for appeal from that judgment and 
cannot be used to reduce the time, or defeat the 
right, to take an appeal. Utah State Bldg. Bd. 
v. Walsh Plumbing Co., 16 Utah 2d 249, 399 
P.2d 141 (1965). 
Where judgment was entered on April 2 but 
the judgment recited that it was entered nunc 
pro tunc as of February 24, this latter recital 
had no effect upon the time for appeal and ap-
peal could be taken by filing notice within the 
required time from April 2. Utah State Bldg. 
Bd. v. Walsh Plumbing Co., 16 Utah 2d 249, 
399 P.2d 141 (1965). 
Motion to strike. 
Order granting plaintiffs motion to strike 
defendant's pleadings is not a final order or 
judgment, and is not appealable. Nielsen v. 
Nielsen, 529 P.2d 803 (Utah 1974). 
Where defendant petitioned court for modifi-
cation of a divorce decree and alternatively 
alledged in the petition that the decree should 
be vacated and set aside, the granting of defen-
dant's motion for modification fully satisfied 
his claim and his alternative claim became 
moot, so that the court's granting of a motion 
to strike the motion to vacate and set aside was 
meaningless and no appeal would lie there-
from. Peay v. Peay, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980). 
New trial. 
An order granting a new trial is not a final 
judgment; it only sets aside the verdict and 
places the parties in the same position as if 
there had been no previous trial. Haslam v. 
Paulsen, 15 Utah 2d 185, 389 P.2d,736 (1964). 
Order denying a motion for a new trial was 
not appealable. Habbeshaw v. Habbeshaw, 17 
Utah 2d 295, 409 P.2d 972 (1966). 
Partial judgment. 
Where the real issue before the court was 
whether mountain ground belonged to dece-
dent's estate or to his widow and the decree 
decided the issue against the widow, the fact 
that the court retained, jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate further matters did not leave open for re-
consideration the question as to who owned the 
property, and the decree entered was final and 
appealable and became conclusive in the ab-
sence of a timely appeal. In re Voorhees' Es-
tate, 12 Utah 2d 361, 366 P.2d 977 (1961). 
Where plaintiffs complaint contained eight 
causes of action, court's judgment on merits as 
to one cause with reservation of jurisdiction 
and judgement as to other causes was not a 
final judgment from which an appeal could be 
taken. J.B.& R.E. Walker, Inc. v. Thayn, 17 
Utah 2d 120, 405 P.2d 342 (1965). 
Where court granted one defendant's motion 
to dismiss with prejudice and entered default 
judgment in favor of that defendant on his 
counterclaim, but action against other defen-
dants and one defendant's counterclaim re-
mained alive, court's order was not final and 
an appeal from it would be dismissed. Kennedy 
v. New Era Indus., Inc., 600 P.2d 534 (Utah 
1979). 
A judgment that disposes of fewer than all of 
the causes of action alleged in the plaintiffs 
complaint is not a final judgment from which 
an appeal may be taken. Salt Lake City Corp. 
v. Layton, 600 P.2d 538 (Utah 1979). 
A partial summary judgment is not gener-
ally a final judgment and hence it is not ap-
pealable under the limitations prescribed by 
this rule. South Shores Concession, Inc. v. 
State, 600 P.2d 550 (Utah 1979). 
District court order setting aside certain pro-
visions in a default decree of divorce and pro-
viding for a further hearing on the matter was 
not a final ruling from which an appeal could 
be taken. Pearson v. Pearson, 641 P.2d 103 
(Utah 1982). 
Postjudgment orders. 
An order vacating a judgment is not a final 
order from which an appeal can be taken pur-
suant to this rule. Van Wagenen v. Walker, 
597 P.2d 1327 (Utah 1979). 
The final judgment rule does not preclude 
review of postjudgment orders; such orders 
were independently subject to the test of final-
ity, according to their own substance and ef-
fect. Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140 (Utah 
1982). 
Purpose of notice. 
The object of a notice of appeal is to advise 
the opposite party that an appeal has been 
taken from a specific judgment in a particular 
case. Nunley v. Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 15 
Utah 2d 126, 388 P 2d 798 (1964). 
Review in equity cases. 
In the appeal of an equity case, the Supreme 
Court may weigh the facts as well as review 
the law, but will reverse on the facts only when 
the evidence clearly preponderates against the 
findings of the trial court. Crimmins v. 
Simonds, 636 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981). 
In reviewing trial court's findings of fact in 
equity cases, the Supreme Court would give 
due deference to the trial court's decision and 
reverse only when the evidence clearly prepon-
derated against the trial court's findings. 
Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150 (Utah 1981). 
Summary judgment. 
Order setting aside summary judgment was 
not final judgment from which aggrieved per-
son might appeal as matter of right. Jensen v. 
Nielsen, 22 Utah 2d 23, 447 P.2d 906 (1968). 
Order denying a motion for summary judg-
ment was not a final order and was not appeal-
able. Denison v. Crown Toyota Motors, Inc., 
571 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1977). 
A summary judgment in favor of one defen-
dant alone is not a final judgment where the 
action against the remaining defendant re-
mains alive. Neider v. State DOT, 665 P.2d 
1306 (Utah 1983). 
Unsigned minute entry. 
An unsigned minute entry did not constitute 
377 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 4 
an entry of judgment, nor was it a final judg- An unsigned minute entry does not consti-
ment for purposes of appeal Wilson v Man- tute a final order for purposes of appeal. State 
ning, 645 P 2d 655 (Utah 1982); Utah State v. Crowley, 737 P 2d 198 (Utah 1987). 
Tax ComnVn v. Erekson, 714 P.2d 1151 (Utah
 n.. . „ , T o t o n o j c o t 
1986); Sather v. Gross, 727 P.2d 212 (Utah ^ t l a ^ S ** ^ III p ?,l 
1986) Ahlstrora v. Anderson, 728 P2d 979 Utah 1991); Boggs v. Boggs, 824 R2d 478 
(Utah 1986) ( U t a h C t APP 1 9 9 1 ) -
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Appealability of order suspending 
imposition or execution of sentence, 51 
A.L.R.4th 939. 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order* In a case in which an appeal 
is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial 
court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible 
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of 
entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judg-
ment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional 
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be re-
quired if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the 
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all 
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting 
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) 
under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judg-
ment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for 
all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or grant-
ing or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the 
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of 
appeal must ber filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of 
the order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in 
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of 
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a 
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date 
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excus-
able neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal 
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the 
prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires. 
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given 
to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. 
No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the 
date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
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ANALYSIS 
Attorney fees. 
Cross-appeal. 
Extension of time to appeal. 
Filing of notice. 
Filing with county clerk. 
Final order or judgment. 
Post-judgment motions. 
Premature notice. 
Reconsideration of order. 
Timeliness of notice. 
—Date of notice. 
Cited. 
Attorney fees. 
No cross-appeal is necessary where plaintiffs 
merely sought attorney's fees incurred in de-
fending their judgment on appeal. Wallis v. 
Thomas, 632 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981). 
Cross-appeal. 
Subdivision (d) requires that a notice of 
cross-appeal be timely filed. Absent a cross-ap-
peal, a respondent may not attack the judg-
ment of the court below. Henretty v. Manti 
City Corp., 791 P.2d 506 (Utah 1990) (decided 
under former R. Utah S. Ct. 4). 
Extension of time to appeal. 
Neither Rule 6(b), U.R.C.P, granting the 
court power to extend a time limit where a fail-
ure to act in time is due to excusable neglect 
generally, nor Rule 60(b)(1), U.R.C.P., autho-
rizing the court to relieve from final judgment 
for inadvertence or excusable neglect, applies 
where a notice of appeal has not been timely 
filed. Holbrook v. Hodson, 24 Utah 2d 120, 466 
P.2d 843 (1970). 
A party could not extend the time for filing 
an appeal simply by filing a "Motion for Recon-
sideration of Order Striking Petition and Mo-
tion for Relief from Final Judgment." Peay v. 
Peay, 607 P 2d 841 (Utah 1980). 
When the question of "excusable neglect" 
arises in a jurisdictional context, as opposed to 
a nonjurisdictional context, the standard con-
templated thereby is a strict one; it is not 
meant to cover the usual excuse that the law-
yer is too busy, but is to cover emergency situa-
tions only. Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel 
Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984). 
The time for filing an appeal is jurisdictional 
and ordinarily cannot be enlarged. State v. 
Montoya, 825 P.2d 676 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Filing of notice. 
The mailing of a notice of appeal was not 
equivalent to a filing of notice of appeal. 
Isaacson v. Dorius, 669 P.2d 849 (Utah-1983). 
Filing with county clerk. 
Filing with the county clerk was not a timely 
filing with the juvenile court, where there was 
no indication when the clerk transmitted a 
copy of the notice of appealto the juvenile 
court, and the original was returned to appel-
lant's counsel. State, In re M.S., 781 P.2d 1287 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Final order or judgment 
Where the trial court signed two different 
judgments but neither party served his pre-
pared judgment on the other party before sub-
mitting it to the court, the filing of either judg-
ment would be erroneous, and an appeal taken 
from either is premature because the judg-
ments are not properly "final." Larsen v. 
Larsen, 674 P.2d 116 (Utah 1983). 
Juvenile court's order for temporary confine-
ment in a youth facility for observation and 
assessment prior to a final disposition was not 
a final order, for purposes of appeal, because it 
did not finally dispose of all issues, including 
the rights of the juvenile and/or his mother's 
rights as parental custodian. State, In re 
T.D.C., 748 P.2d 201 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, de-
nied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
An unsigned minute entry is not a final 
judgment for purposes of appeal. A judgment, 
tolled by a timely post-judgment motion, starts 
to run on the date when the trial court enters 
its first signed order denying the motion. 
Gallardo v. Bohnder, 800 P.2d 816 (Utah 
1990). 
Post-judgment motions. 
Where a post-judgment motion was timely 
filed under Rule 59(a)(6), U.R.C.P., to upset the 
judgment, and notices of appeal from the judg-
ment were filed after the motion was made, but 
before the disposition of the motion, the motion 
rendered the notices of appeal ineffective, and 
notice of appeal had to be filed within the re-
quired time from the date of the entry that 
disposed of the motion. U-M Invs. v. Ray, 658 
P.2d 1186 (Utah 1982). 
The time for appeal of an order confirming 
an arbitrator's award runs from the order 
denying appellant's timely motion to alter or 
amend that judgment under Rule 59, U.R.C.P. 
Robinson & Wells v. Warren, 669 P.2d 844 
(Utah 1983). 
The Supreme Court may not consider an ap-
peal from the dismissal of a complaint for 
unpaid overtime compensation until the trial 
court has had an opportunity to review the or-
der in question by ruling on all pending post-
judgment motions. Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc., 
694 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1984). 
A notice of appeal filed before the disposition 
of a proper post-judgment motion is ineffective 
to confer jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court. 
Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v Hafen, 723 
P.2d 425 (Utah 1986); DeBry v. Fidelity Nat'l 
Title Ins. Co., 828 P 2d 520 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). 
Filing a post-judgment motion of a type 
listed in this rule suspends the finality of the 
judgment, and a notice of appeal filed prior to , 
disposition of such a motion by entry of a 
signed order is not effective to confer jurisdic- _ 
tion on an appellate court. Anderson v. j 
Schwendiman, 764 P.2d 999 (Utah Ct. App. -
1988). 
Filing of an "exception to order and motion I 
for reconsideration" of summary judgment 
tolled the thirty-day time period within which 
to file a notice of appeal, notwithstanding the 
incorrect title placed upon the pleading, since 
the judge ruled on the motion as if it were a 
motion for a new trial. Watkiss & Campbell v. 
Foa & Son, 808 P 2d 1061 (Utah 1991). 
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Premature notice. 
A notice of appeal filed after a ruling on a 
motion to alter or amend a judgment has been 
announced, but before the entry of an order 
disposing of the motion, is premature and does 
not confer jurisdiction on the court Anderson 
v Schwendiman, 764 P 2d 999 (Utah Ct App 
1988) 
Reconsideration of order. 
The Court of Appeals declined to reconsider 
and overrule its prior denial of the state s re-
quest to dismiss an appeal as untimely State 
v Yates, 765 P 2d 251 (Utah Ct App 1988) 
Timeliness of notice. 
Notice of appeal filed within the required pe-
riod from date of entry of order of contempt was 
filed timely and Supreme Court had junsdic 
tion to hear appeal concerning the contempt 
order Burgers v Maiben, 652 P 2d 1320 (Utah 
1982) 
An untimely motion for a new trial had no 
effect on the running of the time for filing a 
notice of appeal Burgers v Maiben, 652 P 2d 
1320 (Utah 1982) 
Case was temporarily remanded to the juve-
nile court in order to allow that court to make 
a determination whether an order extending 
the time for appeal should be entered by the 
juvenile court under this rule, when it was not 
apparent whether the notice of appeal was ei 
ther timely filed or deemed timely filed by the 
juvenile court State In re M S , 781 P 2d 1287 
(Utah Ct App 1989) 
Where plaintiff, one day after the voluntary 
withdrawal of its motion for directed verdict, 
filed a notice of appeal and also moved for an 
extension of time in which to file a notice of 
appeal, the notice of appeal was timely filed, 
irrespective of whether the order granting ad 
ditional time for filing had a nunc pro tunc 
effect Guardian State Bank v Stangl 778 
P2d 1 (Utah 1989) 
Notice of appeal placed in tne prison mail by 
an incarcerated criminal defendant within the 
30-day period set forth in this rule was not 
timely, where the notice was filed in the dis-
trict court more than 30 days after entry of the 
judgment being appealed State v Palmer, 777 
P 2d 521 (Utah Ct App 1989) 
By using the disjunctive or n Subdivision (c) 
clearly allows the notice of appeal to be filed 
after the announcement of either a decision a 
judgment, or an order Decision" is broadly 
defined to cover final judgments, interlocutory 
orders, or "the first step leading to a judg-
ment," and includes a trial court's determina-
tion of guilt City of St George v Smith, 814 
P2d 1154 (Utah Ct App 1991), overruled on 
other grounds City of St George v Smith 828 
P2d 504 (Utah Ct App 1992) 
Appellants notice of appeal which was filed 
after the announcement of the derision of guilt 
but before sentencing, was timely filed under 
Subdivision (c) City of St George v Smith, 
814 P 2d 1154 (Utah Ct App 1991), overruled 
on other grounds City of St George v Smith, 
828 P2d 504 (Utah Ct App 1992) 
—Date of notice 
In determining whether a notice of appeal is 
timely filed and establishes jurisdiction in an 
appellate court, the appellate court is bound by 
the filing date on the notice of appeal transmit 
ted to it by the trial court State In re M S , 781 
P 2d 1287 (Utah Ct App 1989) 
Cited in Neermgs v Utah State Bar, 817 
P 2d 320 (Utah 1991) Wiggins v Board of Re 
view, 824 P2d 1199 (Utah Ct App 1992) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — When will premature notice of ap 
peal be retroactively validated in federal civil 
case, 76 A L R Fed 199 
Rule 5. Discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders. 
(a) Petition for permission to appeal. An appeal from an interlocutory 
order may be sought by any party by filing a petition for permission to appeal 
from the interlocutory order with the clerk of the appellate court with jurisdic-
tion over the case within 20 days after the entry of the order of the trial court, 
with proof of service on all other parties to the action A timely appeal from an 
order certified under Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that the 
appellate court determines is not final may, in the discretion of the appellate 
court, be considered by the appellate court as a petition for permission to 
appeal an interlocutory order The appellate court may direct the appellant to 
file a petition that conforms to the requirements of paragraph (c) of this rule 
(b) Fees and copies of petition. The petitioner shall file with the Clerk of 
the Supreme Court an original and seven copies of the petition, or, with the 
Clerk of the Court of Appeals, an original and four copies, together with the 
fee for filing a notice of appeal m the trial court and the docketing fee in the 
appellate court If an order is issued authorizing the appeal, the clerk of the 
appellate court shall immediately give notice of the order by mail to the 
respective parties and shall transmit a certified copy of the order, together 
with a copy of the petition and filing fee, to the trial court where the petition 
and order shall be filed in lieu of a notice of appeal If the petition is denied, 
the filing fee shall be refunded 
863 OPERATION OF THE COURTS Rule 4-505 1 
(2) The affidavit must also separately state hours by persons other than 
attorneys, for time spent, work completed and hourly rate billed 
(3) If judgment is being taken by default for a principal sum which it is 
expected will require considerable additional work to collect, the following 
phrase may be included in the judgment after an award consistent with the 
time spent to the point of default judgment, to cover additional fees incurred 
in pursuit of collection. 
"AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THIS JUDGMENT 
SHALL BE AUGMENTED IN THE AMOUNT OF REASONABLE 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES EXPENDED IN COLLECTING 
SAID JUDGMENT BY EXECUTION OR OTHERWISE AS SHALL 
BE ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT " 
(4) Attorneys' fees may be awarded pursuant to this rule or pursuant to 
Rule 4-505 1 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990, May 1, 1993) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- The 1993 amendment effective May 1, 1993, 
ment inserted be filed with the court and" in rewrote Subdivision (4), which had read "Judg-
Subdivision (1), deleted the former Subdivision ments for attorney's fees should not be 
(2), requiring descriptions of fee arrangements awarded except as they conform to the provi-
other than hourly rates, added the designation sions of this rule and to state statute and case 
(2) to the former last sentence of Subdivision * a w " 
(1), and in Subdivision (4) inserted the subdivi-
sion designation and the phrase beginning 
"and" at the end 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Information required. hours spent to prosecute the claim, and some 
The party seeking attorney fees is not re affirmation that the fees charged are reason-
quired to specify the hourly rate billed by each able m light of comparable legal services are 
attorney working on the case m order to com- included m the affidavit submitted by the 
ply fully with Subdivision (1) So long as the party requesting the fees, there is no failure to 
legal basis of the award, the nature of the work comply with the rule LMV Leasing, Inc v 
performed by the attorneys, the number of Conhn, 805 P 2d 189 (Utah Ct App 1991) 
Rule 4-505.1. Awards of attorneys' fees in civil default 
judgments with a principal amount of $5,000 or 
less. 
Intent: 
To provide for uniformity m awards of attorneys' fees in civil default judg-
ments with a principal amount of $5,000 or less 
To provide for notice of the amount of attorneys' fees that may be awarded 
in the event of default 
Applicability: 
This rule shall govern awards of attorneys' fees in civil default judgments 
with a principal amount of $5,000 or less in which the claimant elects to seek 
an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to this rule 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) When reasonable attorneys' fees are provided for by contract or statute 
and the claimant elects to seek an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to this 
rule, such fees shall be computed as follows 
Principal Amount of Judgment, Attorneys' Fees 
Exclusive of Costs, Between. Allowed 
$ 0 00 $ 700 00 $150 00 
700 01 900 00 175 00 
900 01 1,000 00 200 00 
1,000 01 1,500 00 250 00 
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Principal Amount of Judgment, 
Exclusive of Costs, 
1,500.01 
2,000.01 
2,500.01 
3,000.01 
3,500.01 
4,000.01 
4,500.01 
Between: 
2,000.00 
2,500.00 
3,000.00 
3,500.00 
4,000.00 
4,500.00 
5,000.00 
Attorneys' Fees 
Allowed 
325.00 
400.00 
475.00 
550.00 
625.00 
700.00 
775.00 
(2) Reference to this rule and the amount of attorneys' fees allowed pursu-
ant to paragraph (1) shall be stated with particularity in the body or prayer of 
the complaint. 
(3) When a statute provides the basis for the award of attorneys' fees, refer-
ence to the statutory authority shall be included in the complaint. 
(4) Clerks may enter civil default judgments which include attorneys' fees 
awarded pursuant to this rule. 
(5) Attorneys' fees awarded pursuant to this rule may be augmented after 
judgment pursuant to Rule 4-505. When the court considers a motion for 
augmentation of attorneys' fees awarded pursuant to this rule, it shall con-
sider the attorneys' time spent prior to the entry of judgment, the amount of 
attorneys' fees included in the judgment, and the statements contained in the 
affidavit supporting the motion for augmentation. 
(6) Prior to entry of a judgment which grants attorneys' fees pursuant to 
this rule, any party may move the court to depart from the fees allowed by 
paragraph (1) of this rule. Such application shall be made pursuant to Rule 
4-505. 
(7) If a contract or other document provides for an award of attorneys' fees, 
an original or copy of the document shall be made a part of the file before 
attorneys' fees may be awarded pursuant to this rule. 
(8) No affidavit for attorneys' fees need be filed in order to receive an award 
of attorneys' fees pursuant to this rule. 
(Added effective March 31, 1992.) 
Rule 4-506- Withdrawal of counsel in civil cases . 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure and criteria for withdrawal of counsel in 
civil cases. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to all counsel in civil proceedings in trial courts of 
record except guardians ad litem and court-appointed counsel. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Consistent with the Rules of Professional Conduct, an attorney may 
withdraw as counsel of record without the approval of the court except when 
(a) a motion has been filed and is pending before the court or (b) a certificate of 
readiness for trial has been filed. Under these circumstances, an attorney mayr 
not withdraw except upon motion and order of the court. :c 
(2) When an attorney withdraws as counsel of record, written notice of the 
withdrawal must be served upon the client of the withdrawing attorney and 
upon all other parties not in default and a certificate of service must be filed 
with the court. If a trial date has been set, the notice of withdrawal served 
upon the client shall include a notification of the trial date. 
(3) When an attorney dies or is removed or suspended or withdraws from 
the case or ceases to act as an attorney, opposing counsel must notify, in 
writing, the unrepresented client of his/her responsibility to retain another 
attorney or appear in person before opposing counsel can initiate further 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Rule U 
and Federalizing Lawyer Ethics, 1991 B.Y.U-
L. Rev. 959. 
Rule 1.3. Diligence. 
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in represent-
ing a client. 
COMMENT 
A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of 
a client despite opposition, obstruction or pe r 
sonal inconvenience to the lawyer and ma/ 
take whatever lawful and ethical measures ar^ 
required to vindicate a client's cause or en' 
deavor. A lawyer should act with commitment 
and dedication to the interests of the client an<J 
with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf' 
However., a lawyer is not bound to oress CQ<" 
every advantage that might be realized for # 
client. A lawyer has professional discretion if* 
determining the means by which a matte*" 
should be pursued. See Rule 1.2. A lawyer's 
work load should be controlled so that eac^ 
matter can be handled adequately. 
Clients resent professional procrastination* 
A client's interests often can be adversely af' 
fected by the passage of time or the change of 
conditions; in extreme instances, as when £ 
lawyer overlooks a statute of limitations, th# 
client's legal position may be destroyed. Ever1 
when the client's interests are not affected ifi 
substance, however, unreasonable delay car* 
cause a client needless anxiety and undermine 
confidence in the lawyer's trustworthiness. 
Unless the relationship is terminated as pro-
vided in Rule 1.14, a lawyer should carry 
through to conclusion all matters undertaken 
for a client. If a lawyer's employment is limited 
to a specific matter, the relationship termi-
nates when the matter has been resolved. If a 
lawyer has served a client over a substantial 
period in a variety of matters, the client some-
times may assume tiiat tiie lawyer will con-
tinue to serve on a continuing basis unless the 
lawyer gives notice of withdrawal. Doubt about 
whether a client-lawyer relationship still 
exists should be clarified by the lawyer, prefer-
ably in writing, so that the client will not mis-
takenly suppose the lawyer is looking after the 
client's affairs when the lawyer has ceased to 
do so. For example, if a lawyer has handled a 
judicial or administrative proceeding that pro-
duced a result adverse to the client but has not 
been specifically instructed concerning pursuit 
of an appeal, the lawyer should advise the cli-
ent of the possibility of appeal before relin-
quishing responsibility for the matter. 
CODE COMPARISON 
DR 6-10HAX3) required that a lawyer no* 
"[nleglect a legal matter entrusted to him." EC 
6-4 stated that a lawyer should ngive approprr 
ate attention to his legal work." Canon 7 stated 
that "a lawyer should represent a client zeal' 
ously within the bounds of the law." D# 
7-101(A)(1) provided that a lawyer "shall not 
intentionally ... fail to seek the lawful objec-
tives of his client through reasonably available 
means permitted by law and the Disciplinary 
Rules ...." DR 7-10KAX3) provided that a law-
yer "shall not intentionally ... [prejudice or 
damage his client during the course of the pro-
fessional relationship " 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Negligence, inattention, or profes-
sional incompetence of attorney in handling 
client's affairs in personal injury or property 
damage actions as ground for disciplinary ac-
tion — modern cases, 68 A.L.R.4th 694. 
Negligence, inattention, or professional in-
competence of attorney in handling client's af-
fairs in criminal matters as ground for disci-
plinary action — modern cases, 69 A.L.R.4th 
410. ;, 
Negligence, inattention, or professional in- . 
competence of attorney in handling client's af-
fairs in bankruptcy matters as ground for disci- i 
plinary action — modern cases, 70 A.L.R.4th 
786. 
Legal malpractice in handling or defending
 v 
medical malpractice claim, 78 A.L.R.4th 725 ,. 
Rule 1.4. Communication. 
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a 
matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information. 
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to 
enable the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. 
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COMMENT 
The client should have sufficient information 
to participate intelligently in decisions con-
cerning the objectives of the representation 
and the means by which they are to be pur-
sued, to the extent the client is willing and 
able to do so. For example, a lawyer negotiat-
ing on behalf of a client should provide the cli-
ent with facts relevant to the matter, inform 
the client of communications from another 
party and take other reasonable steps that per-
mit the client to make a decision regarding a 
serious offer from another party. A lawyer who 
receives from opposing counsel an offer of set-
tlement in a civil controversy or a proffered 
plea bargain in a criminal case shall promptly 
inform the client of its substance unless prior 
discussions with the client have left it clear 
that the proposal will be unacceptable. See 
Rule 1.2(a). Even when a client delegates au-
thority to the lawyer, the client should be kept 
advised of the status of the matter. 
Adequacy of communication depends in part 
on the kind of advice or assistance involved. 
For example, in negotiations where there is 
time to explain a proposal, the lawyer should 
review all important provisions with the client 
before proceeding to an agreement. In litiga-
tion, a lawyer should explain the general strat-
egy and prospects of success and ordinarily 
should consult the client on tactics that might 
injure or coerce others. On the other hand, a 
lawyer ordinarily cannot be expected to de-
scribe trial or negotiation strategy in detail. 
The guiding principle is that the lawyer should 
fulfill reasonable client expectations for infor-
mation, whether written or oral, consistent 
with the duty to act in the client's best interest 
and the client's overall requirements as to the 
character of representation. 
Ordinarily, the information to be provided is 
that appropriate for a client who is a compre-
hending and responsible adult. However, fully 
informing the client according to this standard 
may be impracticable, for example, where the 
client is a child or suffers from mental disabil-
ity. When the client is an organization or 
group, it is often impossible or inappropriate to 
inform every one of its members about its legal 
affairs; ordinarily, the lawyer should address 
communications to the appropriate officials of 
the organization. Where many routine matters 
are involved, a system of limited or occasional 
reporting may be arranged with the client. 
Practical exigency may also require a lawyer 
to act for a client without prior consultation. 
Withholding Information 
In some circumstances, a lawyer may be jus-
tified in delaying transmission of information 
when the client would be likely to react 
imprudently to an immediate communication. 
Thus, a lawyer might withhold a psychiatric 
diagnosis of a client when the examining psy-
chiatrist indicates that disclosure would harm 
the client. A lawyer may not withhold informa-
tion to serve the lawyer's own interest or con-
venience. Rules or court orders governing liti-
gation may provide that information supplied 
to a lawyer may not be disclosed to the client. 
Rule 3.4(c) directs compliance with such rules 
or orders. 
CODE COMPARISON 
"should exert his best efforts to insure that de-
cisions of his client are made only after the 
client has been informed of relevant consider-
ations." EC 9-2 stated that "a lawyer should 
fully and promptly inform his client of mate-
rial developments m the matters being han-
dled for the client." 
Rule 1.4 has no direct counterpart m the Dis-
ciplinary Rules of the Code. DR 6-10KAX3) 
provided that a lawyer shall not "[nleglect a 
legal matter entrusted to him." DR 9-102(B)(l) 
provided that a lawyer shall rrlp]romptly notify 
a client of the receipt of his funds, securities, or 
other properties." EC 7-8 stated that a lawyer 
Rule lo5. Fees. 
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge or collect an 
illegal or clearly excessive fee. A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review 
of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and 
firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to be 
considered as guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the 
following: 
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the ques-
tions involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service prop-
erly; 
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the 
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; 
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal ser-
vices; | 
(4) The amount involved and tne results obtained; 
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; 
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the 
client; 
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ent, he is peculiarly susceptible to the charge 
that he unduly influenced or overreached the 
client. If a client voluntarily offers to make a 
gift to his lawyer, the lawyer may accept the 
gift, but before doing so, he should urge that 
the client secure disinterested advice from an 
independent, competent person who is cogni-
zant of all the circumstances. Other than in 
exceptional circumstances, a lawyer should in-
sist that an instrument in which his client de-
sires to name him beneficially be prepared by 
another lawyer selected by the client." 
Paragraph (d) is substantially similar to DR 
5-104(B), but refers to "literary or media" 
rights, a more generally inclusive term than 
"publication" rights. 
A.L.R. — Attorney's assertion of retaining 
lien as violation of ethical code or rules govern-
ing professional conduct, 69 A.L.R.4th 974. 
After termination of a client-lawyer relation-
ship, a lawyer may not represent another cli-
ent except in conformity with this Rule. The 
principles in Rule 1.7 determine whether the 
interests of the present and former client are 
adverse. Thus, a lawyer could not properly 
seek to rescind on behalf of a new client a con-
tract drafted on behalf of the former client. So 
also a lawyer who has prosecuted an accused 
person could not properly represent the ac-
cused in a subsequent civil action against the 
government concerning the same transaction. 
The scope of a "matter" for purposes of Rule 
1.9(a) may depend on the facts of a particular 
situation or transaction. The lawyer's involve-
ment in a matter can also be a question of de-
gree. When a lawyer has been directly involved 
in a specific transaction, subsequent represen-
tation of other clients with materially adverse 
interests clearly is prohibited. On the other 
hand, a lawyer who recurrently handled a type 
of problem for a former client is not precluded 
from later representing another client in a 
wholly distinct problem of that type even 
though the subsequent representation involves 
a position adverse to the prior client. Similar 
considerations can apply to the reassignment 
Paragraph (e)(1) is similar to DR 5-103(B), 
but eliminates the requirement that "the client 
remains ultimately liable for such expenses."4 
Paragraph (e)(2) has no counterpart in the' 
Code. ": j# 
Paragraph (f) is substantially identical to 
DR 5-107CAX1).
 x^ 
Paragraph (g) is substantially identical to 
DR 5-106. J 
The first clause of paragraph (h) is similar to 
DR 6-102(A). There was no counterpart in the 
Code to the second clause of paragraph (h). 
Paragraph (i) has no counterpart in the 
Code. 
Paragraph (j) is substantially identical to DR 
5-103(A). 
What items of client's property or funds are 
not subject to attorney's retaining lien, 70 
A.L.R.4th 827. 
of military lawyers between defense and prose-
cution functions within the same military ju-
risdiction. The underlying question is whether 
the lawyer was so involved in the matter that 
the subsequent representation can be justly re-
garded as a changing of sides in the matter in 
question. 
Information acquired by the lawyer in the 
course of representing a client may not subse-
quently be used by the lawyer to the disadvan-
tage of the client. However, the fact that a law-
yer has once served a client does not preclude 
the lawyer from using generally known infor-
mation about the client when later represent-
ing another client. 
Disqualification from subsequent represen-
tation is for the protection of clients and can be 
waived by them. A waiver is effective only if 
there is disclosure of the circumstances, includ-
ing the lawyer's intended role in behalf of the 
new client. 
With regard to an opposing party's raising a 
question of conflict of interest, see Comment to„ 
Rule 1.7. With regard to disqualification of a 
firm with which a lawyer is associated, see 
Rule 1.10. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Rule 1.9. Conflict of Interest: Former Client. 
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not there-
after: 
(a) Represent another person in the same or a substantially factually 
related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to 
the interests of the former client unless the former client consents after 
consultation; or 
(b) Use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage 
of the former client except as Rule 1.6 would permit with respect to a 
client or when the information has become generally known. 
COMMENT 
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CODE COMPARISON 
There was no counterpart to paragraphs (a) 
and (b) in the Disciplinary Rules of the Code. 
The problem addressed in paragraph (a) was 
sometimes dealt with under the rubric of 
Canon 9 of the Code, which provided: "A law-
yer should avoid even the appearance of impro-
priety." EC 4-6 stated that the "obligation of a 
lawyer to preserve the confidences and secrets 
of his client continues after the termination of 
his employment." 
The provision m paragraph (a) for waiver by 
the former client is similar to DR 5-105(0= 
Definition of "Firm" 
For purposes of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, the term "firm" includes lawyers in a 
private firm and lawyers employed in the legal 
department of a corporation or other organiza-
tion, or in a legal services organization. 
Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm 
within this definition can depend on the spe-
cific facts. For example, two practitioners who 
share office space and occasionally consult or 
assist each other ordinarily would not be re-
garded as constituting a firm. However, if they 
present themselves to the public m a way sug-
gesting that they are a firm or conduct them-
selves as a firm, they should be regarded as a 
firm for purposes of the Rules. The terms of 
any formal agreement between associated law-
yers are relevant m determining whether they 
are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual 
access to confidential information concerning 
the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is rele-
vant in doubtful cases to consider the underly-
ing purpose of the rule that is involved. A 
group of lawyers could be regarded as a firm 
for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer 
should not represent opposing parties in litiga-
tion, while it might not be so regarded for pur-
The exception in the last sentence of para-
graph (b) permits a lawyer to use information 
relating to a former client that is in the "public 
domain," a use that was not prohibited by the 
Code, which protected only "confidences and 
secrets." Since the scope of paragraph (a) is 
much broader than "confidences and secrets," 
it is necessary under the Rules to define when 
a lawyer may make use of information about a 
client after the client-lawyer relationship has 
terminated. 
poses of the rule that information acquired by 
one lawyer is attributed to another. 
With respect to the law department of an 
organization, there is ordinanly no question 
that the members of the department constitute 
a firm within the meaning of the Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct. However, there can be un-
certainty as to the identity of the client. For 
example, it may not be clear whether the law 
department of a corporation represents a sub-
sidiary or an affiliated corporation, as well as 
the corporation by which the members of the 
department are directly employed. A similar 
question can arise concerning an unincorpo-
rated association and its local affiliates. 
Similar questions can also arise with respect 
to lawyers in legal aid. Lawyers employed in 
the same unit of a legal service organization 
constitute a firm, but not necessarily those em-
ployed in separate units. As in the case of inde-
pendent practitioners, whether the lawyers 
should be treated as associated with each other 
can depend on the particular rule that is in-
volved and on the specific facts of the situation. 
Where the lawyer has joined a private firm 
after having represented the government, the 
situation is governed by Rule 1.11(a) and (b); 
where a lawyer represents the government af-
ter having served private clients, the situation 
Rule 1.10. Imputed Disqualification: General Rule. 
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly 
represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited 
from doing so by Rule 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.2. 
(b) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may not know-
ingly represent a person in the same or a substantially factually related mat-
ter in which that lawyer, or a firm with which the lawyer has associated, had 
previously represented a client whose interests are materially adverse to that 
person and about whom the lawyer had acquired information protected by 
Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to the matter. 
(c) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm is 
not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially 
adverse to those of a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer 
unless: 
(1) The matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the 
formerly associated lawyer represented the client; and 
(2) Any lawyer remaining in the firm has information protected by 
Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to the matter. 
(d) A disqualification prescribed by this Rule may be waived by the affected 
client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7. 
COMMENT 
CODE COMPARISON 
With regard to paragraph (a), DR 9-102(A) 
provided that "funds of clients" are to be kept 
in an identifiable bank account in the state in 
which the lawyer's office is situated. DR 
9-102(B)(2) provided that a lawyer shall "iden-
tify and label securities and properties of a cli-
ent and place them m . safekeeping " 
DR 9-102(B)(3) required that a lawyer "main-
tain complete records of all funds, securities, 
and other properties of a client ...." Rule 
A.L.R. — Attorney's assertion of retaining 
hen as violation of ethical code or rules govern-
ing professional conduct, 69 A.L.R.4th 974. 
A lawyer should not accept representation in 
a matter unless it can be performed compe-
tently, promptly, without improper conflict of 
interest and to completion. 
Mandatory Withdrawal 
A lawyer ordinarily must decline or with-
draw from representation if the client demands 
that the lawyer engage in conduct that is ille-
gal or violates the Rules of Professional Con-
1 13(a) extends these requirements to property 
of a third person that is in the lawyer's posses-
sion in connection with the representation. 
Paragraph (b) is substantially similar to DR 
9-102(B)(l), (3) and (4) 
Paragraph (c) is similar to DR 9-102(A)(2), 
except that the requirement regarding dis-
putes applies to property concerning which an 
interest is claimed by a third person as well as 
by a client. 
duct or other law The lawyer is not obliged to 
decline or withdraw simply because the client 
suggests such a course of conduct; a client may 
make such a suggestion in the hope that a law-
yer will not be constrained by a professional 
obligation. 
When a lawyer has been appointed to repre-
sent a client, withdrawal ordinarily requires 
approval of the appointing authority. See also 
Rule 6.2. Difficulty may be encountered if 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Rule 1.14. Declining or Terminating Representation. 
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has com-
menced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if: 
(1) The representation will result in violation of the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct or other law; 
(2) The lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs the 
lawyer's ability to represent the client; or 
(3) The lawyer is discharged. 
(b) A lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if withdrawal can be 
accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client or 
if: 
(1) The client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's ser-
vices that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent; 
(2) The client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or 
fraud; 
(3) A client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer con-
siders repugnant or imprudent; 
(4) The client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer 
regarding the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning 
that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled; 
(5) The representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden 
on the lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or 
(6) Other good cause for withdrawal exists. 
(c) This Rule is not violated by a lawyer who continues representation 
when ordered to do so by a tribunal, notwithstanding good cause for terminat-
ing the representation. 
(d) Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the 
extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, 
surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding 
any advance payment of fee that has not been earned. The lawyer may retain 
papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law. 
COMMENT 
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withdrawal is based on the client's demand 
that the lawyer engage in unprofessional con-
duct. The court may wish an explanation for 
the withdrawal, while the lawyer may be 
bound to keep confidential the facts that would 
constitute such an explanation. The lawyer's 
statement that professional considerations re-
quire termination of the representation ordi-
narily should be accepted as sufficient. 
Discharge 
A client has the right to discharge a lawyer 
at any time, with or without cause, subject to 
liability for payment for the lawyer's services. 
Where future dispute about the withdrawal 
may be anticipated, it may be advisable to pre-
pare a written statement reciting the circum-
stances 
Whether a client can discharge appointed 
counsel may depend on applicable law. A client 
seeking to do so should be given a full explana-
tion of the consequences. These consequences 
may include a decision by the appointing au-
thority that appointment of successor counsel 
is unjustified, thus requiring the client to rep-
resent himself. 
Optional Withdrawal 
A lawyer may withdraw from representation 
in some circumstances. The lawyer has the op-
tion to withdraw if it can be accomplished 
without material adverse effect on the client's 
interests. Withdrawal is also justified if the cli-
ent persists in a course of action that the law-
yer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudu-
With regard to paragraph (a), DR 2-109(A) 
provided that a lawyer "shall not accept em-
ployment ... if he knows or it is obvious that 
[the prospective client] wishes to ... [bjring a 
legal action ... or otherwise have steps taken 
for him, merely for the purpose of harassing or 
maliciously injuring any person ...." Nor may 
a lawyer accept employment if he is aware that 
the prospective client wishes to "[p]resent a 
claim or defense ... that is not warranted un-
der existing law, unless it can be supported by 
good faith argument for an extension, modifi-
cation, or reversal of existing law." DR 
2-110(B) provided that a lawyer "shall with-
draw from employment ... if: 
"(1) He knows or it is obvious that his client 
is bringing the legal action ... or is otherwise 
having steps taken for him, merely for the pur-
pose of harassing or maliciously injuring any 
person. 
w(2) He knows or it is obvious that his con-
tinued employment will result in violation of a 
Disciplinary Rule. 
"(3) His mental or physical condition ren-
ders it unreasonably difficult for him to carry 
out the employment effectively. 
"(4) He is discharged by his client." 
With regard to paragraph (b), DR 2-110(0 
permitted withdrawal regardless of the effect 
on the client if: 
"(1) His client: (a) Insists upon presenting a 
claim or defense that is not warranted under 
existing law and cannot be supported by good 
lent, for a lawyer is not required to be associ-
ated with such conduct even if the lawyer does 
not further it. Withdrawal is also permitted if 
the lawyer's services were misused in the past. 
even if that would materially prejudice the cli-i. 
ent. The lawyer also may withdraw where the'-
client insists on a repugnant or imprudent 
objective. 
A lawyer may withdraw if the client refuses 
to abide by the terms of an agreement relating 
to the representation, such as an agreement 
concerning fees or court costs or an agreement 
limiting the objectives of the representation. 
Assisting the Client Upon Withdrawal 
Even if the lawyer has been unfairly dis-
charged by the client, a lawyer must take all 
reasonable steps to mitigate the consequences 
to the client. The lawyer may retain papers as 
security for a fee only to the extent permitted 
by law. 
Whether or not a lawyer for an organization 
may under certain unusual circumstances 
have a legal obligation to the organization af-
ter withdrawing or being discharged by the or-
ganization's highest authority is beyond the 
scope of these Rules. 
Compliance with Applicable Court Rule 
Regarding Withdrawal 
When a lawyer is representing a client in a 
matter before the courts and the lawyer seeks 
to withdraw from the matter under these rules, 
the lawyer should consult applicable court 
rules regarding procedures for withdrawal. 
faith argument for an extension, modification, 
or reversal of existing law; (b) Personally seeks 
to pursue an illegal course of conduct; (c) In-
sists that the lawyer pursue a course of conduct 
that is illegal or that is prohibited under the 
Disciplinary Rules; (d) By other conduct ren-
ders it unreasonably difficult for the lawyer to 
carry out his employment effectively; (e) In-
sists, in a matter not pending before a tribunal, 
that the lawyer engage in conduct that is con-
trary to the judgment and advice of the lawyer 
but not prohibited under the Disciplinary 
Rules; (f) Deliberately disregards an agree-
ment or obligation to the lawyer as to expenses 
and fees. 
"(2) His continued employment is likely to 
result in a violation of a Disciplinary Rule. 
"(3) His inability to work with co-counsel in-
dicates that the best interests of the client 
likely will be served by withdrawal. 
"(4) His mental or physical condition ren-
ders it difficult for him to carry out the employ-
ment effectively. 
"(5) His client knowingly and freely assents 
to termination of his employment. 
"(6) He believes in good faith, in a proceed-
ing pending before a tribunal, that the tribunal 
will find the existence of other good cause for 
withdrawal." 
With regard to paragraph (c), DR 2-110(A)(1) 
provided: "If permission for withdrawal from 
employment is required by the laws of the tri-
CODE COMPARISON 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2 
J, the lawyer shall not withdraw . 
jit its permission." 
.. with- The provisions of paragraph (d) are substan-
tially identical to DR 2-110(A)(2) and (3). 
Counselor 
tule 2.1. Advisor. 
fin representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional 
augment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer 
Jot only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and 
olitical factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation. 
COMMENT 
Scope of Advice 
P'A client is entitled to straightforward advice 
expressing the lawyer's honest assessment. Le-
gal advice often involves unpleasant facts and 
alternatives that a client may be disinclined to 
confront. In presenting advice, a lawyer en-
deavors to sustain the client's morale and may 
put advice in as acceptable a form as honesty 
permits. However, a lawyer should not be de-
terred ficom giving candid advice by the pros-
pect that the advice will be unpalatable to the 
client. 
^Advice couched in narrowly legal terms may 
fie of little value to a client, especially where 
practical considerations, such as costs or effects 
on other people, are predominant. Purely tech-
nical legal advice, therefore, can sometimes be 
inadequate. It is proper for a lawyer to refer to 
relevant moral and ethical considerations in 
giving advice. Although a lawyer is not a 
moral advisor as such, moral and ethical con-
siderations impinge upon most legal questions 
and may decisively influence how the law will 
be applied. 
['A client may expressly or impliedly ask the 
lawyer for purely technical advice. When such 
a1 request is made by a client experienced in 
legal matters, the lawyer may accept it at face 
value. When such a request is made by a client 
inexperienced in legal matters, however, the 
lawyer's responsibility as advisor may include 
indicating that more may be involved than 
strictly legal considerations. 
Matters that go beyond strictly legal ques-
tions may also be in the domain of another pro-
fession. Family matters can involve problems 
within the professional competence of psychia-
try, clinical psychology or social work; business 
matters can involve problems within the com-
petence of the accounting profession or of fi-
nancial specialists. Where consultation with a 
professional in another field is itself something 
a competent lawyer would recommend, the 
lawyer should make such a recommendation. 
At the same time, a lawyer's advice at its best 
often consists of recommending a course of ac-
tion in the face of conflicting recommendations 
of experts. 
Offering Advice 
In general, a lawyer is not expected to give 
advice until asked by the client. However, 
when a lawyer knows that a client proposes a 
course of action that is likely to result in sub-
stantial adverse legal consequences to the cli-
ent, duty to the client under Rule 1.4 may re-
quire that the lawyer act if the client's course 
of action is related to the representation. A 
lawyer ordinarily has no duty to initiate inves-
tigation of a client's affairs or to give advice 
that the client has indicated is unwanted, but a 
lawyer may initiate advice to a client when 
doing so appears to be in the client's interest. 
CODE COMPARISON 
- There was no direct counterpart to this Rule 
in the Disciplinary Rules of the Code. DR 
5-107(B) provided that a lawyer "shall not per-
mit a person who recommends, employs, or 
pays him to render legal services for another to 
direct or regulate his professional judgment in 
rendering such legal services." EC 7-8 stated 
that M[a]dvice of a lawyer to his client need not 
be confined to purely legal considerations — 
In assisting his client to reach a proper deci-
sion, it is often desirable for a lawyer to point 
out those factors which may lead to a decision 
that is morally just as well as legally permissi-
ble In the final analysis, however, ... the 
decision whether to forego legally available 
objectives or methods because of non-legal fac-
tors is ultimately for the client " 
Rule 2.2. Intermediary. 
(a) A lawyer may act as intermediary between clients if: 
(1) The lawyer consults with each client concerning the implications of 
the common representation, including the advantages and risks involved, 
and the effect of the attorney-client privileges, and obtains each client's 
consent to the common representation; and 
(2) The lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be resolved on 
terms compatible with the client's best interest, that each client will be 
able to make adequately informed decisions in the matter and that there 
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Applicable Constitutional Provisions and Statutes 
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Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 
319. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi-
cial Decisions — Criminal Law, 1988 Utah L. 
Rev. 177. 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury § 7 et 
seq. 
C.J.S. — 50 CJ.S. Juries § 9 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Driving while intoxicated or simi-
lar offense, right to trial by jury in criminal 
prosecution for, 16 A.L.R.3d 1373. 
Right in equity suit to jury trial of counter-
claim involving legal issue, 17 A.L.R.3d 1321. 
Issues in garnishment as triable to court or 
to jury, 19 A.L.R.3d 1393. 
Automobiles: validity and construction of 
legislation authorizing revocation or suspen-
sion of operator's license for "habitual," "per-
sistent," or "frequent" violations of traffic reg-
ulations, 48 A.L.R.4th 367. 
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state 
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747. 
Paternity proceedings: right to jury trial, 51 
A.L.R.4th 565. 
Right to jury trial in action for retaliatory 
discharge from employment, 52 A.L.R.4th 
1141. 
Right to jury trial in state court divorce pro-
ceedings, 56 A.L.R.4th 955. 
Jury trial rights in, and on appeal from, 
small claims court proceeding, 70 A.L.R.4th 
1119. 
Key Numbers. — Jury «» 9 et seq. 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person 
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this 
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
History: Const 1896. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Action under Civil Rights Act of 1871. 
Actions by court. 
Actions by state. 
Actions not created. 
Arbitration Act. 
Assignments. 
Attorneys' duties. 
Criminal law. 
—Suspension of execution of death sentence. 
Debt collection. 
District court jurisdiction. 
Election contest. 
Forum non conveniens. 
Injury or damage to property. 
Intoxicating liquor. 
Land Registration Act. 
Limitations. 
—Limitations of actions. 
—Statutory limitation of review. 
Occupational disease law. 
Sovereign immunity. 
Torts. 
—Action by wife against husband. 
—Loss of consortium. 
Unlicensed law practice. 
Waiver of rights. 
Workmen's compensation law. 
Cited. 
Action under Civil Rights Act of 1871. 
Jurisdiction over actions brought under the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. 1981 et 
seq., is vested originally in the federal courts, 
but the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by 
state courts is not thereby prohibited; in view 
of the provisions of this section, therefore, it 
was error for trial court to dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction otherwise proper action brought 
under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d 
625 (Utah 1977). 
Trial court would not err in dismissing ac-
tion brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on the 
ground of forum non conveniens in a proper 
case, but such dismissal should be without 
prejudice so that the plaintiff might move his 
suit to another forum without harm to his 
claim. Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d 625 (Utah 
1977). 
Actions by court. 
Court of equity has jurisdiction to open pro-
bate proceeding and to proceed against bond of 
administratrix where she has practiced extrin-
sic fraud on the court. Weyant v. Utah Sav. & 
Trust Co., 54 Utah 181, 182 P. 189, 9 A.L.R. 
1119 (1919). 
Actions by state. 
This section did not alter the law with re-
spect to certain rights which are vested in the 
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state, which alone can exercise sovereign 
powers; therefore, it does not prevent the state 
from reserving to itself the sole right to bring 
actions for the dissolution of building and loan 
associations. Union Sav. & Inv. Co. v. District 
Court, 44 Utah 397, 140 P. 221, 1917A Ann. 
Cas. 821 (1914). 
Actions not created. 
This section does not create new rights, or 
give new remedies where none otherwise are 
given, but places a limitation upon Legislature 
to prevent that branch of the state government 
from closing the doors of the courts against any 
person who has a legal right which is enforce-
able in accordance with some known remedy. 
Therefore, where no right of action is given or 
no remedy exists, under either the common law 
or some statute, this section creates none. 
Brown v. Wightman, 47 Utah 31, 151 P. 366, 
1916A L.R.A. 1140 (1915). 
Arbitration Act. 
The amendment of the arbitration statute to 
permit valid and enforceable agreements for 
arbitration of future disputes does not violate 
this section. Lindon City v. Engineers Constr. 
Co., 636 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1981). 
Assignments. 
In action for dairy products sold, plaintiff 
who was assignee of claim could bring action 
thereon even if claim was assigned for purpose 
of having action brought thereon. Perkes v. 
Utah Idaho Milk Co., 85 Utah 217, 39 P.2d 308 
(1934). 
Attorneys' duties. 
This section means that courts are open for 
the purpose of having any order or judgment 
assailed in the proper manner and at the 
proper time, so that attorney with reasonable 
cause may act in good faith and challenge an 
order he believes to be in excess of the court's 
jurisdiction. In re Thomas, 56 Utah 315, 190 P. 
952 (1920). 
Criminal law. 
—Suspension of execution of death sen-
tence. 
Former section providing that no judge, tri-
bunal, or officer other than those mentioned 
therein could suspend execution of judgment of 
death except sheriff as provided in succeeding 
sections with reference to inquiry as to insan-
ity of defendant did not violate this section. 
State ex reL Johnson v. Alexander, 87 Utah 
376, 49 R2d 408 (1935). 
Debt collection. 
To collect past-due claim in court is right 
guaranteed by Constitution. Karenius v. Mer-
chants' Protective Ass'n, 65 Utah 183, 235 P. 
880 (1925). 
District court jurisdict ion 
The district courts are courts of general ju-
risdiction, and have original jurisdiction in all 
matters, civil and criminal, not excepted and 
prohibited by the Constitution. Brady v. 
McGonagle, 57 Utah 424, 195 P. 188 (1921). 
District courts are courts of original jurisdic-
tion having jurisdiction in all matters not pro-
hibited by law or the Constitution, but one dis-
trict court cannot exercise power or control 
over another. Nielson v. Schiller, 92 Utah 137, 
66 P.2d 365 (1937). 
Election contest. 
There is no intimation herein that courts are 
given power to pass on purely political ques-
tions, but it is clearly stated that courts are 
always open for the enforcement of such rights 
and redress of such wrongs as from time imme-
morial have been considered as proper for 
courts to consider. The power to consider politi-
cal questions and the vindication of rights 
growing out of or incidental to such questions 
is not an inherent power of the courts. Courts 
can exercise powers respecting political mat-
ters only to the extent and in the manner pro-
vided by legislature, and election contest is not 
within jurisdiction of court of equity in absence 
of statute. Ewing v. Harries, 68 Utah 452, 250 
P. 1049 (1926). 
Forum non conveniens. 
Utah state courts may apply doctrine of 
forum non conveniens to actions arising under 
Federal Employers' Liability Act. Mooney v. 
Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 118 Utah 307, 221 P.2d 
628 (1950). 
While courts have inherent power to refuse 
to exercise their jurisdiction when convinced 
that to do so would work hardship on some or 
all the litigants, the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens should be invoked only where it ap-
pears that plaintiff has selected an inconve-
nient forum for the purpose of annoying and 
harassing defendant, or where factors such as 
the location of the principal parties, ease of ac-
cess to proof, availability of witnesses, etc., so 
strongly preponderate in favor of holding the 
trial somewhere else that to deny a motion to 
dismiss would work great hardship on defen-
dant. Summa Corp. v. Lancer Indus. Inc., 559 
P.2d 544 (Utah 1977). 
Injury or damage to property. 
A right of action exists for any injury or 
damage to private property, and neither the 
legislature nor municipalities can interfere 
with that right. Lewis v. Pingree Nat'l Bank, 
47 Utah 35, 151 P. 558, 1916C L.R.A. 1260 
(1915). 
Intoxicating liquor. 
The liquor nuisance sections of the former 
Liquor Control Act did not contravene this sec-
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tion. Riggins v. District Court, 89 Utah 183, 51 
P.2d 645 (1935). 
Depriving a holder of a state liquor store 
lease of his liquor store without notice, hear-
ing, or any judicial review offends against both 
the guarantee of due process and the guarantee 
of access to the courts. Celebrity Club, Inc. v. 
Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 657 P.2d 1293 
(Utah 1982). 
Land Registration Act. 
The Torrens Act was not unconstitutional as 
conferring judicial powers on registrar of titles. 
Ashton-Jenkins Co. v. Bramel, 56 Utah 587, 
192 P. 375, 11 A.L.R. 752 (1920). 
Limitations. 
Former Section 78-15-3, a limitations provi-
sion in the Utah Product Liability Act which 
barred actions without regard to when an in-
jury occurred and was not designed to provide 
a reasonable time within which to file a law-
suit, was unconstitutional because it violated 
this section and the constitutional prohibition 
against abrogation of wrongful death actions. 
Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 
P.2d 670 (Utah 1986) 
The former architects and builders statute of 
repose (§ 78-12-25.5) was unconstitutional un-
der this section because it did not provide an 
injured person with an effective and reason-
able alternative remedy for vindication of his 
or her constitutional interest, and abrogation 
of the remedy was arbitrary and unreasonable. 
Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm 
Hughes & Son, 782 P.2d 188 (Utah 1989). 
The former Utah architects and builders 
statute of repose (§ 78-12-25.5) was unconsti-
tutional under this section because it denied a 
remedy for injury to one's person or property 
caused by a latent defect. Horton v. 
Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 
1989). 
Subsection 78-12-25(3), which provides a 
four-year statute of limitations on "an action 
for relief not otherwise provided by law," does 
not violate this section. McHenry v. Utah 
Valley Hosp., 724 F. Supp. 835 (D. Utah 1989). 
—Limitation of actions. 
This section does not preclude the legislature 
from prescribing a statute of limitations for 
time within which to assail the regularity or 
organization of an irrigation district. Horn v. 
Shaffer, 47 Utah 55, 151 P. 555 (1915). 
—Statutory limitation of review. 
Former act authorizing improvement dis-
tricts for water or sewage systems did not vio-
late this section on the ground that it limited 
or prohibited review by the courts. Tygesen v. 
Magna Water Co., 119 Utah 274, 226 P.2d 127 
(1950). 
Occupational disease law. 
Occupational Disease Disability Law, in ex-
cluding compensation for partial disability 
from silicosis, and in rendering remedy under 
that act exclusive so as to abrogate common-
law right of action therefor, was not unconsti-
tutional as depriving employee of his remedy 
by due course of law for injury done to his per-
son. Masich v. United States Smelting, Ref. & 
Mining Co., 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612, ap-
peal dismissed, 335 U.S. 866, 69 S. Ct. 138, 93 
L. Ed. 411 (1948). 
Sovereign immunity. 
Sovereign immunity is not unconstitutional 
under this section. Madsen v. Borthick, 658 
P.2d 627 (Utah 1983). 
Torts. 
—Action by wife against husband. 
Doctrine of interspousal tort immunity does 
not bar wife's action against husband for the 
intentional infliction of personal injuries. 
Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590 (Utah 1980). 
—Loss of consortium. 
The Married Women's Act of 1898 (§ 30-2-4) 
was a reasonable legislative enactment in-
tended and reasonably tailored to place men 
and women on equal footing with respect to 
their ability to bring actions for their own inju-
ries and to extinguish the concept that a wife 
was the property of her husband. If, in the pro-
cess, the husband's right to sue for loss of his 
wife's consortium, which may have never ex-
isted in Utah, was abolished, that abolition 
was not an unreasonable step. Cruz v. Wright, 
765 P.2d 869 (Utah 1988). 
Unlicensed law practice. 
This section does not render unconstitutional 
statute making practice of law without a li-
cense a crime. Legislature has the power to 
declare acts of unauthorized practice of law to 
be illegal, and to punish violations thereof by 
fine and imprisonment. But the right to appear 
in person and prosecute or defend a cause to 
which one is a party cannot be abrogated ei-
ther by the Legislature or the courts. Nelson v. 
Smith, 107 Utah 382, 154 P.2d 634,157 A.L.R. 
512 (1944). 
Waiver of rights. 
Right to apply to courts for redress of wrong 
is substantial right, and will not be waived by 
contract except through unequivocal language. 
Bracken v. Dahle, 68 Utah 486, 251 P. 16 
(1926). 
Workmen's compensation law. 
Employers are entitled to have recourse to 
courts under Workmen's Compensation Act 
concerning question of their ultimate liability. 
Industrial Comm'n v. Evans, 52 Utah 394, 174 
P. 825 (1918). 
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Workmen's Compensation Act is not invalid 
because it delegates to industrial commission 
the power to hear{ consider and determine con-
troversies between litigants as to ultimate lia-
bility, or their property rights. Utah Fuel Co. 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 57 Utah 246, 194 P. 122 
(1920). 
Dependents of employee killed by acts of 
third party, a stranger to employment, are not 
Utah Law Review. — No-Fault Automobile 
Insurance in Utah — State Constitutional Is-
sues, 1970 Utah L. Rev. 248. 
Comment, The Defense of Entrapment: Next 
Move — Due Process? 1971 Utah L. Rev. 266. 
Comment, The Scope of Fourteenth Amend-
ment Due Process: Counsel in Prison Disciplin-
ary Proceedings, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 275. 
Comment, The Utah Supreme Court and the 
Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 
319. 
Outdoor Sports and Torts: An Analysis of 
Utah's Recreational Use Act, 1988 Utah L. 
Rev. 47. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi-
cial Decisions — Constitutional Law, 1990 
Utah L. Rev. 129. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitu-
tional Law §§ 613 to 617. 
C.J.S. — 16D C.J.S. Constitutional Law 
§§ 1428 to 1437. 
A.L.R. — Exclusion of public from state 
History: Const 1896. 
Cross-References. — Rights of defendants, 
statutory provisions, § 77-1-6. 
limited to recovery under Workmen's Compen-
sation Act exclusively, unless they have as-
signed their rights to insurance carrier. Robin-
son v. Union Pac. R.R., 70 Utah 441, 261 P. 9 
(1927). 
Cited in Wrolstad v. Industrial Comm'n, 786 
P.2d 243 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
criminal trial in order to preserve confidential-
ity of undercover witness, 54 A.L.R.4th 1156. 
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial 
in order to prevent disturbance by spectators or 
defendant, 55 A.L.R.4th 1170. 
Exclusion of public from state criminal trial 
in order to avoid intimidation of witness, 55 
A.L.R.4th 1196. 
"False light invasion of privacy—defenses 
and remedies, 57 A.L.R.4th 244. 
Imputation of criminal, abnormal, or other-
wise offensive sexual attitude or behavior as 
defamation—post-New York Times cases, 57 
A.L.R.4th 404. 
Libel or slander: defamation by statement 
made in jest, 57 A.L.R.4th 520. 
Defamation: designation as scab, 65 
A.L.R.4th 1000. 
Intentional spoliation of evidence, interfer-
ing with prospective civil action, as actionable, 
70 A.L.R.4th 984. 
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law 
«=» 322, 324, 327, 328. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment.] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
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Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
History: Proposed by Congress on June 16, 
1866; declared to have been ratified by three-
fourths of all the states on July 28, 1868. 
AMENDMENT XV 
Section Section 
1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not 2. [Power to enforce amendment] 
to disqualify.] 
Section 1, [Right of citizens to vote•— Race or color not to 
disqualify,] 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude. 
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legisla-
tion. 
History: Proposed by Congress on February more than three-fourths of all the states on 
27, 1869; declared to have been ratified by March 30, 1870. 
AMENDMENT XVI 
[Income tax,] 
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from 
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, 
and without regard to any census or enumeration. 
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78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — Filing 
fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term of appointment 
to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is until the first general election 
held more than three years after the effective date of the appointment. There-
after, the term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and 
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the date of elec-
tion. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon request of the Judicial 
Council, until a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding judge of 
the Court of Appeals shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per 
annum or fraction thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three 
judges. Assignment to panels shall be by random rotation of all judges of the 
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection 
of a chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from 
among the members of the court by majority vote of all judges. The term of 
office of the presiding judge is two years and until a successor is elected. A 
presiding judge of the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than 
two successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for an acting 
presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of presiding judge 
by majority vote of all judges of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties 
of a judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial 
Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for the Supreme 
Court. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, enacted by L. ficeofajudgeof the Court of Appeals is 6 years 
1986, ch. 47, § 45; 1988, ch. 248, § 7. and until a successor is appointed and ap-
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- proved under Section 20-1-7.1," into the 
ment, effective April 25, 1988, in Subsection present third and fourth sentences and made 
(1), divided and rewrote the former third sen-
 m i n o r stylistic changes, 
tence, which read "Thereafter, the term of of-
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The. Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Ser-
vice Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of 
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
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(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies; and 
(h) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involv-
ing a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, in-
cluding, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988, 
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch. 
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5; 1990, ch. 224, § 3; 
1991, ch. 268, § 22. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment by ch 73, effective April 25, 1988, in-
serted subsection designations (a) and (b) in 
Subsection (1); inserted "resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings" m Subsection (2)(a), 
substituted "state agencies" for "state and local 
agencies" in Subsection (2)(a), substituted "in-
formal adjudicative proceedings of the agen-
cies" for "them" in Subsection (2)(a), deleted 
"notwithstanding any other provision of law" 
at the end of Subsection (2)(a); inserted Subsec-
tion (b), redesignated former Subsections (2)(b) 
to (2)(h) as Subsections (2)(c) to (2)(i); added 
"except those from the small claims depart-
ment of a circuit court" at the end of Subsec-
tion (2)(d); and made minor stylistic changes. 
The 1988 amendment by ch 210, effective 
April 25, 1988, added Subsection (2)(h) and re-
designated former Subsection (2)(h) as Subsec-
tion (2)(i) 
The 1988 amendment by ch 248, effective 
April 25, 1988, m Subsection (2)(a), rewrote 
the phrase before "except" which had read "the 
final orders and decrees of state and local agen-
cies or appeals from the district court review of 
them", deleted "notwithstanding any other 
provision of law" at the end of Subsection 
(2)(a), inserted present Subsection (2)(b\ desig-
nated former Subsections (2)(b) to (2)(h) as 
Subsections (2)(c) to (2)(i), and substituted 
"first degree or capital felony" for "first or capi-
tal degree felony" m present Subsection (2)(f) 
The 1990 amendment by ch 80, effective 
April 23, 1990, rewrote Subsection (2)(g), 
which read "appeals from orders on petitions 
for extraordinary writs involving a cnminal 
conviction, except those involving a first de-
gree or capital felony" and made punctuation 
changes in Subsections (2)(h) and (3) 
The 1990 amendment by ch 224, effective 
April 23, 1990, inserted the subdivision desig-
nation (l) m Subsection (2)(b) and added Sub-
section (2)(b)(n), and made related stylistic 
changes. 
The 1991 amendment, effective January 1, 
1992, substituted "a court of record" for "dis-
trict court" in Subsection (2)(f) 
Cross-References. — Composition and ju-
risdiction of military court, §§ 39-6-15, 
39-6-16 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Habeas corpus proceedings. 
Post-conviction review. 
Scope. 
—Sentence reduction. 
Cited. 
Habeas corpus proceedings. 
The language of Subsection (2)(g) is suffi-
ciently broad to include those cases where a 
criminal conviction is involved in a habeas 
corpus proceeding challenging extradition. 
Hernandez v. Hayward, 764 P.2d 993 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
The Court of Appeals lacked original appel-
late jurisdiction of an appeal from the denial of 
an extraordinary writ involving an interstate 
transfer of a prisoner which bore no relation to 
his underlying criminal conviction, except that 
%tbut f&r" the conviction, he wou)d not have 
been incarcerated in Arizona and then trans-
ferred to Utah. Ellis v. DeLand, 783 P.2d 559 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Appeal from the denial of a petition for writ 
of habeas corpus was properly before the Court 
of Appeals, where the writ challenged the post-
conviction actions of the board of pardons and 
did not challenge the conviction in the trial 
court or the sentence, and the fact that defen-
dant was serving a sentence for a first-degree 
felony did not require a transfer to the Su-
preme Court under the circumstances. North-
ern v. Barnes, 814 P.2d 1148 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Constitu-
tional Law, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 129. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-4, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 47. 
^ost-conviction review. 
Post-conviction review may be used to attack 
^ conviction in the event of an obvious injustice 
Or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a con-
stitutional right in the trial. Gomm v. Cook, 
754 P.2d 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Scope. 
This statute defines the outermost limits of 
Appellate jurisdiction, allowing the Court of 
Appeals to review agency decisions only when 
the legislature expressly authorizes a right of 
Review. It is not a catchall provision authoriz-
ing the court to review the orders of every ad-
ministrative agency for which there is no stat-
ute specifically creating a right to judicial re-
View. DeBry v. Salt Lake County Bd. of Ap-
peals, 764 P.2d 627 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
^-Sentence reduction. 
When a conviction is reduced under 
§ 76-3-402, the appeal lies in the court having 
Jurisdiction of the degree of crime recorded in 
%e judgment of conviction and for which de-
fendant is sentenced, rather than the degree of 
crime charged in the information or found in 
the verdict. State v. Doung, 813 P.2d 1168 
(Utah 1991). 
Cited in Scientific Academy of Hair Design, 
Inc. v. Bowen, 738 P.2d 242 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987); In re Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988); State v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496 (Utah 
Qt. App. 1990); Johanson v. Fischer, 808 P.2d 
1083 (Utah 1991); Heinecke v. Department of 
Commerce, 810 P.2d 459 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of Appeals shall 
be by petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. 
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